ally, he demanded that since Yugoslavia _ Was a less developed country industrial- jy, Hungary’s entire industry shout be ‘Subordinated to Yugoslavia’s ecernemic Policy, although this was to the detrie. ment of Hungarian interests.

He regarded me, Palffy and Antal Rob as the guarantee of this. Similarly he in- formed me through Rankovic that he had no objections to supporters of Ferenc Nagy who had fled to the west, and Several right social democrats taking Part in the government. Thus, Tito’s plan €nvisaged a right coalition government.

Plots in other democracies

Both Rankovic and Mrazovic informed me, on Rankovic’s instructions, of Tito’s _ Words that he was not only thinking of “armed support” of intervention in Hun- gary; but was also trying ‘to create favorable conditions for similar actions in the People’s Democracies bordering on Hunganvy.

This policy was connected with the Serious movements against the govern- Ments of Poland and Czechoslovakia Similar to the political actions initiated _by Mindszenty. With regard to Bul- 8aria, Tito stated that national resent- ment could be fomented and a reaction- ary policy pursued ‘on the national question that would have serious con- Sequences.

Describing the policy of the bloc, Ran-

' Kovie told me in Paks that they would Make short shrift of Albania. They Would not only colonize Albania, but cut _ Short her existence ag. an independent Country and would annex hen territory to Yugoslavia.

Most important was Tito’s plan for as- Sistance to monarcho-fascist Greece. When I spoke to Rankovie in Paks he told me there was no sense in concealing any longer their policy with regard to Greece. It was in their interests that the United States should strengthen its base there as soon ag possible in agree- Ment with them, that is, with Tito and his associates.

That is why Yugoslavia would, at first Covertly and later more and more open- ly, follow the course of isolating demo- ratic Greece from the other people’s demoratic countries, so that the monar- _Chist forces could smash it. Rankovic Went.on to say that parallel with the Hun- arian events and using the same meth- Sod as in Hungary, they would encourage their supporters in the other People’s Democracies to become politically active, using approximately the same categories of reactionary forces enumerated with regard to Hungary.

He said that while the U.S. would put Out provocations against the Soviet Union

at the time of the putsch, in order to -

tie its hands, they for their part would attend to. various small and large scale disorders in the People’s Democracies to Make the confusion complete. Their ultimate aim in these People’s Democ- racies. was the overthrow of power and the restoration of capitalism.

Another fascist on stand

' After Rajk had finished his evidence the accused Palffy took his place in the

dock. Palffy is a onfirmed fasist, a fact _ he did not conceal at the trial. : Palffy was the chief of the military ©

Part of the conspiracy. The Tito clique Tegarded this former officer of the Hor- thy army as their man and had prom- ised him the post of Hungary war min- ister, From 1945 Palffy was in the ser- Vice of the Yugoslav Intelligence Ser- Vice, regularly supplying it with secret documents,

On Rankovic’s instructions he deliber- ately staffed the army and the border _ troops with reactionary officers, bitter enemies of the People’s Democracy. Pal- ffy was in the confidence of the Yugo- Slav leaders and he knew a great deal about their plans.

In the autumn of 1947, Palffy met Col-

- Mel Nedeljkovic, one of Tito’s men, at the Congress of Partisans in Rome. Nedeljkovic had been sent specially to 8ive Palffy the necessary information. n the course of his conversation, with

Palffy he repeatedly stressed that he |

Was talking on behalf of. Tito.

‘He spoke of the plans, which had the @greement of the United States, to wrest the People’s Democracies from the de- Mocratic camp, headed by the USSR. Nedeljkovic assured Palffy that Tito’s aims would materialize since they had the backing of the United States.

Questioned by the chairman, Palffy told of ‘his links with official representatives of the Yugoslav government in Hungary who under cover of their diplomatic passpports, developed extensive activil ties. Brankov, counsellor to the Yugo- slav Embassy in Budapest, and the mili- tary attaches, Colonels Lozic and Djo- kail, received highly important data

. from. Palffy personally: In the summer

of 1947, Palffy told Rajk that it was necessary to seize power at all costs. Rajk decided to get Rankovic’s advice.

Palffy said: on his return from his holiday in Yugoslavia, Rajk told me of Rankovic’s instructions. These amounted to an armed putsch, with the support of the U.S.

In October, 1948, Palffy taking ad- vantage of his position as chief of the border troops, helped to arrange an il- legal meeting between Rankovic and Rajk. The latter afterwards told Paffly of the assignments given him by Ran- kovic.

Reveals putsch plans

Chairman: What was the essence of Rankovic’s plan?

Palffy: Rajk told me that, according to Rankovic’s plan, the putsch was to be staged on a day when Rakosi, Gero and Farkas were in Budapest, that is, when there was a meeting of the Politi- cal Bureau, or a session of the Council of Minisiters. The beginning of the putsch was timed for 28.00 hours, or la- ter when all three would certainly have returned home. Upon verifying this, groups of twelve men each were to at- tack the guards, disarm them and ar rést the aforementioned people.

I had detailed conversations with Kor- ondy on this matter. This was in April, 1949, just a few days before May Ist. Ko- rondy had already been informed by Rajk of his assignment, but I discussed the details with him. After I had -told him about the above-mentioned tasks he informed me that he had gendarmes at present serving in the police and the army who could be formed, into groups to assassinate Rakosi, Gero and Farkas.

Thereupon I told him that Rankovic had promised Djokail and Rajk his as- sistance in this matter. Rankovic said that before the putsch they would send across the border Yugoslavs of Hungari- an origin, in Hungarian army and police uniforms so that they would be at hand as specialists—but actually as hired as- sassins.I told Korondy that he could rely on Yugoslav support and that he would be given a special detachment to carry out this measure.

Paiffy, further stated that the putsch did not come off not because of any ‘fault of theirs. The Hungarian govern- ment tightened its security measures and the criminals were arrested.

Dr. Alapi, chairman of the public pro- secutor’s office, asked Palffy what he knew of the preparations to overthrow the people’s democratic order in ‘the other people’s Democracies.

Palffy replied that the subversive ac- tivities of the Tito clique were conduct- ed in all the People’s Democracies. Ned-

-elkovic informed me of this.

How Tito clique operated

The accused Brankov, told the court of the Tito clique’s undermining work. Colonel Tsitsmil was the original organ- izer of the Yugoslav military mission in Budapest and personally received his instructions from Tito and Rankovic con- cerning the mission’s method of work.

These instructions were to organize an Intelligence Service, to establish close contact with the Anglo - American rep- resentatives and to avoid falling under the influence of the Soviet representa- tives in the Allied Control Commission. During the war, Tsitsmil had close con- tact with Anglo-American Intelligence Service officers in Yugoslavia and after

the war handed over to them all the

necessary information. Tsitsmil has been promoted now—Tito has appointed him ambassador to London.

Brankov stated that they were given

categoric instructions by Rankovic to employ all means in pursuit of their aims, Threats, violence, assassination — even of their own people—all this figured in the arsenal of these bandits. For in- stance, the jHungarian citien Jubitsa Hibar was forcibly taken in an embassy car to Yugoslavia where he was forced to sign a written statement that he would work for the UDB. :

Ded

The Titoites recruited their agents from among provocateurs and careerists, from among people devoid of honor or conscience. Rankoviec knew that Andras Szalay had betrayed a group of anti- fascists who were planning to escape from prison. Nearly 60 of them were killed, including many Serbs. And this enemy of the Yugoslav people was one of the leading agents of the Yugoslav government.

The Yugoslav official representation - in Budapest lost no time in handing over to the American and British In- telligence Services all the data they re- ceived from their spies. Rajk, Palffy, Szonyi, Szalay, Justus, Korodny and others. Kardelj gave direct instructions that the British general Edgecombe, who egged on the Yugoslav hirtelings, should be kept informed of everything.

Aimed to popularize Tito

The principle aim of the Tito agency in _Hungary was to popularize Tito, draw over the Hungarian people to its side and furnish the conditions for establish-. ing a Balkan Federation. Here the Yugo- slav agents did not confine themselves to Hungary alone, but stretched their tentacles to the other democratic coun- tries.

In Rumania, the man chosen was the minister of justice, Patrascanu,. who had no objection to carrying out Tito’s plan. But he was isolated in good’ time and removed from the party. Rankovic com- plained to Brankov that they would have to start all over again in Rumania. The notorious American agent, Misha Lom- par, was sent to Rumania for this pur- pose.

Great hopes were also placed on the disagreements in the Polish Workers’ party. It was assumed that Gomulka would be the proper man to carry out Tito’s designs. But Gomulka acknow- ledged his mistakes.

Here, too, complained Rankovic, they would: have to start from scratch, and he sent Ivan Rukavin to Poland as Counsellor to the Yugoslav Embassy, to- gether with a number of other agents. Similar attempts were made in relation to Bulgaria and Albania. Brankov said that he. had learned all this from Ran- kovic, Djilas and Milic.

Brankov said that, in 1946-47, Tito sent his, representatives to the People’s De- mocracies under the guise of repriesen- tatives of the Yugoslav Communist.

Party. I was such a representative in’

Hungary, stated the accused.

In Czechoslovakia the representatives were Novosel, now a minister, and la- ter Stilinivic; in Bulgaria, N. Kovacevic and O. Tsitsmil; in Albania, Djerdje and Slatic, and in Poland, another Kovocevic. ‘The task of these representatives, tes- tified the accused. was to popularize Ti- to, to engage in undernfining activities in the Communist parties and the state apparatus of the People’s Democracies.

Brankov described how the consular

_ department of the Yugoslav mission in

Budapest forged documents for the Yu- goslav diplomats engaged in espionage, and for recruited Hungarian subjects.

Knew of secret parleys

The accused testified that he knew of the ‘secret meeting between Rankovic and Rajk held at a country house near Paks, and that Mrazovic told him about this meeting. Brankov further testified that during one of his regular trips to Belgrade, Rankovic expressed dissatis-

’ faction with Rajk’s slowness, stressing

that Rajk could have been more energet- ic and killed Rakosi and other leadens of the Hungarian state in one night. Rankovic sent two of his agents, the ex- perisne-d p.itical assassins, Jovanovis and Joikovic to Hungary to help Rajk. They shadowed Rakosi. sent out of Hungary and Joikovic re- turned to Belgrade at the end of 1948. Chairman: What directives did you receive from the Minister of the Inte- rior, Rankovic, in October, 1948, regard-

‘ ing the publication of a false statement

.

about relations with the Tito govern- ment having been broken off? Brankov: Rankovic simply stated that the situation in Hungary wag such that it was no longer possible to work in the ~way and that the methods would have to be changed. The Hungarian authori- ties had become so vigilant that it was practically impossible for the embassy members to carry on subversive work.

Jovanovic was”

He gave me instructions to return to Budapest and leave the embassy, after which I was to announce that I con- demned the Tito policy and would remain in Hungary as a political immigrant. Seeing my hesitation, Rankovic told me that he had spoken to Tito personally about the matter and that Tito expect- ed me to handle the assignment success- fully. Rankovic also gave me instruc- tions on what I was to do on my return to Hungary.

These instructions were: first of all, to win the confidence of the leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party: sec- ondly, once this confidence was won, to maintain imperceptibly contact with the Hungarian plotters, mainly with Rajk, Rankovie ordered Mraxovic and myself to put all other work aside and do only this. Another of my assignments was to establish contact with several important Yugoslav agents in Hungary.

Chief agent for Rankovic

Brankov was Rankovic’s chief resident agent in Hungary. He often visited Bel- _ grade where he received instructions di- rect from the Yugoslav leaders. During one of his visits there he had a confi-

. dential talk with Rankovich.

Chairman: Djilas was present at this conversation ?

Brankov: Dijilas was present at this conversation. He had just been in con- ference with Tito who was then negoti- ating with the American and British rep- resentatives in Belgrade. They told Tito that they were prepared to help the Yugoslav government not only economic- ally but also politically if the Tito gov- ernment was prepared to fight against the Soviet Union.

Djilas said the situation was such that we had better accept this offer, for the Americans and British had become our natural allies, Rankovic thereupon add- ed that collaboration was being carried out in other countries.

A certain Sahota acted as go between for Brankov and Rankovic during the recent past. Brankov testified: In Feb- ruary I met Sahota at an appointed place. He reported to me that Rankovic want- ed Rajk to be prodded into getting on with the putsch; it should be made clear to him that the time for preparation had passed, that action was wanted. |

Rankovic also added that Rajk be in- formed that Belgrade was dissatisfied _ with the delay in preparing the attempt | against the lives of the Communist Patty leaders.

During the trial Brankov tried to de- pict Tito as the victim of the machina- tions of Rankovic, Kardelj and Diilas. However, when cross-examined he relat-_ ed that ag early as the initial stages of the war, Tito was secretly negotiating with Germany, promising to cease mili- tary operations if Hitler: would allow a Yugoslav government to be established under the leadership of Tito.

After Stalingrad, however, when the tide of the war turned, Tito broke off these negotiations. A number of the par- — tisan leaders who had had an inkling about these negotiations and voiced their indignation were deliberately put out of the way. They were sent to sectors which meant death.

Contact with U.S. spies

Even after the war, Brankov testified, Tito, Rankovic and Kardelj were in con- tact with the British and American In- telligence Services in Yugoslavia and al- so beyond its borders. I learned of this,

he continued, from a talk with Tsitsmil |

and also from the secret files of the PUB. Misha Lompar, who during the war had been sent on a mission to Switzer- | land, was commissioned to contact Allen Dulles, chief of American espionage in Europe.

Upon his arrival in Switzerland, Lom-— par also contacted a group of trotskyites _ there. Latinovic was sent to Marseilles and Basso Jovanovic to Bari where he contacted the Anglo-American Intelli- gence Service. General Velebit, a British spy of long standing was active in Lon- don where he passed on to British Intel- ligence all the materials at his disposal including information about the Soviet army. ;

In 1943 American and British military missions came to Yugoslavia headed by the Intelligence Officers Colonel] Hamil- ton and General MacLean. Rankovic

Concluded. on page 9—See TRIAL

PACIFIC TRIBUNE — OCTOBER 21, 1949 — PAGE 7