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TRIBUNE

SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

PRODUCED BY USSR EMBASSY PRESS OFFICE

‘After Reykjavik it is plainer than ever to all that SDI is a

symbol of obstruction to the cause of peace’

Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

—

Sees

s you know, my meeting in Iceland with the President of the United States, Ron-

day, on Sunday. A press conference on its results was held and televised. The text of My statement and my replies to journalists were Published.

On returning home I consider it my duty to tell you Ow the meeting took place and how we evaluate what happened in Reykjavik.

The results of the meeting in the capital of Iceland Ve just been discussed at a meeting of the Politbureau. Teport will be published tomorrow on the opinion that Sur party’s: leadership has formed about this major Political event, the consequences of which, we are con- _ Yinced, will be making themselves felt in international - Telations for a long time to come. ; Before Reykjavik much was said and written about tt forthcoming meeting. As it usually happens in such Situations, there was a maze of conjectures and views. hat is natural. But there were speculations this time as well. __ Now that the meeting is over its results are in the

_ entre of attention of the world public. Everybody wants ‘0 know — what happened? what did it produce? what _ Will the world be like after it? ; = € strove for the main questions of world politics _,_ huclear disarmament and ending the arms race, given _ 1°P priority at the meeting in Reykjavik. And that is how it was. ares,

What are the motives for our persistence in this mat- - ter? One can often hear abroad that the reason lies in ur domestic difficulties. There is a thesis in Western “alculations that the Soviet Union will not ultimately Ndure the arms race economically, that it will break ©Wn and will go bowing to the West. One should only Tess on it harder and shore up a position of strength. Incidentally, the U.S. president made a remark to this fect already after our meeting. I said more than once that such plans are not only 2uilt on sand, but are dangerous because they may result fatal political decisions. We know our own problems better than others. We do have them, and we openly Uiscuss and resolve them. On this score, we have our plans and approaches, and there is a common will °ftthe party and the people. On the whole, I should say , at the Soviet Union is strong today through its unity, jy. ttical activity of the people and dynamism. I think is these trends and, therefore, the strength of our lety are growing. « ‘Ve will always be able to stand up for ourselves. The €t Union has the capacity to respond to any chal-

._8e, if need be. Soviet people know this, and all people

ound the world should know this as well. But we are

Soyj

ald Reagan ended the day before yester--

opposed to playing power games. This is an extremely dangerous undertaking in the nuclear-missile age.

We are firmly convinced that the protracted, fever- ish state of international relations harbours the threat of a sudden and doomful crisis. Practical steps away from the.nuclear abyss are required. Concerted Soviet- American efforts, efforts by the entire international community are required to radically improve inter- national relations.

For the sake of these goals we, the Soviet leadership, carried out extensive preparatory work ahead of the meeting, even before we received the consent of Presi- dent Reagan to attend it. Taking part in it, apart from the political bureau and secretariat of the CPSU central committee, were the ministry of foreign affairs and the defense ministry, other organizations, scientists, mili- tary experts, and specialists from various branches of industry. The positions that we worked out for the Reykjavik meeting were a result of broad and repeated discussions with our friends, with the leadership of countries of the socialist community. We sought to fill the meeting with principled content and far-reaching proposals.

Now about the meeting itself, how events developed there. We must tell you about it not only for the sake of affirming the truth which is being distorted already by our partners in the Reykjavik talks, but also mostly for informing you of what we are going to do next.

The first conversation with President Reagan started on Saturday, at 10:30. After the greetings which are indispensable on such occasions and a short meeting with journalists, there remained only the two of us and the interpreters. We exchanged views on the general situation, on the way the dialogue between our two countries is developing and outlined problems to be discussed.

On October 14, 1986, two days after the Reykjavik —_ Mikhail Gorbachev: The proposals presented by

~summit, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev appeared

on nationwide TV to give Soviet viewers the USSR’s appreciation of the meeting and what occurred.

the USSR at Reykjavik opens the door to the search for mutually acceptable disarmament solutions.

Then I asked the president to listen to our concrete proposals on principal questions which prompted our meeting. I already spoke at length about them during

the press conference. Still, I will recall them in brief. —

A whole package of major measures was submitted to the talks. These measures,once accepted,-weuld usher in a new era in the life of humanity — the nuclear- free era. This makes up the essence of the radical turn in the world situation, the possibility of which was obvious and realistic. The point at issue was no longer the limitation of nuclear arms, as in the SALT-1, SALT-2 and other treaties, but the elimination of nuclear weapons within comparatively brief periods.

he first proposal concerned strategic of- fensive weapons. I expressed the readi- ness to reduce them by fifty per cent with- in the next five years. Strategic weapons on land, water and in the air were subject to halving. In order to make the accord easier, we agreed to a major concession by revoking our pre- vious demands that the strategic equation include American medium-range missiles reaching our ter- ritory and American forward-based systems. We were also ready to take into account the U.S. concern about our heavy missiles. We regarded the proposal on strategic arms in the context of their total elimination, as we suggested on January 15 this year. Our second proposal dealt with medium-range mis- siles. I suggested to the president that both Soviet and American missiles of this class in Europe be fully elimi- nated. On this point as well we agreed to a substantial concession: we stated that, unlike our previous stand, the nuclear-missile weapons of Britain and France should not be taken into account. We proceeded from the need for paving the way to detente in Europe, for setting the European nations free from the fear of a nuclear catastrophe, and then going further — towards the elimination of all the nuclear weapons. You will agree that it was another bold step on our part.

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PACIFIC TRIBUNE, NOVEMBER 12, 1986 e 5