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Continued from page 1 major shift of priorities in Washington and Islamabad can alter the bleak prediction of continuing bloody conflict.

“In the past three years or so the Soviet Union has articulated a new approach to international relations and has moved to put it into practice,” says Glukhov. “In Afghanistan, we have pulled out our troops and undertaken a whole series of diplomatic moves aimed at achieving a political settle- ment.

“The People’s Democratic Party (PDPA) government in Kabul initiated the policy of national reconciliation and has renounced any monopoly of power. There is an open- ing, a possibility for compromise and set- tlement involving all of the diverse elements of Afghan society — including, naturally, the PDPA, which also represents the aspira- tions of broad numbers of people.

“It is this opening which the irreconcila- ble opposition — the Mujahedin — and their Western sponsors so far refuse to address. They prefer to press the military option, with all of the bloody consequences that entails.

“They always said that it was the pres- ence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan that was the main obstacle to a negotiated politi- cal solution. What is the problem now?”

Indeed, the United States and other countries have helped the Mujahedin with vast quantities of sophisticated weaponry, training, logistical support and diplomatic backing, largely on the grounds that they were opposing a “Soviet occupation” of Afghanistan. There has been no attempt on the part of Western governments to scrutin- ize the Mujahedin themselves or examine the political prospects they offer and the social forces they represent.

The big Western media have been sim- ilarly uncritical, by and large accepting the “freedom fighter” label to describe a mass of divergent groups whose leaders include corrupt former officials, feudal landlords, drug smugglers, bandits and, among the most powerful, Khomeini-like religious fanatics.

The rank-and-file Mujahedin comprise

many who have followed tribal, feudal or _

religious loyalties, but also many who have been genuinely offended by PDPA policies — particularly the ultra-leftist and anti- religious campaigns of Hafizullah Amin (1978-9) — as well as refugees who fled the war and came under Mujahedin control in Pakistani or Iranian refugee camps. A

8 e Pacific Tribune, February 20, 1989

Soviet troops cross the Friendship Bridge over the Darya River separating Afghanistan from the USSR.

major motivation, since the Soviet interven- tion, has been a fierce sense of patriotism.

At the very start the Soviet military pres- ence strengthened the PDPA regime a bit, and gave a new lease on life to the Afghan army,” writes Alexander Bovin in Izvestia. “But on the whole, Soviet participation in the warfare had a dire effect. We gave counter-revolutionaries a mighty propa- ganda weapon. The presence of infidel alien soldiers aroused patriotism and religious enthusiasm.”

No one, however, could claim that the Mujahedin — even in all of their fractious, explosive diversity — represent anything close to a full cross-section of Afghan society.

“We have to remember that Afghanistan is a very traditional and conservative society,” says Glukhov. “There is a decades-old tension between progressive

FROM MOSCOW

modernizers and reactionary traditional forces. Class differences are blurred by tri- bal, clan, national and religious distinctions. Previous attempts at reform have foun- dered on these rocks.

“But on the other hand, the PDPA, des- pite all of the mistakes it has made since it came to power in April 1978, can still rely upon many sections of society that gained

from the April revolution. These include _

women, liberated from the veil and the tyranny of Islamic strictures; peasants, who

won through land reform, even if, due to the .

widespread warfare, these benefits remain largely theoretical; students, whose numbers have burgeoned through PDPA’s expan- sion of education; and workers, who won trade union and other rights.

“One thing that is certain,” says Gluk- hoy, “‘is that virtually all sectors of Afghan society, the whole population, are war- weary and longing for peace.”

Large numbers of Afghans may not be active supporters of the PDPA, yet seem willing to resist the advance of the Muja- hedin. Here we have to confront the curious

fact that although Soviet troops departed most Afghan provinces, and large cities like Kandahar and Jalalabad more than seven months ago, these continue to hold out des- pite massive Mujahedin assaults and long sieges.

Though it was barely reported in the Western media, all Afghans undoubtedly recall the tragic fate of Kunduz,-a north- eastern provincial capital that was briefly taken by Mujahedin forces last summer. The occupiers staged an orgy of violence, revenge-killings and plunder, ending with the kidnapping of 200 young women, before being driven out. They haven’t taken a single important city since.

If the war goes on, and centrifugal forces are not countered by strong, internationally- backed efforts at genuine reconciliation, the human price is certain to be appalling. There is a clear danger, in the worst scena- rio, that it could end with Islamic funda- mentalist groups — who have been dis- proportionately bolstered by American and Saudi aid channelled to them through the late Pakistani president Zia al-Hug — set- ting up a fanatically right wing feudal regime in Kabul and settling scores in a bloodbath. The fruits of shallow thinking in Washington, which has shown interest in nothing more than sticking it to the Soviets as hard as possible, may well be enduring anguish for Afghanistan.

The PDPA, though it too is riven by divisions between its Khalq and Parchem factions, is likely to show much more strength and staying-power than most in the West realize. The stalemate in Afghanistan could be long and agonizing. The only obstacle to meaningful negotiations, at this point, is the policy of the Mujahedin, backed by Washington, who continue to refuse the PDPA and the forces it represents a place at the bargaining table.

“T am an optimist,” says Glukhov. “By focussing on the present difficulties and div- isions One might miss the real possibilities for national reconciliation and negotiated solution. Objectively, there are no reasons for this war to continue, and few Afghans want it to.

“New thinking can be tough to imple- ment, but the consequences of not doing so would be worse. We are withdrawing from Afghanistan. In this dangerous world someone has to express common sense, to put it onto the agenda. Even if this doesn’t bring results immediately, it will in the long run. There is no other choice’’.

stonewalling on peace plan

By TOM MORRIS

With every passing day, the size of the gap separating Likud/Labour government spokesmen from reality is seen, as the inti- fada saps the will of the military and PLO diplomatic successes continue to isolate zionist intransigence.

How divorced the Israeli government is from reality can be seen in three positions advanced last week:

The first, the extreme right-wing rejec- tionist view, was put forward by Likud’s Prime Minister - Yitzhak Shamir in a nationally-televised speech. “There will be no Palestinian state here — never,” he said, calling Palestinians and the PLO “bru- tal, wild alien invaders in the land of Israel that belongs to the people of Israel and only to them.”

Based on this thinking, Shamir will travel to the U.S. in March to unveil his “plan for peace.”

The second position is advanced by the Labour Party. While rejecting any talks with the PLO and/or an independent Pales- tinian state on the occupied Arab lands, Labour advocates a form of Israeli military withdrawal in exchange for a peace with neighbouring Jordan. Jordan, however, has made it clear that it doesn’t speak for the Palestinians and that Israel must deal directly with them and their leadership, the PLO.

A third position, floated by Defence Min- ister Yitzhak Rabin, is found amidst his never-ending warnings that more force will be used against the intifada — after 375 murders, tens of thousands of arrests and beatings, and countless deportations and dynamitings of Palestinian homes.

First, Rabin wants the intifada called off, Then, after six months of “quiet,” and based on a “no recognition of the PLO” policy, he would permit elections for leader- ship among unnamed but non-PLO candi- dates to oversee a form of “autonomy.”

The three “‘plans” are non-starters. All are based on one or another form of con- tinued Israeli control of occupied Arab ter- ritories. All are based on refusal to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organ- ization as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. All are destined, even designed, to fail.

By contrast, the PLO last November made a major breakthrough in the long, painful Mideast peace process with its clear- cut position. Supported by most states, the PLO put forward a three-point plan:

® Convening an international conference in Geneva under UN auspices.

@ Placing the Israeli-occupied territories under temporary UN supervision,

® Working out a comprehensive settle- ment among all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The United States, as well, as Israel’s main financial and military partner, bears a special responsibility to convince Shamir, Rabin, Peres and other top government leaders that the time is long overdue for serious negotiations toward a just peace based on a Palestinian homeland and on mutual security for all states in the region.

Canada, too, can play a role in this pro- cess. In this regard, the hard-line stance adopted by Ottawa has been disappointing. Rather than greeting the PLO peace plan and pressing Israel to negotiate, the Cana- dian government so far remains a prisoner of the powerful zionist lobby in Canada and its rejectionist platform.

As such, the Mulroney government shoulders some of the responsibility for the ugly repression which is an inevitable part of military occupation.