FEATURE

The following is an abridged text of an interview with Mik- hail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, conducted by the Czechoslovak news- paper Rude Pravo.

Your statement about the exten-

& sion of the unilateral moratori-

um on nuclear explosions till

January 1, 1987 has evoked a very broad response

and has had a serious impact on the alignment of so-

cial and political forces in the world in the sphere of

disarmament issues.

How do you evaluate the reasons for that and the

possible consequences of the initiative?

Today many more people know : & about the Soviet moratorium. Polit- ical leaders and the mass media in the West find it more and more difficult to keep silent about it, and American arguments in favor of testing have lost much of their ef- fect on the public.

Secondly, awareness of the reality of the nuclear threat is becoming ever more profound. [Nuclear war] can be averted only by eliminating — and this is what we propose — nuclear weapons, and terminating nuclear tests as a first step.

Our socialist friends, the Communist parties, the Harare conference of the non-aligned movement which represents scores of countries, the leaders of the “Delhi Six,” numerous public organizations and trade unions, authoritative political parties, including West German Social Democrats and Britain’s Laborites, people promi- nent in science and culture everywhere in the world came out in support of the Soviet moratorium, and called upon America to follow the example of the USSR. On the whole, it can be said that it is easier to list those who did not support our action than those who approved it.

A new political thinking is forcing its way through old prejudices, outmoded conceptions, through heaps of lies about the “Soviet threat.” The idea of the termination of nuclear testing is supported both by public opinion in the U.S. and by a substantial part of Congress.

‘I want to believe in the reason, realism and sense

of self-preservation of the

American people. ’

Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The realization has never been as widespread as it is today that a nuclear war must never be fought and that there can be no winner in such a war, no matter what clever ‘scenarios’ of military operations are drawn up. ‘

Another factor is added to all that: the-policy of the United States begins to scare people more and more; as- tounding manifestations of the militarist line have opened the eyes of many people, and the alarm at the prospect that a catastrophe may indeed occur can no longer be concealed by anyone.

The favorable response to the Soviet nuclear test- ing moratorium also has something to do with the fact that it is not a declaration, but an action. This is the fourth time that we have extended the moratorium. One year without nuclear explosions is both a political and military reality. The tendency of reason and com- mon sense is now clearly present in world politics and it can be developed, augmented by an agreement on the mutual prohibition of nuclear testing. There are other issues too, whose resolution is long overdue, that could be addressed with bold and forceful steps.

For example, we could crown the work of the Stockholm conference with a substantial agreement — the possibility of which I have already mentioned — on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on the elimination of the industrial base for their production.

Rational compromises are possible on_ strategic arms, on medium-range nuclear missiles, and on con- ventional weapons, if one really strives to lower the level of military confrontation and to achieve equal security. It is possible to reach agreement on strengthening and extending the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty.

The reaction in the ruling circles of the United States to our statement is indicative in this respect. It has revealed from the very outset that at least around the president, whose spokesmen did not even bother to con- ceal their irritation this time, they are not thinking in ear-

_nest about eliminating the nuclear threat. This is why the

extension of the moratorium caused such displeasure there. People in these circles began to feel uneasy in the face of the new Soviet proposals. It has evidently be- come very difficult to justify their stand in the eyes of both the world and the American public.

And once again the old road was followed in a bid to belittle the significance of our move — it was branded “propaganda.” But it is appropriate to ask:

If this is propaganda, then what is it designed to

prove, what do we ‘vant to say by it? That it is possible to do without nuclear explosions? That we back up our call

_ and the cause of peace in general.

to rid mankind of nuclear weapons with a termination of their tests? What is bad about such “propaganda”?

It is not a propaganda war that we seek to win. We do not even want to participate in such a “fight,” believ- ing that it is unworthy of the importance of the subject Our aim is to make a real step towards real disarmaieee And we sincerely invite the american administration to this. We want to have progress in negotiations so as to

push back the nuclear threat for the sake of the security

of all and genuine detente.

If one is to speak about the “seriousness” that the: called upon us for when we extended our mona once again, I should like to say that the attitude to the termination of nuclear tests, to the early elaboration of a treaty on their full prohibition, has now become the most convincing indicator of how seriously each of the : nuclear powers treats disarmament, international security

If one wants military superiority, one does not need a moratorium.

If one wants to continue the arms race, and parti ularly, to transfer it to new areas, to outer s ace = does not need a moratorium. eas

If one wants to have new, more sophisticated

weaj ons, one does not need a moratorium at all. e

If in solving international problems one counts on

strength and intends to resort to diktat, to blackmail, then a moratorium is a hindrance as well. :

If one is afraid of honestly competing with a differ- ent social system in economy, democracy, culture’ intel- lectual wealth of human life, a moratorium obvious] is unsuitable. y

If one does not care what will happen to nature, to

human environment, one will continue conducting nucle-

ar explosions.

If the appetites of the tycoons of military business :

and all those linked with it are more important than the opinion and vital interests of hundreds of millions of peo- ple all over the world, one continues nuclear tests.

In other words, one’s attitude toward the moratorium reveals the true essence and aims of one’s policy. There is no escaping this fact. :

But if there really is a desire to start reducing nuclear arms with the goal of doing away with them altogether, as the President of the U.S. has solemnly declared more than once; if there exists a genuine understanding that nuclear war is unacceptable; if it is true that the U.S. does not seek military superiority, then there are no obstacles in principle to reaching an equitable and strictly verifiable agreement. = —

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biggest _

YoU KNOW, A ToTAL BAN ON TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BRING A HALT

\T SOUNDS Goop, BUT THe SoviETs \WOULD NEVER AGREE TO IT

PROPOSED IT

THEY'RE THE ONES WHO

THEN ITS OUTOF , THE QUESTION |