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Continued from page 1 More or less squarely as a programmatic 80al. This is probably not such a bad devel- pment, inasmuch as it now frames the Process between stark and clearly-defined alternatives,

_On the other hand, the Soviet Commu- hist Party in mid-August released its own draft program on reconstructing Soviet Nationalities relations. This document will form the political foundation for an enlarged conference of the CPSU Central Committee set to open Sept. 18. From this Meeting, many hope, will emerge the radi- cal, democratic federal alternative to the breakup of the Soviet Union.

_ Everyone who wishes to understand this Issue ought to read the draft platform for, Whatever the future may hold, it carries the Seeds of a powerful new vision. It calls for the preservation of a federal framework in the context of vastly expanded rights to the republics, a new level of internationalism that would accord Soviet peoples their

Si perhaps last best — chance in his- tory to develop fully their individual Nationhoods,

Another twist occurred some 10 days after the platform was issued. Central Committee leaders, alarmed by the demon- Strations on Aug. 23 and the explosive emergence of the separatist agenda, issued a scathing — and clumsy — warning state- Ment.

“Things have gone far,” the statement tead. “The fate of the Baltic peoples is in Serious danger. People should know into What abyss they are being pushed by Nationalist leaders. The consequences could be disastrous for these peoples should the

_ Nationalism dramatizes GPSU debate

CANDLELIGHT VIGIL MARKING HITLER-STALIN PACT .. . advocates of separa-

tion often invoke a mythical ‘golden age’’ before states became part of USSR.

nationalists achieve their goals. The very viability of the Baltic nations could be called into question ....”

The statement was undeniably a blast in the language of the past, but any close read- ing of it shows it was clearly intended as an appeal, not a threat. Yet there is no doubt that its sharp formulations fanned the flames of defiance among Baltic national- ists, and muddied the waters in general. Baltic activists immediately decried the

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eS

Their departure timed to mark the 30th anniversary of the treaty making the Antarctic a zone of peace, six explorers, from the U.S., Britain, China, USSR, Japan and France began an epic trans-Antarctic expedition last month from King George island. At top, the Soviet transport plane which took them to the drop-off point flies over Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of Chile. Below, the members of the expedition, led by Will Steger from the U.S. (second from left) and Jean-Louis Etienne of France (second from right).

statement as “political terror” — among other things — while western journalists speculated that it was the manifesto of those in the Soviet leadership seeking a “Chinese solution” to the Baltic problem.

That is definitely not the mood of the Soviet leadership, or any discernible section of it, as subsequent events make clear. In early September, Yegor Ligachev, often labelled as the Politbureau’s “leading con- servative” went on the evening television news show, Vremia, to clarify his position: ““We must take measures,” he said. “But not repressive..measures, not dictatorial mea- sures, but political measures. Let me say again — we must do it not through dicta- torship and repression but through consoli- dation and unity of the party.”

There it is. Whatever differences may exist in the Soviet leadership, whatever degree of alarm they may feel as events accelerate, all seem agreed on this point: the challenge of Baltic separatism must be addressed by political means and through a constitutional process.

But how will this process unfold? It seems fairly probable that if one polled ethnic Balts tonight, a majority of them would opt euphorically for independence. This — as Canadians, perhaps better than most West- ern peoples, should know — does tell us a great deal about their pent-up frustrations and soaring sense of national awakening, but does not finally or definitively settle anything, much less tell us how these same populations might be feeling five years from now.

In modern times, the three Baltic repub- lics have only enjoyed political independ- ence for one brief period between the wars, when they constituted part of the “cordon sanitaire” system of small independent States set up under the 1919 Versailles Treaty to separate Soviet Russia from the West. : Their independence came to an end in the midst of strategic maneuvering by the great

- powers on the verge of World War II. The

Baltic states were consigned to the ‘Soviet sphere of influence” under the Hitler-Stalin pact and its no-longer-secret protocols, and the following year — under Soviet occupa- tion — voted to join the USSR.

Baltic nationalists are prone these days to look back upon those brief years of inde- pendence as a “golden age,” and have apparently come to believe some incredibly spurious, self-serving fictions about it — which are accepted all too uncritically by sympathetic westerners.

Since historical glasnost ought to cut equally in every direction, and since a realis- tic view of the future depends heavily on an

accurate reading of the past, a few things should be pointed out. First, the three Baltic states were not particularly “democratic” during their independent years; in fact all

three spent most of the time as dictator- _

ships. They were not models of “tolerance” (the speed and enthusiasm with which they all handed over their Jews to the Nazi invaders in 1941 offers a better glimpse of reality).

Nor were they exactly “prosperous.” Despite all of the talk about how “Wester- nized” they are, all three Baltic states were overwhelmingly agricultural backwaters of Europe between the wars. Virtually all the industry they have dates from Soviet times and is inextricably integrated with the Soviet economic complex.

The only point here is to note that all the problems that face them today do not, after all, stem from the Hitler-Stalin pact. There was a certain,’ perhaps well-deserved, euphoria last month as Baltic popular fronts declared that 1939 agreement between Nazi Germany and the USSR “null and void.” However, as Alexander Yakovlev rejoined in Pravda: “There is little point in debating this issue, since the non- aggression and other treaties with Germany became juridically invalid on June 22; 1941,” when Germany invaded the USSR.

The more essential point today is: can 50 years of history be abolished? Is there any reason to try? Since that time, whatever its deep injustices, the surrounding world has changed radically, as has internal reality, and both the opportunities and the pitfalls are very different.

Here is where there is real hope for the Process, provided it is not brought artifi- cially to a rapid denouement. Most of the substantive grievances of the Baltic peoples have been or are being addressed. They have won new language laws, regulations on new immigration, sweeping rights of economic self-government, and political institutions that reflect popular will. They have moved beyond the stage of airing grie- vances, and the utility of negative politics is fading. It is time for separatists to spell out their programs ina positive way, show how total independence will work for the future of the nation and all its people. It can no longer be simply invoked, or worshipped like an icon.

And this is where Baltic nationalists often become as blind and thoughtless about the future as they are about the past. They tend to believe that the West will shower them with “gift capital” as a reward for declaring independence. Estonians are fond of saying that within 10 years they will be “the Hong Kong of northern Europe” — without any hard reflection over the fact that, if they don’t make some rather deep accommoda- tions with the USSR, they will be a Hong Kong without a China.

Many Baltic nationalists are also veering from the legitimate need to protect ethnic culture and identity, to almost neo-fascist politics of racial purity. They routinely refer to Slavic inhabitants of their republics as parasitical “migrants” and “illegal immi- grants,” and imply that national justice will mean sending them all back where they came from. Beneath the rhetoric, one can sense sometimes the potential for crimes that would rival those of Hitler or Stalin.

As the process advances, then — provi- ded it is open and democratic — we are likely to find that the sentiments of the majority of Baltic peoples are much more layered, ambivalent and conciliatory than any poll taken tonight might indicate.

If the whole Soviet Union continues to move, meaningfully, through perestroika, toward a qualitatively better future, there is every likelihood that shared historical community will re-assert itself over the cen- trifugal forces now in play. History turns like a ratchet and, as Gorbachev put it so simply on TV the other night, there is no way to go but forward ....

Pacific Tribune, September 25. 1989 « 9