By MAURICE RUSH

he results of the provincial election were a

disappointment to many who hoped and

thought that the Socreds could be defeated
and that the years of right wing government
could be brought to an end. The lessons of the
May 5 vote will be debated for many months to
come in the NDP, in the labor and people’s
movements and among all those who want pro-
gressive change. It’s important that such a
debate take place because only by learning the
lessons of the May 5 election will the working
people and the progressive movement be able to
adopt policies and programs which will bring
about changes in the political situation in B.C.

The overall result of the election was the
return of a stronger right wing government to
Victoria with a larger majority, an outcome
which will have serious consequences for the
people of B.C. However, the question must be
asked: Did the election represent a sharp swing
to the right among the people? The answer to
this question is decisive because on it depends an
estimation of what the possibilities are for
fighting right wing policies and for defeating the
drive to the right in B.C.

An analysis of the election results show that
the Socreds increased their majority from five
to 13 seats while the NDP dropped four seats.
In the 57-seat legislature the Socreds now hold
35 seats and the NDP 22. In the previous house
the Socreds held 31 and the NDP 26.

In 1979 the Socreds got 48.2 percent of the
popular vote and the NDP 46 percent. The
May 5 result was 49.4 percent for the Socreds
and 45.3 percent for the NDP. As can be seen
from these figures, the Socreds gained 1.2 per-
cent in the popular vote and the NDP popular
vote dronned by 0.7 percent.

Althc the Socred government has been
strengthened as a result of a significant shift in
the number of seats, this was accomplished by a
marginal shift in the popular vote. These results
cannot be interpreted as an overwhelming
mandate for right wing policies. Extreme
polarization between the Socreds and the NDP
remains the main feature of B.C. politics. The
election results further demonstrated that there
is massive opposition to Socred policies, and
that the 45.3 percent vote for the NDP, taken
together with thousands of voters who were
temporarily misled to vote Socred, but who
would likely oppose many of their right wing
policies, constitutes a very broad base for
developing a massive fightback against right
wing policies.

Still, premier Bill Bennett is interpreting the
results of the election as a mandate for a sharper
swing to the right. Statements made by Bennett
and leading members of the cabinet at the
Okanagan resort meeting of the Socreds last

week indicate that the government intends to-

extend its restraint program. It’s significant
that the cabinet invited the head of the far-right

Fraser Institute to lecture them on what policies
the government should adopt. Secret meetings
have also been held with top leaders of big
business to discuss how to tackle the crisis B.C.
faces. All of this is part of the preparation for
the upcoming session of the legislature called
for later in June.

Indications are that the government plans to
step up its reactionary offensive, with emphasis
on the restraint program. The Compensation
Stabilization Program will be retained with the

prospect of new lower limits of wage set- :

tlements in the next two years — possibly three
percent in the first year and two percent in the
second year. There is also a certainty that all
social legislation will come under further at-
tack, with cutbacks and complete abolition of
some programs. Sweeping anti-labor legislation
which would curb the right to strike, introduce
aspects of right-to-work legislation, and amend
the labor code to weaken trade unions in face of
employer demands for concessions is also ex-
pected.

It has been proposed that the government
will turn over some Crown corporations to the
private sector, particularly the more profitable
ones, and that the government will contract out
more of its work to private companies. There
are also strong indications that new taxes will be
imposed against people while concessions will
be made to the private sector to increase their
profits.

If the Socreds pursue these right wing policies
in face of the large anti-Socred vote in the May 5
election, the stage will be set in B.C: for a
sharpening of the class struggle and social con-
flicts as labor and progressive people fight back
to protect themselves against this accelerated
right wing offensive.

BENNETT ANNOUNCING RESTRAINT PROGRAM (above), DAVE BARRETT (inset) ...

NDP leadership did not directly challenge the Socred wage control program or pose alter-

native to it.
PACIFIC TRIBUNE—JUNE 10, 1983—Page 6

TRIBUNE PHOTO— JOSHUA BERSON

he question people concerned with the

May S election results are asking is: What

made the return of the Socred government
possible and what lessons need to be drawn
from it?

In the highly polarized political situation in
B.C. the key to any realistic analysis.must be an
examination of the political positions of the two
major contenders in the election — the Socreds
and the NDP.

The first conclusion that must be drawn is
that the big protest vote against the Socreds did
not materialize, reflecting the fact that a large
number of voters did not see a better alter-
native, plus a fear of change in the midst of
economic crisis. The Socreds were able to ex-
ploit certain improvements in the economic
situation such as lower interest rates and therate
of inflation. They held out the prospect of the
restraint program and the mega-projects and
cutbacks in government spending as the way
out of the crisis, and promoted fear that if the
NDP were elected capital would flee B.C. and
that the economy and jobs would suffer.

_ Obviously many voters, including sections of

the working class, decided to stick with what
they knew rather than risk change and the
uncertainty of what the NDP was offering.

The second conclusion which must be drawn

is that in the eyes of many voters the NDP fail-
ed, both before the election and during the elec-
tion campaign, to come forward with any clear-
cut alternative policies on the restraint pro-
gram,’on the unemployment crisis, on labor’s
rights, or on resource policies. The lack of alter-
native policies and the failure to challenge the
Socreds’ big business policies were major fac-
tors in the Socreds’ return to office. An analysis
of the NDP’s shortcomings and lack of policies
must therefore be seen as the major reason for
the unfavorable May 5 election outcome.

Some analysts have argued that the shift in
the Liberal and Tory vote was a major factor in
determining the election result. While it un-
doubtedly had some effect, it was secondary
and would not have changed the main outcome
of the election. Some have pointed to four
borderline ridings (Vancouver-Little Moun-
tain, Maillardville-Coquitlam, Kootenay and
Dewdney) when the Liberal vote was the dif-
ference between the successful Socred can-
didate and the NDP. They argue that the
Liberals defeated the NDP in these ridings. This
argument wrongly assumes that if the Liberals
had not run all their votes would have gone to
the NDP. The 52 Liberal candidates took votes
from both the Socreds and NDP.

More serious for the NDP was what happen-
ed to the Tory vote, which declined from 5.1
percent in 1979 to only 1.2 percent on May 5.
Over 53,000 people who voted Tory last time
did not do so this time. Where did their vote go?
Most of it apparently went to the Socreds,
especially after the appeal of the Tory president
a week before the election to ignore Tory can-
didates and vote Socred. Some of their vote
may have gone to the Western Canada Concept
candidates, but most of it, we can assume, went
to the Socreds. This represented a further con-
solidation of the right wing vote in B.C.., but it
was not sufficient to have affected the outcome
of the election.

m,n analysis of the NDP’s policies and
electoral tactics are the key to under-
@'S standing what happened on May 5. The
seeds of the NDP defeat were planted after the
last provincial election when the NDP leader-
ship adopted as its main electoral strategy to
move to the political centre and away from left
policies and to make its main appeal to middle
voters and even some sections of the business
community. It was a strategy which took the
working class vote for granted and was aimed at
winning Liberal and other centre voters for the
NDP.

This strategy found expression in a policy of
avoiding a stand on any issue which might
alienate middle voters. It sought to avoid con-
frontation with the Socreds and big business
and to adopt a low profile on issues, and not to
provide a strong challenge to Socred and big
business policies. For long periods of time the
NDP spokesmen, including Barrett, disap-
peared from the scene. The NDP sought at all
times to avoid any challenge of the Socreds on
basic issues, and discouraged labor and other

AU

progressive organizations frost
fightback.

The essence of this NDP e
failure to put forward alternative!
Socreds and big business who" |
tually a free hand on major iss
the Socreds announced their resi
as the way out of the economie \
the NDP failed to challenge it#
with strong alternative policies. (°
do so gave credibility to the restr
the only way out of the crisis, #
sections of the working class bal .
by it.

A key part of the Socred right
was its attack on the trade unions
ing class of B.C. Over the last tw?
labor’s rights have been under f
the NDP failed to mount 4 §
defence of labor’s rights for feat fa
ed as being too friendly to Ja |
issues the NDP not only failed
attack on the unions but disco!

ott
er

e

union movement from fighting
policy in the labor and people’s
to avoid confrontation and stru# ti
of their interests. This enco :
wing drive, spread defeatism alt
the labor movement, and evel 0
spreading anti-union sentiment
sections of the working class. ||
During the election campaign
Dave Barrett’s leadership moved 3
centre and away from left polia®
peted with the Socreds for sup?
ing companies with his propost
royalties from mining companieé
the offer of tax concessions.
the forest industry on refor
shutdown of Chemainus were Ds
bailing out the forest ll

in

of the public.

His proposal for a tripartite
cil of employers, labor and gov
through economic planning off
for new economic policies. Hf :
widespread demand, supported
B.C. Federation of Labor conv’,
tionalization of B.C. Tel. ae

9

be

pressed to make a statement o2 (
said and NDP government WO fig
wage stabilization due to expul® rq
but coupled that policy with the if
going to be tougher getting wage ope
us then it was with (Ed) Peck
rule out categorically enfofr j
workers and recalled that when}
he was “tough” with labor. Hé |
that an NDP government would k
more ‘‘voluntary’’ concessions
than a Socred government. |

On restraint and economic i
described himself as a ‘small ¢?”

|