‘Project X’ smashed

Tito’s deal with Wall Street to restore capitalism in the People’s Democracies
and to establish a fascist East European federation headed by himself
is bared in this full account of the recent Hungarian treason trial

THE trial at Budapest of Laszlo Rajk,
erstwhile foreign minister and intenor
minister of Hungary, and his associates
had its end last week when Rajk and two
others were hanged for the crimes of
which a people’s court found them guilty.

The case was heard by the People’s
Court of Budapest in the House of
the Metal Workers. Attending the

trial were representatives of the Hungar-
working people—factory workers, peas-
ants, intellectuals—and numerous repre-
sentatives of the foreign and Hungarian
press and news agencies.

The trial opened on the morning of
September 16. After briefly questioning
the eight accused and reading the In-

dictment of the Hungarian State Prose ,

cutor’s Office, the chairman of the court
began his interrogation of Laszlo Rajk,
chief agent of the American and Yugo-
slav Intelligence Services in Hungary
and, before his arrest, Hungarian For-
eign Minister and former Minister of the
Interior. Rajk pleaded guilty.

In 1931, when a student of the Buda-
pest Pedagogical Institute, Rajk was ar-
rested for distributing Communist leaf-
lets. -His brother-in-law Police Captain
Louis Bokor, intervened on his behalf
and upon agreeing in writing to serve
as an informer in the revolutionary
movement, he was released. From’ that
time on, Rajk specialized in betraying
heroic Hungarian Communists to the po-
lice, in sending dozens of fighters for
the cause of the working class to prison
and death.

Spied for fascists in Spain
In 1936 he went to Spain on the in-
structions of the secret police. At the
trial] Rajk testified:

I went to Spain with a double assign-
ment: on the one hand to find out who
was in the Rakosi Battalion, and on the
other, to lower the fighting efficiency of
the battalion by corrupting it politically.
“It was not difficult to carry out the first
assignment, since all its members knew
each other. I carried out the second as-
signment as follows: In 1938, just before
the battle on the Ebro,I, as party secre-
tary of the Rakosi Battalion, made a
false accusation of a_ political nature
against the Battalion Commisar Laszlo
Haas in order to cause trouble in the
battalion and lower its fighting effici-
ency. I also carried out trotskyite propa-
ganda in the battalion. When the party
leadership discussed the Haas case, the
Communists in the battalion exposed my
trotskyite behavior. In the end the whole
thing turmed out badly for me: I was

Chairman: When did this take place?

Rajk: In June, 1938. Before the battle
on the Ebro. . . . One way or another
my undermining trotskyite activity
and the discussion round the Laszlo Haas
case resulted in lowering the fighting ef-
ficiency of the Rakosi Battalion which
occupied a very important sector of the
front just before one of the most decisive
battles launched by the Republicans.

Chairman: After! your exclusion from
the Rakosi Battalion did you continue
your activities? :

Rajk: Yes, I did. My activities came
to an end in February, 1939, while fight-
ing was still in progress in Spain. I
deserted. them and fled from Spain. This
ig how I got into a French internment
camp. I was together with Yugoslavs
lin the French internment camps /of
Saint-Cyprien, Gurs and Vernet. Particu-
larly intensive trotskyite undermining ac-

_ tivities were conducted in the intern-
ment camps.

The Yugoslav trotskyites were the
main organizers of this activity which
they also helped to carry out. As far as
I can remember there were about 150
Yugoslavs engaged in trotskyite activi-
ties. They were for the most part intel-
lectuals, bourgeois people and students.
Prominent among them were Kosta Na-
gy, Milic, Stefanovic ind Bebler. These
men not only organized and directed the
work of the Yugoslav trotskyites but also
that of the other trotskyite groups in
the camps and the trotskyite factions
among the other national groups. I was
in close contact with these Yugoslavs
and conducted this trotskyite undermin-
ing activity jointly with them as well as
independently. .

I reported to the officer in change of
the Deuxienne Bureau that a strong Yu-
goslav group was operating the camp
and gave him the names of the leaders
of this group. This officer checked these
names against a list of Yugoslav names
in his possession. I noticed that those I
had mentioned as leaders figured also
as leaders of the Yugolav trotskyite group
in his list. The officer of the Deuxienne
Bureau told me that he knew of the

activities of the group and that they

welte carrying out certain assignments
in agreement with him, and even more,
on his instruction.

I visited the head of the Deuxienne
Bureau several times and there I asw
the leaders of the aforementioned trot-
skyite group—Kosta, Nagy, Stefanovic,
Milic and others. It was clear to all that
these Yugoslavs had been recruited by
the Deuxienne Bureau and, like myself,
were carrying out its instructions.

Chairman: How long were you in the
camps? How did you get out of them?

Rajk: I remained in the French camp
at Vernet until 1941. In the spring of
1941, a German mission arrived at the
camp to secure labor for construction

. work in Germany and other jobs. At this

time northern France was under Ger-
man occupation. This German mission
was headed by a major of the Gestapo.
I do not remember his name. The major
asked to see me and proposed that I
should register for work in Germany. He
told me that he was making this pro-
posal because the chief of the politica}

‘department of the Hungarian police had

asked him to help me, as an old agent
of the Hungarian police, to get back
home.

Converse with Gestapo

» During this conversation that Gestapo
major took out a list of names and. en-
quired about certain Yugoslavs. This list
was the same as had been in the posses-
sion of the officer at the Deuxienne Bu-
reau. When I told him about the Yugo-
slav group in the camp the German ma-
jor became interested, particularly in
Kosta, Nagy, Stefanovic and others. The
Yugoslavs, about 150 of them, asked
him to help them return to Yugoslavia.
I told him all I knew about the activity
of this Yugoslav trotskyite group. The
Gestapo major received my information
about their trotskyite activity with satis-
faction and told me that he would grant

their request and help them return to.

Yugoslavia. That he did so was proved
by two facts: first, there were many Yu-
goslavs in the group with which I went
to Germany; second, from time to time

Yugoslav groups passed through the >

Leipzig area, where I was working, on
their way to Yugoslavia. Since they pass-
ed through legally, it could only mean
that the German authorities, the Ges-
tapo and other organs, were helping
them)

“On his return to, Hungary, during the

war, Rajk resumed undermining activi-
ties in the working class movement. To
avoid suspicion he was arrested but was
soon released when it was learned who
he was and for whom he was working.

Agrees to spy for U.S.

Step by step the court disclosed Rajk’s
espionage activities after his second re-
turn from Germany where he had been
sent just before the entry of the Soviet
Army in Hungary.

Rajk testified: The leadership of the
Communist Party was not aware of my
espionage activities. I wag considered one
of the best members of the Communist
Party. That is why I was entrusted with
a high post in the party immediately

vafter my return. I became secretary of

the Budapest party organization. Soon
after I had been given this post by the
party leadership, I was visited by a
Man named Kovacs, a member of the
American military mission. This wés
about August or September, 1945. :

Kovacs told me that he nad been in-
formed by Sombor-Schweinitzer, a former
Horthy police chief then in the Ameri-
can zone, that I had worked for the
Horthy police. Kovacs threatened that
if I did not agree to work for the Ame-
Yvicans they would expose me to the
leaders of the Communist Party. I, of
course, agreed. Kovacs asked to be sup-
Plied with information regarling the
political situation in Hungary.

He told me that since I occupied such

a high position he would not give me.

the minor intelligence jobs of ordinary
agents. He wanted me, as one close to
leading political circles, to supply the
American Intelligence Service in Buda-
pest with the political information they
could not get through other channels. I
kept Kovacs—I think he was a lieuten-

_ ant-Colonel—supplied, with information

on the politica] situation in the country.
Information I gave him on the 1945 elec-
tions Was particularly important to him.

Kovacs put Rajk in contact with Mar-
ton Himmler, another American intelli-
gence agent, who instructed Rajk to
place his men in key posts in the party

‘and government.

Rajk: The purpose of this work was to
place people in all spheres of state life,
decisive in the event of the seizure of
power who could be relied on to catiry
out the plan for the overthrow of the
people’s democratic order. I must, how-
ever, note that in 1946 when I spoke to
Marton Himmler, this policy in the
sphere of cadres was only being outlined
and was not at that time realized. It
was carried out, not on the basic of con-
versations with Marton Himmler, but on
the basis of the instructions and politi-

' cal plans of Tito and Rankovic. In the
‘long run, of course, it was one and the

same line, since Tito and Rankovic close-
ly collaborated with the America Intel-
ligence Service.

_ Agents high Yugoslavs

‘I am in possession of a whole number
of facts to prove that they closely col-
laborated with the U.S. Intelligence Ser-
vice. First, my observations in the French
internment camp, where I saw for my-
self that the people who today hold lead-
ing posts in Yugoslavia were agents of
the Deuxienne Bureau and returned

_ home with the help of the Gestapo. Dur-

ing the war the Deuxienne Bureau was
collaborating closely with the organs of
the American Intelligence Service.

After the war the Deuxienne Bureau
agents in Central and Eastern Europe
began to work for the American Intel-
ligence Service. That Yugoslav govern-

- rior, Brankov constantly retur

- ing our conversation along lines
‘would give him an idea of my att

' ply him with various data, to kee

. drew out of his pocket a P

| Yugoslav police who had formerly

ment circles, Tito, Rankovic and 0
were closely linked with American
telligence Service organs is prove?
the fact that, in 1945, in the majority of
cases the Americans filtered their agen
into Hungary through Yugoslavia.
Moreover, this was done in such a Way
that the Yugoslavs knew that these
dividuals were American agents. For i
stance, Tibor Szonyl and his associates —
the Swiss trotskyite group made uP &?
tirely of American agents—returned ‘0
Hungary through Yugoslavia. Most Co?
vincing proof of the ties of leading YU8*
slav circles of Prime Minister Tito 20" —
Home Minister Rankovic, with the Al
ericans in my conversation with Rank©
vic in the summer of 1947 during ™Y
holiday in the Yugoslav resort of 40 —
bazia. : :
Chairman: Will you please tell thé
court how you established contact Wi
Yugoslav official persons? — coe
Rajk: I established contact with
Yugoslav intelligence organs and wit ;
Brankov as early as 1945, independently —
of the American Intelligence organ®
did not know at the time that Yugosl@v®
were in close contact with the Amé ne
cans. Brankov presented Tito’s policy bi
me as a “new tactic in building socialism
in the new historical situation that
arisen in the course of the world wa?

When I became minister of the gi
ned to this —
rect-

that
itude

to the Soviet Union and to the leader —
of the Communist Party who wel? a a
suing a policy of friendship with t??
Soviet Union, that is, to Rakosi, Gere —
Farkas and others, of how much I 5y™
pathized with Tito’s nationalist Povey
and what were my political sentiment®
From my answers, Brankov could &
ther that I not only sympathized wit)
Tito but also approved of his national co
and anti-Soviet views. As a result, ean
kov became so frank that he told res
that he was leader of the Yugoslav haem
telligence Service in Hungary and ask

me, as minister of the interior, tO Sune
p him ;

litical

were

theme and I guessed that he was di

informed about the Hungarian Pp
scene, about different questions that
state secrets and so on.
Chairman: Was there any menti0
your internment camp acquaintances:

Involved with Tito’s gang

Rajk: Yes. As head of the militar
sion, Brankov often went to Belgr@ id
instructions and every time he ee é
he brought back greetings from Ran e
vie, Milic, Vokmanovic and others. all
informed me that the Yugoslavs wer® ©
leading statesmen in Yugoslavia. &

In 1947 I spent my holidays in Rae
slavia where I was heartily weleo™
Rankovie paid me a visit in Abbazis
woman from the Croat UDB, acted 2° win
terpreter. Rankovic told me that he me
of my work for the Hungarian po 8
and that he had now come to Ab»
on the direct orders of Tito to i” ne
me that if my political behavior #2
future did not fully fit in with Tito’s PY
icy, I would be exposed. 1

I replied that his threats were pa ae
fluous since I had had nothing a ith
with the Hungarian police, and t cally
I had collaborated with them politic? |
it was not because I had been CURR
and recruited but because my P° wit?
conyictions coincided with theirs. capone

ovic ther Es
a mocking gesture, Rank notostati© ue

wat
copy and gave it to me to read. re

the copy of my statement to the reaih
garian police in 1931, at the time of 7”
first arrest. : tic
I asked Rankovie how the photost# to
copy of this document had Bae old
his possession. Was it through ¢ pad
lice

contact with the Hungarian POW jy
had received information from aes
ter, for it was known that the f ate.
police used to exchange informatie? aoe .
_ Or was it through other channels *\ this
kovic told me that he had obtaine@ —
document not from the files of pet)
goslav police but from the Ame oe
that the Horthy police sent thet
chives to the west when Sane
overnment and various of
fled at the end of the war. Ther ee
he Ame

mn oft

y mis-
ae for

chives found their way into t

can zone. :
I asked Rancovic how w:
Americans had given him this

that t
it 7 stot

ee
PACIFIC TRIBUNE — OCTOBER 21, 1949 — PAGE ©

form