Alvaro Cunhal, Genesol Secretary, Communist Party of Portugal mee SS : PCP’s ap to the military proach qe Situation of By Albert J. Lima which said in part; tionary Action. of its suceess: sible changes: and give it confidence. fascism. @ All actions must be based on a correc results, never-on improvisation and impatience oe @ Action must on no account become terroristic. The activities of the Armed Revolutionary ‘Action followed these sugges- tions. Never at any time did the organization erty that would confuse and antagonize the S ; geared to the people's democratic revolutionary movement so as to encourage it T.. attitude of the PCP in regard to the responsibility of revolutionaries toward the armed forces was clearly spelled out in May 1972, when the Plenum of the Cen- tral Committee adopted a document entitled: ‘‘The Main the Present Situation,” “Organization and work in the armed forces is a prime task in combatting the fascist dictatorship, because on the threshold frontation is is essential to command the support of a Substantial part of the ser- vicemen and to neutralize the rest. Desertions, therefore be viewed in the light of this objective. ‘Outright desertion, desertion to emigrate, thou protest, is, in the long term, by no means the best way of fi onialism. A revolutionary armyman should remain in the for > d _ revolutionary activity, excepting where his freedom is directly imperilled.”’ In addition to the legal and semi-legal forms of struggle in the armed forces, the PCP hailed the founding of an independent organization called Armed Revolu. of an acute revolutionary con- Particularly of officers, should gh expressive of a definite ghting fascism and col- ces and continue his The founding of this organization was characterized as an event of immense importance in the fight against the fasci welcoming this new initiative, the Party suggested the following basic conditions st dictatorship. In addition to @ Its actions must be tied in with the broad public movement and should not impede, but rather help, the mass Struggle; ® Careful consideration should be given to the Political situation and pos- t appraisal of forces and possible ’ take people’s lives or destroy prop- mass movement. Its actions were The actions of the Armed Revolutionary Action were aimed at all times against the colonial war machine, and their activities generated enthusiasm in the mass movement. It was inspiring to know that a growing number of servicemen were ready to put their lives on the line to destroy the colonial war machine and recently visited Portugal. Lima, a member of the Central Committee of the U.S. Communist Party, PACIFIC TRIBUNE-—FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1974—Page 6 CP of Portugal’s statement on: os PROVISIONAL AOVWEDOIWSG The following statement by the Com- munist Party of Portugal appeared in the September 6 issue of Avante!, the party’s paper. provisional democracy we are living through is full of novelties and contradictions. A clear understanding of both is basic _ if we are to define a Correct orientation at the present juncture. The system of power comprises various elements, whose positions do not always coincide. The Provisional Government is the expression of a vast Coalition united for achieving common objectives. The most important one is conducting elections for the Constituent Assembly, but on that mat- _ ter there are, naturally, differences of opin- ion to be overcome by means of voting and compromises. Up to the present, the pro- cess of cleaning up has still left many re- actionaries in responsible positions where they can exert influence. In solving any . important problem various forces, opinions and pressures come into play and influence _ the final decision. The correlation of forces is favorable to those who want to insure democratiza- tion and decolonization. But it does not per- mit spectacular advances in a straight line. The political process now going on will ° continue to be marked by irregularity and the hesitations arising from the factors Mentioned above. Anyone who does not realize this, who does not have a sense of : the facts, who ignores or forgets these Particular characteristics of the Portu- guese situation, who supports the policy of “all or nothing,” who is unable to appre- ciate results even when limited, and in- Sists on the impossible, is certainly not making any contribution toward defeating reaction and consolidating democracy in Portugal and peace in Africa, with the in- dependence of the peoples hitherto subject to Portuguese colonialism. : _We-are at a point where the battle be- tween the forces of democracy on the one hand and those of reaction on the other has not yet been concluded. Definitive victory in this battle is the first great priority in our struggle. It means defeating the forces of reaction, preventing the creation of eco- nomic, social and political conditions favor- able to counter-revolution, consolidating _ liberty, Overcoming the obstacles to the _ holding of elections, and insuring that those elections are truly free and democratic. reat” ‘popular government but one of thé f i PARTIDO COMUNISTA PORTUGUES Oo partido da classe operaria : e do povo ; trabalhadol § | We are for everything that achieve this objective and we are 4 anything that standsinitsway. _ The Provisional Government 15 Popular Government. But in -esse# serves the people. Despite the ba : and political spectrum of the coal goes to make it up, despite some d ‘a that objectively constitute concess} pressure from the right, the genera line of the policy of the Provisional @ ment is democratic and progress out surrendering the right to criti disagree, supporting the ProvisiO re ernment is in the vital interest of Ga tuguese people. The Provisional 6? ment is of the utmost importance means of insuring the way of dem Contrary to the illusions of certain the gogues and. irresponsible Leftists, ternative to the Provisional Gover under present conditions, would 0! ©) tionary right. . T;. opposition: to. the covers consists of the reactionary forces aa qi? FE ist groups, who objectively cooper: the vile | them. Overtly or covertly, using ga” weapons of propaganda, econ nas tage and social demagogy, reacey git afl up, as the principal target of its ( fe its conspiracy, not only the MFA x sist Forces Movement) and the most aa iol political forces but also the Pro vernment. a is in the interest of all othe 0 support and defend that governme” " : in Ble light of these considerati™ ig e is hard to accept the fact that dem? co a) forces, including parties of the gové tal coalition, sometimes act as thou otal were opposition forces. It is unacce for example, that anyone having a0 pr bilities in the government should 4 Fas behind closed doors, certain decisi®,, even take the initiative in proposing and then attack them violently ou 3 public opinion. This is what took “tf cently with respect to the right F and it should not berepeated. _ is For its part, the PCP’s policy