WESTERN CANADIAN LUMBER WORKER FOREST TRAGEDY By JOHN T. ATKINSON IWA Regional Safety Director It has been said many times that there is no such thing in the logging industry as a new accident. Hundreds of men killed, thou- sands injured, same accident, different name, different face, but the same aspects and circumstances and the same facts. Coroner’s in- quests are held in each and every case, the purpose being to find out who, when, where, why and by what means the workman died and what can be done to prevent its recurrence. Many very valu- able recommendations for the removal of physical hazards and changes to regulations have been made by coroner’s juries. These have resulted in the reduction and elimination of many industrial fatalities. THE PLACE On a hot summer day in June, 1961, near Parksville on Van- couver Island a new kind of accident occurred. Four highly skilled 4 and experienced crew members of a Martin Mars water bomber F were killed when the plane crashed and burned while making a a bombing run on a forest fire. _ This is a new technique in fire fighting with new equipment a and new possibilities. a No regulations, no rules of conduct have been determined and no training of ground crews has yet taken place so far as we are- Ag aware. _ This is the background of circumstances under which these a men met fiery deaths in a logging operation at Northwest Bay. 4 The Coroner’s Inquest was held in Parksville, July 4, 1961 at 4 7.30 p.m. In attendance were Brother Ed Linder, Financial Sec- retary of Local 1-80 and myself from the Regional Office. At the a very outset of the inquest, our apprehensions were aroused by the presence of highly rated legal representation from the em- ployers. This is not customary in the case of industrial accidents. oor gor ae 12 THE FIRE The forest fire in question started on a logging setting and "had no special circumstances. It could have started from any number of reasons in such weather, and had not made too much =e progress before the alarm was turned in. It was, however, a per- feet target for which this new technique of water-bombing could be used to advantage. Sidehill with freedom of access from almost any direction at low altitude. Visibility was good and smoke was no problem, THE MACHINE _ The nature of the tasks to be performed by this giant four ‘engined machine made mechanical perfection mandatory. At no me during the inquest was any function of the aircraft in ques- on, the only exception to this being the radio silence after the lot had started the bombing run on the fire target. Experts borated in great detail on the methods of load release from » four tanks, two of which were loaded, and the system of ntrols by which the drop is made. Any possibility of failure in ; aspect of operation appeared to be very remote. The fact » load was never dropped emphasized the need for close the evidence with regard to this. “ THE AIR CREW Killed in the crash with Pilot Richmond were co-pilot W. J. Wiggins, Flight Engineer J. V. Edwards and second engineer, R. A. Morin. These men were highly skilled and experienced air- men, well known in B.C. aviation and had received extensive training in the operation of the Martin Mars bomber and the technique of water bombing. FIRE FIGHTERS Having completed the days’ work prior to the fire alarm, the logging crew was stopped on its way home and returned to the woods to fight fire. They were made aware of the coming of the water bomber and told to evacuate the fire area when the whistle on the yarder was blown and to come down to the road. ACTION A radio call to Sproat Lake to the aircraft brought immediate action and the plane flew over the fire scene on a reconnaisance flight and made contact with the ground control. The pilot deter- mined the core of the fire and stated the course of the bombing run. He immediately left for Parksville to pick up his water load. Shortly afterwards he radioed that he was coming in and would be over the target in two minutes. The whistle was blown and he swooped in very low. Ground control grabbed the radio, yell- ing: “You're too low, you’re too low!” but no reply came from the plane. The run was made over the target but the load was not dropped. Beyond the target area the pontoon hit a snag and the plane crashed and burned. CONCLUSIONS The coroner’s jury did not come to any conclusions as to why. Here was a perfect setting for water-bombing a forest fire, perfect weather, perfect machine, an efficient crew and yet the ending was tragic. It is clearly evident that two minutes warning by the oncoming aircraft did not allow sufficient time to the firefighters to clear the area. Also, the crew did not know and could not be informed of the direction of the bombing run when the pilot and ground control alone made this decision. Regardless of the merits of this new technique in fighting for- est fires, it must be admitted that much remains to be done to eliminate the hazards inherent in the practical application of it, Statements of workmen directly under the flight path of the plane confirm the theory and possibility that fear of injury to others on the ground may be the “why” that we seek so diligently. More preparation, more planning and co-ordination in these kinds of emergencies will prove to us that these good men did not die in vain.