SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

4

6 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, NOVEMBER 12, 1986

nowing beforehand what the objections
could be, we said that we agreed to freeze
missiles with a range of under 1,000 km
and to immediately start talks on what is
to be done with them inthe future. As for
the medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our
country — this issue was invariably present in the
“global version” of President Reagan — we sug-
gested that talks be started on this subject as well. As
you see, on this problem too our proposals were
serious and extensive, permitting a radical solution
of this problem as well.

The third question that I raised during my first con-
versation with the president and that formed an integral
part of the package of our proposals, was the existing
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and the nuclear test
ban treaty. Our approach is as follows: since we are
entering an entirely new situation, when a substantial
reduction of nuclear weapons and their elimination in
the foreseeable future will be started, it is necessary to
protect oneself from any unexpected developments. We
are speaking about weapons which to this day make up
the core of this country’s defenses.

Therefore, it is necessary to exclude everything that

Nuclear

Weapons

Deployed, 1982
ester? © REED Steareoic

4 Tactical

y nst ane
JARI

10.000 10.000

7,400

300 300
250
192 80 i
US USSR UK FRANCE CHINA
Nuclear-weapon states

could undermine equality in the process of disarma-
ment, to preclude any possibility of developing new
weapons securing military superiority. We regard this
stance as perfectly legitimate and logical.

For that matter, we firmly stated the need for strict
observance of the permanent 1972 ABM treaty. More-
over, in order to consolidate its regime, we proposed
to the president adopting a mutual pledge by the U.S.
and the Soviet Union not to use the right to pull out
of the treaty for at least ten years and abolishing
strategic weapons within this period.

Taking into account the particular difficulties which
the administration created for itself on this problem,
when the president personally committed himself to
space weapons, to the so-called SDI, we did not demand
the termination of work in this area. The implication
was, however, that all provisions of the ABM treaty will
be fully honoured — that research and testing in this
sphere will not go beyond laboratories. This restriction
applies equally to the U.S. and to the USSR.

In listening to us, the president expressed his remarks
and asked for clarification on certain points. During the
conversation, we firmly and definitely raised the ques-
tion of verification, linking it with the post-nuclear
situation. This situation demands special responsibility.
I said to the president that if both countries embark on
nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union will toughen its
stance on verification. It should be realistic, compre-
hensive and convincing. It should create full confidence
in reliable compliance with the agreement and should
contain the right to on-site inspection.

>

-had come to Reykjavik with nothing at all to propose. —

sions, figures, levels, sublevels and so on. There was not
a single fresh thought, a fresh approach or an idea which
would contain at least hint of some solution, of some §
advance. =

It was becoming clear, Comrades, that the Americans”

‘The impression was that they had come there to gather
fruits into their basket, empty-handed.

A dramatic situation was shaping.

he American president was not ready [0
decide ina serious way soasto really give |
an impetus to. productive and encourag: —
ing negotiations. This is exactly what I]
urged the president in my letter, in which }
I put forward the idea suggesting that an urgent and
a powerful impetus (at the level of the top leaders of
the two countries) an impetus to negotiations 0?
nuclear disarmament. : :
Being confident that our proposals were well-balanced,
and took our partner’s interests into account, we
decided not to abandon our efforts to bring about 4
breakthrough at the meeting. A ray of hope on strat J
gic armaments appeared, following many clarifying }
questions. Clutching at that, we made one more big step |
in search of a compromise. I told the president: there
is a triad of strategic offensive armaments, recognizZ
both by you and by us. Ground-based missiles, strate-
gic submarines and strategic bombers. Well, let us have
a 50 per cent reduction of each part of the triad. And |

ee

es

We proposed adopting a pledge not to pull out of the
ABM Treaty for at least.10 years, and abolish strategic
weapons within this period.

ene

—)

should tell you, comrades, that the presi-

dent’s first reaction was not entirely nega-

tive. He even said: “What you have just

_ stated is reassuring”. But it did not escape

our attention that the interlocutors (com-

rade Shevardnadze and George Shultz had already

joined the conversation on these issues by then)

were somewhat confused. Meanwhile, doubts and

objections appeared right away in their separate re-

marks. The president and the secretary of state

started talking straight away about divergencies and

disagreement. In their words we clearly discerned

the familiar old sounds that we heard from the

Geneva negotiations for many months: we were re-

minded of all sorts of sublevels on strategic nuclear

armaments, the “interim proposal’ on missiles in

Europe, that we, the Soviet Union, should join the

SDI and should have some new agreement in place

of the existing ABM treaty, and many other things in
the same vein were voiced on their part.

I expressed surprise. Why so? We propose to accept
the American “‘zero’’ in Europe and get down to nego-
tiations on medium-range missiles in Asia while you,
Mr. President, are abandoning your previous stand.
This is incomprehensible.

As to ABM, we proposed to preserve and strengthen
this fundamental, important agreement, and you want
to give it up and even propose to have it replaced with
some new treaty, and thereby — following the depar-
ture from SALT-2 — also to wreck this mechanism
standing guard over strategic stability. This is incom-
prehensible, too. We grasped the essence of the SDI
plans as well, I said. If the United States creates a three-
tiered ABM system in outer space, we shall respond to
it. However, we are concerned over another problem:
the SDI would mean the transfer of weapons to a new
medium which would destabilize the strategic situation
and make it even worse than today. If this is the intent
of the U.S., then this should be said plainly. But if you
really want to have reliable security for your people and
for the world in general, then the American stand is
absolutely unsupportable.

I told the president directly: we have put forward new
major proposals. However, what we hear from you now
is exactly what everyone is quite fed up with and what
cannot lead us anywhere. Please, Mr. President, exam-
ine our proposals attentively once again and give us an
answer point by point. I handed to him an English trans-
lation of a draft of possible instructions that was drawn
up in Moscow and which could be given to the foreign
ministers and other agencies for drawing up three draft
agreements in case agreement was reached in principle.
They could be signed later during my visit to the U.S.

In the afternoon we met again. The president an-
nounced the stand that was drawn up during the break.
As soon as he uttered the first phrases, it became clear
that they were offering us the same moth-balled old
things, as I put it at the press conference, with which
the Geneva talks were choking: various intermediate ver-

-in the eastern part of our country and, according:

then there will be no need of all sorts of levels and
sublevels, of all sorts of calculations. ia
Following a long debate, we managed to reach mutual
understanding on that issue. c
Then the discussion started on the problem of
medium-range missiles. The Aniericans firmly uphe
the so-called intermediate version which provided for
the preservation of part of their missiles, including —
‘‘Pershing-2”’ missiles, in Europe and, naturally, the
preservation of our relevant SS-20 missiles. We categor
ically opposed it; I have already explained why. Europe
deserves to be rid of nuclear weapons, to stop being a
nuclear hostage. As for the president, it was difficult”
for him to fight his own “‘zero option”’ which he hat”
promoted for so long. And still, we felt the intentio? 4
of Americans to wreck the agreement under the guise
of their special concern for their allies in Asia. |
A lot of untenable things were said by the America?
side. It is embarrassing to repeat them here. The t@
began to advance further only when on this problem :
as well, we made one more step towards the America
side and agreed to the following formula: zero miss!
in Europe, 100 warheads on medium-range missi°"

100 warheads on medium-range missiles in US territo":
The most important thing was that we managed to agi
on ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons: |

—
|_ 500 NAVAL FORCES
9-1]
-— 400 jaudaes NATO oe,
ee
| 309 : Ga)
|Warsaw 5
L- 200 Kage
— 100
Number of Major Total Naval Tonnage 4
Surface Combatant Ships | (Millions of Metric Tons) __
Source: DOD Annual Report, FY 1982

Se a ee ee