Arab reiugees in the Gaza Strip - © How can it he solved ? Crisis in the Middle East RAB - Israeli relationships remain in a state of con- tinuing crisis. Since November the actions of the United Na- tions and the United States have not gone beyond the problem of establishing a mo- mentary peace on the Egyp- tian-Israeli borders. The basic causes of conflict remain, What are these causes? What con- tributions toward peace can be made by enlightened public opinion? The first step towards clar- ity lies in distinguishing two areas of discussion; that. of specific Arab-Iraeli relation- ships, and that of general East-West relationships. Fail- ure to reckon: with ‘both the general and the specific mars much of the discussion today. The history of Arab-Israeli relationships reveals a poten- tially favorable future, despite the bitterness of recent years. In the period following the First World War the Arab peo- ple. for the most part accepted the permanence of Jewish set- tlement, and the Jewish recon- ciled themselves to the loss By DR. SANFORD GOLDNER of Transjordan, which Britain partitioned off from Palestine. There were clashes, but the real cause wasn’t Arab-Jewish animosity, but British colonial- ism, as the Palestine Royal Commission reports themselves acknowledged. By the Second World War an incteasing number of Jews (about 600,000) and a larger and increasing number of Arabs (more than one million), lived in harmonious daily re- lationships in the villages, on the farms, and in industrial occupations. In 1946 and 1947 Jewish and Arab workers en- gaged in joint office, the pub- lic works department, the government-owned railways. The worsening of relation- ships in the years since, can- not be viewed simply in terms - of specific Arab actions to- wards Jews or vice versa. Here the role of the Middle East in world politics becomes deci- sive. First in historic order was Britain’s aim of consolidating its road to empire by securing the areas adjacent to the Suez Canal, Second was the import- ance of oil and the fact that 50-60 per cent of the world’s oil resources lie in this area. Third was the emergence of a post-war world split into two blocs. A footnote also must be added concerning British-U.S. An Israeli contradictions. The U.S. has attempted and partially suc- ceeded in displacing Britain in the area. This, however, leaves essentially undisturbed the larger aims of Western policy, which have an important bear- ing on the reluctance of the Western power to recognize Egyptian control of the Suez Canal. Neglect of the real problems, coupled with what The London Times called the West’s con- cern “to keep an uneasy bal- ance between Israel and the Arabs,” has kept the area in a state of permanent crisis. This was intensified by the at- tempt of the U.S., with Britain as the front, to form the Bagh- dad Pact. Designed to win the Arab states, it won only Iraq. Moreover, it crystallized the rising nationalism of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and the Sudan. Israel, meanwhile, had aban- doned the neutralism of the first few months of her exis- tence, -and openly identified herself with the interests of the West. From this act have fol- lowed certain military, eco- nomic and _ political conse- quences. Tensions between Israel and the Arab states increased. Is- rael reduced her trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to a negligible point. Israel joined with the West in opposing the Asian-African. attempt to place the matters of racialism in South Africa and colonialism- in North Africa on the United Nations’ agenda. Finally, Israel paved the way for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. In the aftermath she has found herself isolated from the Arab world, from: the East and from the West. Events have made clear that there will be no solution of direct Arab-Israel problems without agreement among the Big Four. This means the neu- tralizing of the Middle East with respect to the East-West controversy. All the Arab powers except Iraq are in or moving towards the neutralist camp, in accord soldier watches the Israeli-Egyptian border APRIL 5, 1957 — PACIFIC TRIBUNE—PAGE ll with the spirit of the Bandung Conference. The facts of life, the absence of any other real alternative, would, it seems to this writer, lead Israel increas- ingly towards neutralism in the days ahead. Such conclusions, however, should not lead to simplified judgements with respect to direct Arab-Israel relation- ships. Some persons, looking only at Israel’s alignment with the West, give no thoughts to the raids on Jewish border settlements, or to the continued violation by Egypt of the UN’s | 1951 decision requesting Egypt to open the Suez Canal to Is- raeli shipping. Any settlement must solve these problems and guarantee Israel’s right to existence. Such settlement, on the other hand, must include Israel’s agree- ment to a solution of the prob- lem of Arab refugees and an end to the “‘pass,” “curfew” and § residence restrictions on Arabs living within the borders of Israel. Failure to include, both the © general and the specific leads, © on the one hand, to reactions § of those who heap sole blame © on Nasser and the Arab lead- ers; and on the other hand, to reactions of those who see only | the historically progressive role of the rising national libera- tion movement but fail to note its contradictions and anti- Israel character. ‘ The Eisenhower Doctrine is simply a more naked extension of a policy which has already proved bankrupt: Enlightened public opinion should be brought to bear to make the Middle East a subject for top- level settlement among the Big Four. Without a resolute settle- ment of East-West differences with respect to the Middle East. Israeli-Arab relations will re- main in a state of crisis and turmoil. With such a resolution, the Arab and Israeli people can. return friendship. They can then de- vote themselves to those mat-_ ters of economic and social upbuilding which are ultimate- ly in the highest interest of both peoples. to the highroad of —_ ee