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NATO:
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power

NATO — THREAT TO WORLD PEACE
By M. Kukanov

Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971
Paperback, 60c.

Available Co-op Bookstore,

341 W. Pender, Vancouver 3

By Ray Ellis

are average citizen, relying on infor-
mation from the commercial press and
television, can hardly be faulted for a
degree of bewilderment over the waspish
diplomatic language being exchanged to-
day between Washington and the various
Western European capitals.

That part of Europe — so the assur-
ances went — was a faithful partner;
indeed President Richard M. Nixon re-
cently talked about the ‘Year of Europe”
with paternal generosity; our military
presence on ‘that continent was cherished
by the inhabitants; our investments were
invited; and the Yankee tourist dollar
'was pocketed with due appreciation. The
United States stood in the noble posture
as the guarantor of peace and economic
stability. :

Suddenly something went haywire.

An ungrateful Europe failed to ap-
preciate the unilateral decision by Pres-
ident Nixon to order a world-wide nu-
clear alert at the time of the October 1973
Mideast crisis. England, Italy, France
and others broke from the United States
when the oil boycott was put into effect.
The “Year of Europe’ extravaganza,
with choreography by Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, never reached the re-
hearsal stage.

_ Even before these events, the Feder-
al Republic of Germany abandoned its
US.-tailored policy of territorial claims,
with the consequence that the Bonn gov-
ernment and the socialist German Demo-
cratic Republic are now members of the
United Nations. The claim of Der Alte,
the former Chancellor Kurt Adenauer,
that only Bonn could speak for Germany,
was laid to rest.

FRG LAUNCHING PAD

“We've mounted the rocket on a turn-.
table so we can swing it round if our
NATO friends get out of step.”

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1974-PAGE 4

The reasons for this sharp turn of
events did not flow out of clogged diplo-
matic channels or the aggravation
brought on by the late President Georges
Pompidou’s hem-rrhoids. It was inevit-
able, given the forces at work since World
War II. What evolved in Europe was an-
other, and extremely important, chapter
in the declining power of imperialism to
dictate the fulfillment of its blueprints
for the future.

Fortunately, there is now available an
English translation from Russian of an
account of the history of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization, whose exist-
ence has stimulated the exacerbation of
Euro-U.S. relations. While on the surface
this pact cemented an alliance between
the powers of Western Europe and the
United States, the agreement carried
within itself the eventual growth of an-
tagonism between these two competitive
world centers.

NATO, held over the years in restraint -

by the. socialist nations and the peace
movements of its affiliated countries,
now is viewed by the European national
leaderships as less of a partnership and
more of a vehicle for domination by the
United States. That domination carries
grave risks for those who expected to
reap gains through participation.

M. Kukanov, the author of the book,

has made an exceptional contribution to_

an-understanding of NATO with his com-
pact analysis. His research provides val-
uable documentation for anyone desirous
of gaining clarity on the relationship
between the signatory countries of Eur-
ope and the US.

The concept of a postwar European
military alliance was first put forward in
1948 by Ernest Bevin, Britain’s Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, quickly endorsed
by John Foster Dulles, and then revised
away from the professed aim of prevent-
ing German aggression to opposition to
‘any aggression.” Thus the Brussels
Treaty of 1948 came into being only to be
speedily replaced a year later with the
North Atlantic Treaty which included 12
(later enlarged to 15) countries with the
addition of the United States.

The hypocrisy of the enlarged alliance
was crude. The Preamble to the Treaty
spoke of safeguarding “the freedom,
common heritage, and civilization of their
peoples, founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberties, and the
Tule of law.” This was no bar to the ad-
mission of fascist Portugal. And the Uni-
ted States, where Britain had failed, was
fresh from crushing the Greek democra-
tic movement, a step in the direction of
the military dictatorship which rules that
unhappy land today. ;

All pretense at disguising the Treaty
was quickly discarded. The alliance, as
Kukanov correctly states, ‘‘was not only
a military and political. but also an ideo-
logical organization and as such was on
the same plane as the Holy Alliance of

the 19th and the Anti-Comintern- pact of
the 20th century.”’

The language of the Treaty was so

drafted that it had the effect of binding:

the signatories to U.S. foreign policy even
to the extent of drawing them into a war
they might wish to _avoid. The Treaty
also circumvented the authority of the
United Nations Security Council with its
power to intervene in disputes “likely to
endanger international peace and secur-
ity.”” Here was the opening attack on the
veto power of the Security Council, a pow-
er that Washington is coming to prize as

_ its influence in the UN slips.

The original military outlook of NATO
was for Europe to provide the bulk of the
land forces while the United States was
to employ atomic bombs, planes and
and naval units. This scheme, where
death by the millions was to be Europe’s
fate, was soon discarded — in August 1949
the Soviet Union exploded an atomic
bomb.

The aggressive intent remained; the
plans of the Pentagon were revised ac-
cordingly. First, Washington intensified

. the arms race with enough atomic weap-

ons to blow up the world several times

over. That race initiated by the U.S. has —

gone on to this day with this year’s pro-
posed military budget the largest of all
time.

Tension was increased at every op-
portunity. ‘Massive retaliation’? and
“brinkmanship” became standard phras-
es in the oratory of that pious Christian
statesman, Dulles. Colliers magazine
published a special issue projecting the
future conquest of the Soviet Union. In
legislative halls the Dulles doctrine of

force and violence was given full endorse- °
ment by the ambitious Richard Nixon.

BS after NATO came into being, the
United States, Great Britain and France
created the Federal Republic of Germany

and the U.S. promptly proceeded to call

for ‘the incorporation of an FRG army
into the military alliance — this in the
face of the Potsdam Agreement to disarm
the defeated power and prohibit it from
armament production. The FRG capital-
ists and non-repentant militarists were
quick to comply. Europeans, the victims
of Nazi aggression, protested against a
revived Bundeswehr, but their ‘govern-
ments bowed to U.S. pressure.

Thus NATO came to embrace a re-
armed FRG committed to a revision. of
the territorial status quo of Europe — a
demand that was aggressive in character
and carried the potential of World War III.

The U.S: design of the use of force
went beyond Europe. Pax Americana
was to reach every continent, intervene
in colonial possessions and areas of the
emerging third world. The old colonial
powers lacked the strength to hold their

_ Egypt... the listing can go on 2

ee
empire and, as Kukanov writes, sb
the establishment of NATO yA
members, Belgium and Italy, ee j
all their former colonies, while
and France are left with very Sm of W
tories comprising a mere fraction? jn

they had when the alliance was f0

- NATO felt unrestrained by i
claimed jurisdictional limita Ti
ope when it declared that the F eh
against Indochina was ‘‘an ee a
tribution to the common secur i iat
free world.” NATO gave direct ™ a
and economic aid to France al
against Algerians, using the ae
Algeria was an overseas depa its si
France. To this day Portugal, ee
efforts to crush the liberation Mi)
in Africa, is heavily supplied W! ir
ments and credits from. NATO oan
NATO governments have had “tack ©
Indonesia, Korea, the 1956 4 d on, 2
ni ;
more episodes are added each Sb

Alliances parallel to NATO 1’,
created: Organization of Amer} orga!
(OAS), South East Asia Treaty ~ nist
tion (SEATO), Central Treaty
tion (CENTO), Australia-New
U.S. Military Alliance (ANZUSS gover

The ambitions of the NA. Ss. ott?
ments, spurred on by the U- “ailite
reality. Appropriations for ee tind
warped domestic budgets. The yas V2
strength of the socialist nations verse
ly underrated; liberation rae
spread; peace movements proli ;

The concept of detente i” ied 2
weary of war could not be on
It won approval first in Be reas?
spread to the United States W2" teil
ment of support came from corr de
terests attracted by profitable sp
the economic decline took on eppr0" ;
portions. Detente gained public sel

Detente, however, is not _ a
pelling force. Its enemies hav’
rendered; witness continued tage b
ist activity in the FRG, sabou™, oft
Senator Jackson with the app “up?
Zionist movement, and Chine th 10
for a strong NATO. On the ie for
lasting peace, detente must MO*” jaf
to the next stage, disarmamer pte
quires continual, enormous P
the Nixon Administration 2” udé
to slash the proposed military! nd
halt intervention in Asia, Afric?“ —"

America.

It is certainly valid to enter
outlook of: optimism in the $ ¢a si
peace. NATO and other pacts ‘i replat
nature can be dismantled an y 2
by genuine collective ane and
ments. Obstacles are plenUtr ap
they are removed new ones rt B85
But a ceaseless, unified eff0
capability of removing the S“
from humankind forever.

What better celebration
queath for generations of the

a