Be Sa _ THE REAL RECORD OF THE SOCREDS, LIBERALS AND TORIES Duplicity on the Columbia By SEAN GRIFFIN Canada,’’ declared General A. G. L. McNaughton in 1962 in a Scathing denunciation of the Columbia River Treaty, ‘‘was sold down the river by the government. “In fact,’’ he added succinctly, “you can say by two govern- ments.” Had McNaughton, whose own Plan for the development of the Columbia River was the basis of a Mammoth campaign against the Impending sellout, made the Statement two years later, he ‘Would have had to say three S0vernments, as the Pearson Liberal administration added its betrayal to that of the Diefenbaker f0vernment in Ottawa and the Bennett government in Victoria and rammed the final treaty _ through a minority house. Three governments, three Parties — and a traitorous sellout. Now, more than a decade later, John Diefenbaker has fallen from his position as prime minister though he is still in the House of Commons, a leftover of history. Lester Pearson is dead and W. A. C. Bennett has finally been deposed. But the Columbia River Treaty is far from being past history. Only last September, Premier Barrett demonstrated that Columbia River costs already had Climbed to $721 million (they’ve Climbed even more since) more than the Socred administration had rgained for — an additional cost that would have to be borne by the People of B.C. _ And last week, the latest chapter M the long history of betrayal was’ revealed with the disclosure that Mounting costs of the Columbia Were reallocated in the B.C. Hydro budget of Socred days, to further hide the enormity of the Columbia Slveaway. Three governments, three Parties — and a sellout that has turned into a monumental subsidy to the U.S. paid for by the people of IS province. Significantly, all three of those Parties — the Liberals, the Con- Servatives and Social Credit — are j the B.C. legislature. And all of them, in their clamor to attack the DP government and bolster their Political fortunes, have seized upon “Ne Hydro scandal and have at- © tempted by some reverse logic, to Make it serve their own ends. But all three of those parties are Suilty in the Columbia River Treaty. All three played a role in he selling of a river. And if anything has emerged from their ebate on the Hydro cost Teallocation scandal, it is nothing More than the incredible duplicity of the main spokesmen for those Tee parties. Referring to the Hydro cover-up, Provincial Conservative leader Scott Wallace stated dramatically ast week, “This has to be a devastating indictment and a grim reminder of the depths to which Cial Credit was determined to go Cover up a massive bungle.”’ A devastating indictment indeed . but Wallace had conveniently °rgotten the depths to which his °Wn Conservative Party had gone - and the role played by a Predecessor of his, Davie Fulton. t was the Conservative Party Under John Diefenbaker that San the whole Columbia River Sellout that was to culminate three Years later in the final ratification of the treaty. And it was the “onservative justice minister ‘General Davie Fulton, also chairman of the Canadian negotiating team who in 1960 held the power to change the course of Columbia Treaty history — and failed. Not surprisingly, Socred leader Bill Bennett has remained relatively silent on the latest disclosures about Columbia River costs. For it was his father, former Social Credit premier, W. A. C. Bennett, who sabotaged the treaty negotiations and with Liberal and Conservative assistance — set the stage for the final giveaway terms of the treaty. Actually, the famous Mc- Naughton Plan was not only Mc- Naughton’s; it was the most logical and practicable of three proposals considered by the International Joint Commission (of which McNaughton was Canadian chairman) and as such, formed the basis for Canadian negotiations with the United States in early 1960. In the negotiations, the Americans had agreed, however reluctantly, to the Mc- Naughton proposals for diversion of the Kootenay River into the Columbia and Canadian dams under Canadian control. But Premier Bennett scuttled the whole plan in one swift — and traitorous — move. Without so much as a word to the other Canadian negotiators and in front of the American representa- tives, a B.C. government repre- sentative announced suddenly: “We will not stand for a dam in the East Kootenay.” Commenting later on _ the sabotage, of the negotiations by the Socreds, Howard Green, external affairs minister in the Diefenbaker government explained what happened without elaboration: “With the consent of the government of B.C. and with their approval we got the Americans to agree that the dam could be put in the East Kootenay. I think that was very much to the surprise of the government of B.C: but then they turned right around and changed their minds completely and said ‘we will not stand for a dam in the East Kootenay’.”’ Without the dam — Dorr, Bull River and Luxor — the Me- Naughton plan was nothing. And that, of course, was precisely Premier Bennett’s intention in sending his representative in to make the stunning announcement. The McNaughton plan rendered effectively impossible, the Americans were able to carry the day with their own preferred plan to construct the Libby Dam on the American side. In McNaughton’s words, because of Bennett’s sabotage, ‘‘they moved in on a house divided and .skinned the occupants alive.”’ The occupants were indeed skinned as later history was to prove beyond a doubt. But had Fulton and the Conservative government moved decisively, the course of history — and the Columbia River — might today be very, very different. % Rejecting the obvious decision which was to call off negotiations pending settlement of federal- provincial differences, Fulton instead went back- to the negotiating table and was forced to accept whatever the U.S. had to offer, And although he — and Canada — had been stabbed in the back ‘by Bennett, he never made the fact public. Prime Minister Diefenbaker quickly compounded Fulton’s error. In January, 1961, only days before USS. President Eisenhower’s term of office was to expire, he flew to Washington to initial the disastrous treaty. So enamored were the Americans of it, it went through the Senate in 30 minutes flat. ‘Why the Bennett sabotage? The Socred premier was far less in- terested in providing cheap power under Canadian contro] than he was in serving the corporate in- terests of Wenner-Gren in developing the Peace River. For that he needed a much emasculated Columbia Treaty — and above all — cash. The need for funds to finance the Peace development prompted his second act of sabotage. Even though the form of the treaty that Diefenbaker and Eisenhower initialled in 1961 was virtually pre- determined by Bennett’s refusal to have a dam in the East Kootenay, he still campaigned against it since it stipulated that downstream benefits would be shared by the two countries on a 50-50 basis and would be paid to Canada in the form of power. He wanted cash. For two years he held up the granting of water licences — assigned under the terms of the BNA Act to provincial jurisdiction and without which the project could not go ahead — in a pressure move to force renegotiation of the treaty on his terms. Responding to the Bennett black- mail Davie Fulton joined the fray again, and denounced his demand to replace downstream power benefits with a cash payment. Outlining his position in a speech in Prince George, he declared: “The Americans haven’t been offered such a windfall since the purchase of Manhattan Island — the Bennett-U.S. squeeze play won’t work. The power sellout has to be resisted.” Fighting words — but, for Fulton, too few, too late. And particularly so since by April, 1963 the Diefenbaker Conservative government, having slipped from the largest majority in Canadian history to a minority government in 1962, had lost completely to the Liberals under Lester B. Pearson. Yet, with a new government, here was an opportunity to scrap the treaty and end the ignominious sellout — especially since several Liberals, notably Coast-Capilano MP Jack Davis, had spoken out again the draft treaty. The Pearson minority govern- ment took a step backward in- stead. The addition of a protocol to the treaty was negotiated, making Canada even more servile to the U.S. and, more important, providing for payment of down- stream benefits in a lump cash sum. On June 5, 1964, the treaty was rammed through Parliament by a vote of 108 to 16. Less than half the MP’s were in the House during the crucial vote. Not a single Liberal registered a negative vote. “This confirms our party’s long- held suspicions about the costs of the Columbia,’ Liberal leader David Anderson loudly proclaimed in the Legislature, referring to the Hydro cost reallocation. But did “his party’ attempt to defeat the draft treaty when it first inherited it from the Diefenbaker govern- ment? Did his party, either in the government of Pearson or Trudeau, attempt to renegotiate the terms of the treaty when it was demonstrated that it did grievous harm to this country? Did his party take any action on the demand for renegotiation — voiced by the Columbia River for Canada Committee — based on the disclosure that the U.S. had in- stalled triple the capacity at Grand Coulee that was allowed under the terms of the treaty? Three governments, _ three parties — and a sellout that any one could have stopped or, at least, modified .. . and didn’t. Liberal MLA Pat McGeer was guilty of the ultimate duplicity, however, when he stated: in the Legislature that the government was ‘‘gutless’’ for failing to fight for renegotiation of the treaty. Only the federal government — and a majority Liberal govern- ment is in power — can seek rene- gotiation. The NDP government has already petitioned the . Liberal cabinet to seek renegotiation — without response. And the same Liberal government is on the verge of another sellout, this time in- volving Canadian salmon. The Hydro cost reallocation, indicating that the cost to B.C. taxpayers of the Columbia River Treaty are far from being fully known, raises the issue afresh. It also raises some new questions. Bruce Yorke, former secretary of the Columbia River for Canada Committee which, along with some 60 trade union locals and labor councils, waged a long campaign against the sellout, pointed out that in testifying before the external affairs committee hearings on the Columbia he had demanded that Conservative external affairs minister Howard Green, Davie Fulton and a journalist, Tom Gould be subpoenaed to appear before the hearing to testify onthe actual events surrounding Premier Bennett’s sabotage of the treaty talks. -The journalist, Tom Gould, had publicly divulged the events surrounding Bennett’s move in a column published in October, 1960. His source was Fulton. “They were never called,”’ Yorke recalled in an interview with the Tribune, “‘but now there is an NDP government in Victoria and it should be proposed to resources minister Bob Williams that his government conduct a thorough investigation into the treaty and the costs to British Columbians. “That investigation should in- clude the subpoening of Gould, Green and Fulton to testify as to exactly what happened during the ill-fated negotiations with the Americans. “At a time,” Yorke emphasized, “when Bill Bennett, the Socred successor to the main author of the betrayal, is attempting to stage-a right-wing comeback, it is vitally important to bring all the details of this sellout into the open.” There is also the need, made more imperative with every new disclosure of higher costs for the Columbia, for the federal govern- ment to seek reopening of the treaty, including the demand for compensation from the U.S. for downstream benefits already delivered — benefits that have far exceeded those anticipated in the original treaty. General Mc- See COLUMBIA, pg. 12 oucn/ THIS IS EVEN WORSE TH. | THE BOOK. AQ) CREAR f ic 7F PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1975—Page 3 x presumably.