ally, he demanded that since Yugoslavia _
Was a less developed country industrial-
jy, Hungary’s entire industry shout be
‘Subordinated to Yugoslavia’s ecernemic
Policy, although this was to the detrie.
ment of Hungarian interests.

He regarded me, Palffy and Antal Rob
as the guarantee of this. Similarly he in-
formed me through Rankovic that he
had no objections to supporters of Ferenc
Nagy who had fled to the west, and
Several right social democrats taking
Part in the government. Thus, Tito’s plan
€nvisaged a right coalition government.

Plots in other democracies

Both Rankovic and Mrazovic informed
me, on Rankovic’s instructions, of Tito’s
_ Words that he was not only thinking of
“armed support” of intervention in Hun-
gary; but was also trying ‘to create
favorable conditions for similar actions
in the People’s Democracies bordering on
Hunganvy.

This policy was connected with the
Serious movements against the govern-
Ments of Poland and Czechoslovakia
Similar to the political actions initiated
_by Mindszenty. With regard to Bul-
8aria, Tito stated that national resent-
ment could be fomented and a reaction-
ary policy pursued ‘on the national
question that would have serious con-
Sequences.

Describing the policy of the bloc, Ran-

' Kovie told me in Paks that they would
Make short shrift of Albania. They
Would not only colonize Albania, but cut
_ Short her existence ag. an independent
Country and would annex hen territory
to Yugoslavia.

Most important was Tito’s plan for as-
Sistance to monarcho-fascist Greece.
When I spoke to Rankovie in Paks he
told me there was no sense in concealing
any longer their policy with regard to
Greece. It was in their interests that
the United States should strengthen its
base there as soon ag possible in agree-
Ment with them, that is, with Tito and
his associates.

That is why Yugoslavia would, at first
Covertly and later more and more open-
ly, follow the course of isolating demo-
 ratic Greece from the other people’s
demoratic countries, so that the monar-
_Chist forces could smash it. Rankovic
Went.on to say that parallel with the Hun-
arian events and using the same meth-
Sod as in Hungary, they would encourage
their supporters in the other People’s
Democracies to become politically active,
using approximately the same categories
of reactionary forces enumerated with
regard to Hungary.

He said that while the U.S. would put
Out provocations against the Soviet Union

at the time of the putsch, in order to -

tie its hands, they for their part would
attend to. various small and large scale
disorders in the People’s Democracies to
Make the confusion complete. Their
ultimate aim in these People’s Democ-
racies. was the overthrow of power and
the restoration of capitalism.

Another fascist on stand

' After Rajk had finished his evidence
the accused Palffy took his place in the

dock. Palffy is a onfirmed fasist, a fact _
he did not conceal at the trial. :
Palffy was the chief of the military ©

Part of the conspiracy. The Tito clique
Tegarded this former officer of the Hor-
thy army as their man and had prom-
ised him the post of Hungary war min-
ister, From 1945 Palffy was in the ser-
Vice of the Yugoslav Intelligence Ser-
Vice, regularly supplying it with secret
documents,

On Rankovic’s instructions he deliber-
ately staffed the army and the border
_ troops with reactionary officers, bitter
enemies of the People’s Democracy. Pal-
ffy was in the confidence of the Yugo-
Slav leaders and he knew a great deal
about their plans.

In the autumn of 1947, Palffy met Col-

- Mel Nedeljkovic, one of Tito’s men, at
the Congress of Partisans in Rome.
Nedeljkovic had been sent specially to
8ive Palffy the necessary information.
n the course of his conversation, with

Palffy he repeatedly stressed that he |

Was talking on behalf of. Tito.

‘He spoke of the plans, which had the
@greement of the United States, to wrest
the People’s Democracies from the de-
Mocratic camp, headed by the USSR.
Nedeljkovic assured Palffy that Tito’s
aims would materialize since they had
the backing of the United States.

Questioned by the chairman, Palffy told
of ‘his links with official representatives
of the Yugoslav government in Hungary
who under cover of their diplomatic
passpports, developed extensive activil
ties. Brankov, counsellor to the Yugo-
slav Embassy in Budapest, and the mili-
tary attaches, Colonels Lozic and Djo-
kail, received highly important data

. from. Palffy personally: In the summer

of 1947, Palffy told Rajk that it was
necessary to seize power at all costs.
Rajk decided to get Rankovic’s advice.

Palffy said: on his return from his
holiday in Yugoslavia, Rajk told me of
Rankovic’s instructions. These amounted
to an armed putsch, with the support
of the U.S.

In October, 1948, Palffy taking ad-
vantage of his position as chief of the
border troops, helped to arrange an il-
legal meeting between Rankovic and
Rajk. The latter afterwards told Paffly
of the assignments given him by Ran-
kovic.

Reveals putsch plans

Chairman: What was the essence of
Rankovic’s plan?

Palffy: Rajk told me that, according
to Rankovic’s plan, the putsch was to
be staged on a day when Rakosi, Gero
and Farkas were in Budapest, that is,
when there was a meeting of the Politi-
cal Bureau, or a session of the Council
of Minisiters. The beginning of the
putsch was timed for 28.00 hours, or la-
ter when all three would certainly have
returned home. Upon verifying this,
groups of twelve men each were to at-
tack the guards, disarm them and ar
rést the aforementioned people.

I had detailed conversations with Kor-
ondy on this matter. This was in April,
1949, just a few days before May Ist. Ko-
rondy had already been informed by
Rajk of his assignment, but I discussed
the details with him. After I had -told
him about the above-mentioned tasks he
informed me that he had gendarmes at
present serving in the police and the
army who could be formed, into groups
to assassinate Rakosi, Gero and Farkas.

Thereupon I told him that Rankovic
had promised Djokail and Rajk his as-
sistance in this matter. Rankovic said
that before the putsch they would send
across the border Yugoslavs of Hungari-
an origin, in Hungarian army and police
uniforms so that they would be at hand
as specialists—but actually as hired as-
sassins.I told Korondy that he could rely
on Yugoslav support and that he would
be given a special detachment to carry
out this measure.

Paiffy, further stated that the putsch
did not come off not because of any
‘fault of theirs. The Hungarian govern-
ment tightened its security measures and
the criminals were arrested.

Dr. Alapi, chairman of the public pro-
secutor’s office, asked Palffy what he
knew of the preparations to overthrow
the people’s democratic order in ‘the
other people’s Democracies.

Palffy replied that the subversive ac-
tivities of the Tito clique were conduct-
ed in all the People’s Democracies. Ned-

-elkovic informed me of this.

How Tito clique operated

The accused Brankov, told the court
of the Tito clique’s undermining work.
Colonel Tsitsmil was the original organ-
izer of the Yugoslav military mission in
Budapest and personally received his
instructions from Tito and Rankovic con-
cerning the mission’s method of work.

These instructions were to organize
an Intelligence Service, to establish close
contact with the Anglo - American rep-
resentatives and to avoid falling under
the influence of the Soviet representa-
tives in the Allied Control Commission.
During the war, Tsitsmil had close con-
tact with Anglo-American Intelligence
Service officers in Yugoslavia and after

the war handed over to them all the

necessary information. Tsitsmil has been
promoted now—Tito has appointed him
ambassador to London.

Brankov stated that they were given

categoric instructions by Rankovic to
employ all means in pursuit of their
aims, Threats, violence, assassination —
even of their own people—all this figured
in the arsenal of these bandits. For in-
stance, the jHungarian citien Jubitsa
Hibar was forcibly taken in an embassy
car to Yugoslavia where he was forced
to sign a written statement that he
would work for the UDB. :

Ded

The Titoites recruited their agents
from among provocateurs and careerists,
from among people devoid of honor or
conscience. Rankoviec knew that Andras
Szalay had betrayed a group of anti-
fascists who were planning to escape
from prison. Nearly 60 of them were
killed, including many Serbs. And this
enemy of the Yugoslav people was one
of the leading agents of the Yugoslav
government.

The Yugoslav official representation -
in Budapest lost no time in handing
over to the American and British In-
telligence Services all the data they re-
ceived from their spies. Rajk, Palffy,
Szonyi, Szalay, Justus, Korodny and
others. Kardelj gave direct instructions
that the British general Edgecombe, who
egged on the Yugoslav hirtelings, should
be kept informed of everything.

Aimed to popularize Tito

The principle aim of the Tito agency
in _Hungary was to popularize Tito, draw
over the Hungarian people to its side
and furnish the conditions for establish-.
ing a Balkan Federation. Here the Yugo-
slav agents did not confine themselves
to Hungary alone, but stretched their
tentacles to the other democratic coun-
tries.

In Rumania, the man chosen was the
minister of justice, Patrascanu,. who had
no objection to carrying out Tito’s plan.
But he was isolated in good’ time and
removed from the party. Rankovic com-
plained to Brankov that they would have
to start all over again in Rumania. The
notorious American agent, Misha Lom-
par, was sent to Rumania for this pur-
pose.

Great hopes were also placed on the
disagreements in the Polish Workers’
party. It was assumed that Gomulka
would be the proper man to carry out
Tito’s designs. But Gomulka acknow-
ledged his mistakes.

Here, too, complained Rankovic, they
would: have to start from scratch, and
he sent Ivan Rukavin to Poland as
Counsellor to the Yugoslav Embassy, to-
gether with a number of other agents.
Similar attempts were made in relation
to Bulgaria and Albania. Brankov said
that he. had learned all this from Ran-
kovic, Djilas and Milic.

Brankov said that, in 1946-47, Tito sent
his, representatives to the People’s De-
mocracies under the guise of repriesen-
tatives of the Yugoslav Communist.

Party. I was such a representative in’

Hungary, stated the accused.

In Czechoslovakia the representatives
were Novosel, now a minister, and la-
ter Stilinivic; in Bulgaria, N. Kovacevic
and O. Tsitsmil; in Albania, Djerdje and
Slatic, and in Poland, another Kovocevic.
‘The task of these representatives, tes-
tified the accused. was to popularize Ti-
to, to engage in undernfining activities
in the Communist parties and the state
apparatus of the People’s Democracies.

Brankov described how the consular

_ department of the Yugoslav mission in

Budapest forged documents for the Yu-
goslav diplomats engaged in espionage,
and for recruited Hungarian subjects.

Knew of secret parleys

The accused testified that he knew of
the ‘secret meeting between Rankovic
and Rajk held at a country house near
Paks, and that Mrazovic told him about
this meeting. Brankov further testified
that during one of his regular trips to
Belgrade, Rankovic expressed dissatis-

’ faction with Rajk’s slowness, stressing

that Rajk could have been more energet-
ic and killed Rakosi and other leadens
of the Hungarian state in one night.
Rankovic sent two of his agents, the ex-
perisne-d p.itical assassins, Jovanovis
and Joikovic to Hungary to help Rajk.
They shadowed Rakosi.
sent out of Hungary and Joikovic re-
turned to Belgrade at the end of 1948.
Chairman: What directives did you
receive from the Minister of the Inte-
rior, Rankovic, in October, 1948, regard-

‘ ing the publication of a false statement

.

about relations with the Tito govern-
ment having been broken off?
Brankov: Rankovic simply stated that
the situation in Hungary wag such that
it was no longer possible to work in the
~way and that the methods would have
to be changed. The Hungarian authori-
ties had become so vigilant that it was
practically impossible for the embassy
members to carry on subversive work.

Jovanovic was”

He gave me instructions to return to
Budapest and leave the embassy, after
which I was to announce that I con-
demned the Tito policy and would remain
in Hungary as a political immigrant.
Seeing my hesitation, Rankovic told me
that he had spoken to Tito personally
about the matter and that Tito expect-
ed me to handle the assignment success-
fully. Rankovic also gave me instruc-
tions on what I was to do on my
return to Hungary.

These instructions were: first of all,
to win the confidence of the leadership
of the Hungarian Workers’ Party: sec-
ondly, once this confidence was won, to
maintain imperceptibly contact with the
Hungarian plotters, mainly with Rajk,
Rankovie ordered Mraxovic and myself
to put all other work aside and do only
this. Another of my assignments was to
establish contact with several important
Yugoslav agents in Hungary.

Chief agent for Rankovic

Brankov was Rankovic’s chief resident
agent in Hungary. He often visited Bel- _
grade where he received instructions di-
rect from the Yugoslav leaders. During
one of his visits there he had a confi-

. dential talk with Rankovich.

Chairman: Djilas was present at this
conversation ?

Brankov: Dijilas was present at this
conversation. He had just been in con-
ference with Tito who was then negoti-
ating with the American and British rep-
resentatives in Belgrade. They told Tito
that they were prepared to help the
Yugoslav government not only economic-
ally but also politically if the Tito gov-
ernment was prepared to fight against
the Soviet Union.

Djilas said the situation was such that
we had better accept this offer, for the
Americans and British had become our
natural allies, Rankovic thereupon add-
ed that collaboration was being carried
out in other countries.

A certain Sahota acted as go between
for Brankov and Rankovic during the
recent past. Brankov testified: In Feb-
ruary I met Sahota at an appointed place.
He reported to me that Rankovic want-
ed Rajk to be prodded into getting on
with the putsch; it should be made clear
to him that the time for preparation
had passed, that action was wanted. |

Rankovic also added that Rajk be in-
formed that Belgrade was dissatisfied _
with the delay in preparing the attempt |
against the lives of the Communist Patty
leaders.

During the trial Brankov tried to de-
pict Tito as the victim of the machina-
tions of Rankovic, Kardelj and Diilas.
However, when cross-examined he relat-_
ed that ag early as the initial stages of
the war, Tito was secretly negotiating
with Germany, promising to cease mili-
tary operations if Hitler: would allow a
Yugoslav government to be established
under the leadership of Tito.

After Stalingrad, however, when the
tide of the war turned, Tito broke off
these negotiations. A number of the par- —
tisan leaders who had had an inkling
about these negotiations and voiced their
indignation were deliberately put out of
the way. They were sent to sectors which
meant death.

Contact with U.S. spies

Even after the war, Brankov testified,
Tito, Rankovic and Kardelj were in con-
tact with the British and American In-
telligence Services in Yugoslavia and al-
so beyond its borders. I learned of this,

he continued, from a talk with Tsitsmil |

and also from the secret files of the
PUB. Misha Lompar, who during the war
had been sent on a mission to Switzer- |
land, was commissioned to contact Allen
Dulles, chief of American espionage in
Europe.

Upon his arrival in Switzerland, Lom-—
par also contacted a group of trotskyites _
there. Latinovic was sent to Marseilles
and Basso Jovanovic to Bari where he
contacted the Anglo-American Intelli-
gence Service. General Velebit, a British
spy of long standing was active in Lon-
don where he passed on to British Intel-
ligence all the materials at his disposal
including information about the Soviet
army. ;

In 1943 American and British military
missions came to Yugoslavia headed by
the Intelligence Officers Colonel] Hamil-
ton and General MacLean. Rankovic

Concluded. on page 9—See TRIAL

PACIFIC TRIBUNE — OCTOBER 21, 1949 — PAGE 7