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PECIAL SUPPLEMENT

hus, accord was reached on the problem
of medium-range missiles, too. A major
breakthrough was made in this direction
of nuclear disarmament as well. The
American administration failed to hold
ut against our insistent striving for achieving posi-
_ tive results.

However, there still remained the ABM issue and the
an on nuclear explosions.

Two groups of experts from our and the American
“Sides worked the whole night before we met the next
ay, Sunday, for our third conversation which was to

ome the concluding one in line with the programme.
hey thoroughly analyzed what had been discussed at the
Wo previous meetings with the president and reported
he results of their night-time debates respectively to me
id to the president.

The result was: there appeared a possibility of getting
Own to elaborating agreements on strategic offensive
armaments and on medium-range missiles.

The ABM treaty in this situation acquired key sig-
Nificance. Its role was becoming even more important.
Ould one wreck, I said, what has so far made it possi-
le to somehow restrain the arms race? If we now start
ucing strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons,
0th sides should be confident that over that time
Obody will develop new systems which would under-
Mine stability and equality. Therefore, in my view, it
S absolutely logical to fix the timeframe — the Ameti-
| Cans mentioned seven years, and we proposed ten years
| uring which nuclear weapons ought to be eliminated.
} We proposed ten years during which neither the Soviet
de nor the American side will avail itself of the right
_— and they have such a right — to withdraw from the
BM treaty and to conduct research and tests only in
aboratories. Thus, I think, you understood why exactly
N years? This is not casual. The logic is simple and
Onest. 50 per cent of strategic armaments are to be
duced in the first five years. And the other half —
| M the next five years. This makes it ten years.

In this connection I proposed to instruct our high-
_ tanking representatives to start full-scale talks on the
Iscontinuation of nuclear explosions in order to work
ut ultimately an agreement on their banning once and
all. In the course of the preparation of the agree-
hent — and here we again displayed flexibility and
Sumed a constructive stand — specific problems con-
€cted with nuclear explosions could be simultaneously
solved. ‘

N answer we again heard from President Reagan the
Oning which had been familiar to us since Geneva
hd from his public statements: that the SDI was a
€fense system, that if we started to eliminate nuclear
apons, how could we protect ourselves from some
adman who might get hold of them, that he was ready
© share with us the results obtained within the frame-
tk of the SDI. Answering this last remark, I said:
- President, I do not take seriously your idea of shar-
8 With us the SDI developments. You do not want to
are with us even oil equipment and equipment for milk
TOcessing plants.

_ Still you expect us to believe your promise to share

DI
Second American revolution’’, and revolutions do not
Ppen too often. I said to President Reagan: let us be

.

thi Sts and pragmatists. It is more reliable this way. The
Mgs we are talking about are too serious.

“ the way, yesterday, trying to justify his stand on
© SDI, the president said that he needed the pro-
pamme for America and its allies to remain invulnera-
ws Against a Soviet missile attack. As you see, in this
he already made no mention of madmen. The

Viet threat’? was again brought to light.

But this is nothing but a trick. We suggested that not
nly Strategic armaments, but also all the nuclear arma-

Tents in the possession of the U.S. and the USSR be
‘Munated under strict control.

Whence the need to protect the ‘‘freedom of America’”’

i Its friends from Soviet nuclear missiles as these

~'Ssiles will be no longer?

f there are no nuclear weapons, why have
protection against them? It means that the
entire “Star Wars” undertaking is of a pure-
ly militaristic character and is directed at
gaining military superiority over the Soviet

Let us return, however, to the talks. Although agree-
“ht On strategic arms and medium-range missiles was
“Ched, it was premature to believe that all this was
y finally resolved as a result of the two first
“sions. A whole day was ahead, nearly eight hours of
N-stop and intense discussions in which these ques-
» Which seemed to be agreed upon already, had to
‘Taised again and again. |

these discussions, the president sought to handle
“logical problems as well, demonstrating, to put it
Y, total ignorance and inability to understand both
Ocialist world and what is taking place in it. I.

‘developments with us. It would be a kind of —

rejected the attempts to link ideological differences with
questions of ending the arms race. I persistently drew
the president and the secretary of state back to the sub-
ject that brought us to Reykjavik. It was necessary to
remind our interlocutors again and again about the third
element of the package of our proposals, without which
it was impossible to reach accord on the whole. I mean
the need for strict compliance with the ABM treaty, con-
solidating the regime of this major treaty and banning
nuclear tests.

We had to draw attention again and again to what
seemed to be perfectly clear things: since we agreed to
effect deep reductions in nuclear arms, we should create
a situation that would preclude attempts — both in
deeds and in thoughts — to shake strategic stability and
to circumvent the agreements.

That is why we should be confident about the preser-
vation of the permanent ABM treaty. You, Mr. Presi-
dent, I said, ought to agree that from the time we start
reducing nuclear weapons, there should be firm confi-
dence that the U.S. will do nothing behind the back of
the U.S.S.R., while the Soviet Union will not do any-
thing behind the back of the United States that would
jeopardize your security or that would depreciate the
agreement and create difficulties.

Hence the key task to strengthen the ABM regime —
to not go into outer space with ABM research and to
keep research within laboratories. The ten years of not
using the right to pull out of the ABM treaty are neces-
sary to create the confidence that, while resolving the
problem of reducing arms, we ensure security for both
sides and for the world. -

But the Americans obviously had other intentions.
We saw that the U.S. actually wants to weaken the ABM
treaty, to review itso as to develop a large-scale space-
based ABM system for its own egoistic ends. To agree
with this would be simply irresponsible on my part.

As to nuclear tests, here too it was totally clear why
the American side did not want to conduct talks on this
issue in earnest. It would have preferred talks without
end, to put off the solution of the problem of banning
nuclear tests for decades. And once again we had to
reject attempts to use talks as a screen for a free hand
in the field of nuclear explosions. I stated bluntly: Iam
having doubts about the honesty of the U.S. position,
is there anything in it that might inflict damage to the
Soviet Union? How can one reach agreement on the
elimination of nuclear arms if the United States con-
tinues perfecting them? Still we had the impression that

_ the SDI was'the main hitch. Upon removing it we would’

have had an opportunity to reach an accord on the
banning of nuclear explosions as well.

t a certain stage of the talks, when it be-

came absolutely clear that to continue the

discussion would be a waste of time, I

reminded the other side: we have pro-

posed a definite package of measures and
I ask you to consider it as such. If we have worked
out a common position on the possibility of a major
reduction of nuclear arms and at the same time
failed toreach agrement onthe matter of the SDI and
nuclear tests, then everything we have tried to create
here falls apart.

The president and the secretary of state took our firm-
ness badly. But I could not pose the question in a differ-
ent way. This concerned the security of our country,
the security of the whole world, all peoples and
continents.

We proposed major, really wide-ranging things clearly
of the nature of a compromise. We made concessions.
But on the American side we did not see even the slight-
est desire to respond in kind, to meet us halfway. We
were deadlocked. And we began thinking about what
to conclude the meeting with. Yet we continued the
efforts to make our partners engage in a constructive
dialogue.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

10000 ;—

8000

6000

WARHEADS

7
USSR.“
2000s Be?

a a
Onl gad sala etd

1966 1970 1975 1981
Annual Report FY 1982, p. 54

ec =D of Deft

Geneva, November 1985: Gorbachev and Reagan
pledged to work to end the arms race on Earth and
prevent its spread into space. The Soviet proposals
presented at Reykjavik serve this aim.

The conversation that was planned to be the conclud-
ing one found itself in trouble. In this situation, instead
of parting — we back to Moscow and they to Washing-
ton — yet another break was announced. Let the sides
think everything over and meet once again after lunch.
On returning to the house of the city’s mayor after the
break we made yet another attempt to make the meet-
ing end in success. We proposed the following text as
the basis for summing up a positive result.

Here is the text: “¢

‘‘The USSR and «the Uiilted States nggeriake in the
course of ten years not to use their right to withdraw
from the permanent ABM treaty and to strictly observe
all of its provisions. It is prohibited to test all space ele-
ments of an -ABM defence in outer space except for
research and testing conducted in laboratories.

“*In the course of the first five years of this decade
(till 1991 inclusive) the strategic offensive arms of the
sides will be reduced by 50 per cent.

““In the course of the subsequent five years of this
period the remaining 50 per cent of the strategic offen-
sive arms of the sides will be reduced. —

“Thereby, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR
as A United States will be fully eliminated by the end
re) = es

If there are no nuclear
weapons, why have
protection against them?

Commenting on this text, I made an important addi-
tion, referring to the document which had been handed
over to the president at the end of our first conversa-
tion. The point is that upon the expiration of ten years,
when there are no nuclear weapons any longer, we pro-
pose to elaborate at special negotiations mutually
acceptable decisions on what to do next. ~

But this time, too, our attempts to come to terms were
to no avail. For four hours we were again trying to per-
suade the interlocutors that our approach was well-
founded, that it threatened them with nothing, and did
not affect the interests of the United States’ security.
But the farther the discussion went, the clearer it became
that the Americans would not agree to limit SDI re-
search, developments and tests to laboratories. They are
bent on going to outer space with weapons.

I said firmly that we would never agree to help under-
mine the ABM treaty with our own hands. This is to
us a question of principle, a question of our national
security.

Thus, being virtually one, two or three steps from tak-
ing decisions which could become historic for the whole
nuclear-space era, we were unable to make that step or
those steps. No turning point in the world’s history
occurred although, I say it again with full confidence,
it was possible.

However, our conscience is clear, and no one can
reproach us with anything. We did all we could.

PACIFIC TRIBUNE, NOVEMBER 12, 1986 e 7

SOARES APES ERE RS NC ROSNER NT AI

uF NEN 8 RE CORN RR 5