World

By CHRIS MANGOUTAS

The philosopher Aristotle in one of his
treaties on Greek Drama said a tragic
drama must smooth its tension with a
catharsis (an ideological clean-up finale).
Today, 24 centuries later, Greeks are again
talking about catharsis — this time from
the financial scandals surrounding the last
two years of the Andreas’ Papandreou
government.

It is impossible to grasp the rationale
behind the formation of last week’s
Communist-Conservative government, if
we do not fully understand the importance
that catharsis played in the June 18 elec-
tions. Even former prime minister Andreas
Papandreou’s PASOK (Panhellenic Social-
ist Movement) was forced to do some self-
catharsis in order to avoid large-scale losses.

The election results made the Alliance of
the Left and Progress (with the Communist
Party of Greece as its main force) the real
power brokers: with 28 out of 300 MPs they
could form a government either with the
left-wing forces of PASOK or with the
right-wing forces of Nea Demokratia (Nw
Democracy) Party.

Now comes the inevitable tough ques-
tion: why did the CPG decide against form-
ing a coalition with PASOK and instead
join with the rival forces of the right?

Here again comes the role of catharsis.
With some dozens of Papandreou’s close
friends and advisors in jail, and with others
—including newly elected MPs — under
suspicion for their involvement in “‘Kosko-
tas Scandal,” a coalition with PASOK
would transfer the failure for the promised
clean-up to the Left Alliance.

In addition, the combined forces of the
alliance and PASOK total only 153 MPs,
leaving a narrow margin of two for the
required majority. Any further resignations
of PASOK MPs involved in the scandal

Behind Greece’s left-right ‘alliance’

TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT... cP leader Harilaos Florakis (r) shakes onit with

ee

Mee By

ie,

New Democracy’s Constantine Mitsotakis.

would topple the government.

Also, the Left Alliance isn’t homogene-
ous. It is almost certain that at least five of
the alliance MPs (mainly those from the
United Left and former PASOK members)
would never support a new Papandreou
government.

Its proposal for an all-parties govern-
ment was buried under Papandreou’s rhe-
torical statement that he “‘will never form a
government with the right-wing” (although
some believe that behind his refusal was his
fear of uncovering the scandals).

Theoretically and practically, the CPG
had few options from the one it choose.

Naturally, there is plenty of controversy
surrounding this “unholy alliance” between
left and right. PASOK has already started
to exploit the shock this has created.

In reality there is nothing the Left
Alliance should fear. This temporary arran-

gement with the right may even facilitate
future co-operation with PASOK. The pres-
ent government will have a very short life
span of three months and strictly specific
goals: to tidy up the scandals and to set the
stage for the new national elections in Sep-
tember.

The coalition of the’ two ‘eternal
enemies” — Communist Party leader
Harilaos Florakis and New Democracy’s
Constantine Mitsotakis —-will soon end
and the two parties will resume their tradi-
tional roles. Even this is not without a sym-
bolic significance for many Greeks: the two
parties, which fought each other in the civil
war (with some hundreds of thousands
dead) four decades ago, will now collabo-
rate to lead Greece out of the crisis.

From September and beyond they will
continue to be political opponents, but not
sworn enemies.

Without any doubt PASOK will use the
traumatic memories of the participants
the civil war as one of its main slogal
Already there is talk of the “Alliance ?

. Victims and Victimizers.” But beyond the
rhetoric, the main issue will be: how deep®
Papandreou’s family involved in the “Ko
kotas Scandal?” And if, as expected, there!s
such an intense involvement, then what ®
the fate of his party? The answer to th’
question will play an important role in 0
formation of future political alliance
among the Left Alliance and PASOK. |

At this moment once again Aristotle®
statement on catharsis might be provel
true: this time the left forces are keeping tht
Ministry of Justice for themselves. Instea
of simply supporting the government or gl"
ing directions or criticizing it for not doing!
well, they decided to conduct the clean-UP
themselves. Greek people can now %
assured that after the drama will come?
catharsis, with no revenge but with justi

Of course nothing is that simple in Te4
political life and some Greeks may wonder
how you can clean up the scandals of the
system without touching its structure base?”
on exploitation? |

There is a lot to be séen in Greek political
life during the next few months, but at last |
the progressive ‘forces are not passive
observers but active participants. |

During the last month we received at
least two messages concerning the fi |
against corruption: one from China ane
one from Greece. Although the cases al
not identical, the message from Left Fores
in Greece is clear: the long-term interests
the people must be put before the short-fU?

interests of the party. |

And this is a vital message regarding
socialism in our times. |
Chris Mangoutas is editor of the Greek j
Voice. Ce

—— |

By KAREN WALD

This backgrounder to the arrest of Cuban
revolutionary hero Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa
Sanchez was written before Ochoa and
three other military officers received death
sentences from a military tribunal July 7 for
their involvement in international drug traf-
ficking. Those sentences were subsequently
upheld by the Council of State, Cuba’s high-

received lengthy prison terms.

ment officials, one civilian, one military,
have been removed from office under a
cloud of accusation of misconduct.
Although the announcements concerning
the two came within the space of a week,
there is no apparent link between the two.
The less sensational of the two cases
dealt with the dismissal of Diocles Torral-
bas, minister of transportation. His =mo-
val came as no surprise, given the sorry
state of public transportation, and his
well-known profligate lifestyle. Stories of
his flagrant misuse of public funds and
ostentatious gift-giving (including houses
and cars), scandalous behaviour at private
parties and similar tidbits of gossip circu-
lated for some time, making people
wonder how he had managed to hold onto
his post in this period of “rectification”.
Torralbas, who reportedly gave medio-
cre performances as minister of the sugar
industry and a functionary of the agricul-
ture ministry, had fought in the 26th of
July guerrilla movement that toppled dic-
tator Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Conclud-
ing the war as a captain, he continued to
‘ move up the. ranks of the revolutionary
G a armed forces (FAR). After the rebel vic-
tory, reaching the then-top post of com-

est political body. Ten other officials

HAVANA — Two top Cuban govern-

Cuba: drug charges

mandante, and at one point serving as
chief of the FAR’s air defence forces.

The situation of Division General
Arnaldo Ochoa, a bemedalled “hero of
the republic” was quite different. Like the
deposed transportation minister, Ochoa
was a combatant in the Sierra Maestra
Rebel war in the 1960s and a distinguished
member of the column led by the legend-
ary Camilo Cienfuegos. He rose up
through the ranks, attended officer’s train-
ing schools in Cuba and the Soviet Union,
and remained with the FAR until the
moment of his arrest, serving in a leader-
ship capacity in Nicaragua, Ethiopia,
Angola and other parts of Africa.

It would be an understatement to say
Ochoa’s arrest was unexpected. It came on
June 14, the day Raul Castro was sup-
posed to announce Ochoa’s appointment
as head of the western army, the key
branch of the Cuban armed forces respon-

sible for defence of Havana and key eco- |

nomic, political and social institutions. It
was in fact. because of this imminent
appointment that the investigation of cer-
tain “rumours and bits of information”
was initiated, with no expectation that it
would lead where it did.

Although Ochoa had been criticized
repeatedly for manifesting too much direct’
concern for economic matters in the var-
ious countries where he was posted, the
deposed general had always justified his
activities by saying he was looking out for
Cuba’s economic interests. He was always
believed.

In part this belief was probably due to
his own modest life style. No one ever say
Ochoa flaunting luxury automobiles, liv-
ing in mansions, sporting jewelry or new

tear a nation’s soul

clothes. On his vacation in Cuba he
behaved like any other citizen, “even wait-
ing in line at the grocery store,” his friends
and neighbours insist.

Although loath to reveal the details of
the accusations against Ochoa pending his
appearance before a court martial and the
civilian courts, the government admitted
in a front page editorial of Granma, the
official Communist Party newspaper, that
Ochoa had involved several officers of the
FAR and the Ministry of the Interior in
international drug trafficking.

There is almost nothing a high govern-
ment official could do, short of actual
treason, that would more shock and dis-
may both the people and the leaders of the
country. After their victory in 1959, the
revolutionary government led by Fidel
Castro swept away the mafia-controlled
gambling, prostitution and drug syndi-
cates with an almost puritanical zeal, and
no enemy slander against the revolution-
ary government has been repudiated more
heatedly than the ones charging the Castro
government with drug-dealing.

That fact that this is so makes it impos-
sible for people to doubt that there is irref-
utable proof against the former general
and his accomplices. But that doesn’t
make it any easier for people who knew .
him to accept. Raul Castro was clearly
both exhausted and emotionally over-
wrought when he made the announce-
ment over national television. The next
day — prior to the announcement of the
actual charges — many people continued
to disbelieve it, speculating on some kind
of political infighting or disagreement.

It was only when the government
announced charges so inimical to its own

interests — and so certain to give its ene- |
mies in the U.S. and elsewhere something |
to gloat over — that people finally began —
to unhappily accept that what couldn’t be —
had happened. at
“We should point out that in no
instance has there been the slightest indica-
tion that Arnaldo Ochoa and his small |
group of accomplices from the MinFar |
and MinInt have been implicated in politi-
cal activities or acts of treason against the |
revolution,” the Granma editorial stated. |
“His treason has been of another sort, and
very Serious: against the morality, princi- |
ples, laws and prestige of our revolution |

The list of accusations against Arnaldo |
Ochoa includes references to “dissipation |
and corruption,” “corrupting officers |
under his command,” “improper use of —
funds and resources, embezzlement” aS |
well as the vaguer claims of moralimprop- |
riety. But the gravest accusations were
saved for last: what Granma termed the |
“unprecedented” action by Ochoa and |
officials of the minister of the interior
“who are said to have made contacts with
international drug traffickers, reached
agreements with them and possibly even
co-operated with them in some interna-
tional drug operations near our borders.”

Trying to end on a positive note, the”
editorial concluded: “Although extremely
surprising and bitter for our people, thesé
events demonstrate that although grave |
defects of a moral as well as physical order
can occur among individuals, in our coun-
try absolutely nobody, no matter how great
his merits nor how high he may be in the ~
hierarchy, can violate the laws and prin- |
ciples of the revolution with impunity.”

6 ¢ Pacific Tribune, July 17, 1989