HE POTSDAM Agreement

Was. concluded Aug. 2,
1945, by Britain, the Unit-
@ States and the Soviet Union

nd later adhered to by France.
‘Said:

“German militarism and nazi-
mM will be extirpated and the
lies will take in. agreement
gether, now and in the future,

The Purposes of occupation
‘eluded: “The complete disarm-
ament and demilitarization of
Germany and elimination or
“Ontrol of all German industry
at could be used for mili-
 4ty production. To these ends

: sy German land, naval and air

Srces . . . with all their organi-
ittions, Staffs and institutions,
Ncluding the General Staff, the
cers’ Corps, Reserve Corps,
Sitary schools, war veterans
Ssociations . . . shall be com-
Pletely and finally abolished . . .
a Maintenance and produc-
°n of all aircraft and all arms,
Munition and implements of
_*t shall be prevented.”

“Sas first, the stipulations of
-tsdam were by and_ large
Mplied with; but there were

Number of infringements:

Co,

fore American occupation
Olas Preserved the core of the
“higgcet™man general staff in a
Orical section” in which

a Many of these officers
on €merged in the leadership
© Bundeswehr.

Boo British and American
si feeeuan forces retrained con-
aj peele forces of German sol-

- Scrip i uniformed ‘units de-
View 88 “labor squads”, “ser-

© Companies”; “mine-clearin
U
Nits”, etc

| Dlo ng staff officers were em-
tm Yed to “write their me-
Oirg

a September 1949, in breach
Whi € Potsdam Agreement
be ct laid down that Germany

"eated as a whole, the west-
of Powers sponsored creation
tia Separate West German
Dubie the German Federal Re-
Xdlic (GFR). ‘

“Rest Spokesmen began to sug-
| We Publicly the creation of a
ae German armed force in
} Mentg form. (The early argu-

Were similar to those

e Soon, ‘West German and west-—

used 12 years later to support -
the multilateral NATO nuclear -
force — ‘We must give West ~
Germans some say in the mat-
ter, then we shall-have them
under control. Otherwise they
will go it alone.”)

A survey published in 1957
by the Rand Corporation in the
United States stated:

“Toward the end of 1950, the
American policy of disarming
Germany, which prevailed since
the end of World War II, was
reversed for political, strategic -
and economic reasons ... ”

There followed nearly four
years of complicated negotia-
tions for incorporating West
German units in a “European
army”, which finally broke
down in August 1954, when the
French Assembly refused to ra-
tify the treaty for a “European
Defense Community” (EDC).

A new army..

Meanwhile, public opinion in
the West had been prepared for
the idea that West Germany
should receive arms again, and
in West Germany itself a staff
had been set up and all prepa-
rations made to raise a new
army.

After the breakdown of the
EDC plan a British initiative
led to the signing of the Brus-
sels-Paris treaties of October
1954. The effect of this extra-
ordinarily complicated series of
documents, letters and declara-
tions was to permit West Ger-
man rearmament.

The legal formula was almost
farcical. It consisted of an am-
endment to the Brussels Treaty
of March 17, 1948, signed by
Britain, France and the Bene-
lux states. That treaty had as
a main aim “to take steps as
may be held necessary in the
event of renewal by Germany
of a policy of aggression.” In
1954 this sentence was amend-
ed to read “to promote the
unity. and to encourage the
progressive integration of Eu-
rope,” and West Germany was
invited to join the treaty.

In a unilateral declaration re-
produced in. official documents °
as Annexes I, II, and II to Pro-

tocol III of “Documents Relat-

ing to the ‘Revision and Exten-
sion of the Brussels Treaty”,
Chancellor Adenauer pledged
that West Germany would not
“manufacture in its territory

Here is a documented, frightening story |
of West German militarism, from the Pots-
dam Agreements of 1945 to the present aim:
to establish a multilateral NATO nuclear
force. The story is based on material collect-
ed in Germany and published in Canada by
the Canadian Peace Congress.

‘a two-thirds majority

any atomic weapons, chemical
weapons or biological weap-
ons,’ and also various other
categories of weapons such as
long-range missiles, ‘guided mis-
siles, influence mines, warships
exceeding 3,000 tons, . subma-
rines exceeding 350 tons, and
strategic bombers.

But this pledge was full of
loopholes. For example:

West Germany undertook not
to manufacture these weapons
“in its territory”—it was free

to develop and manufacture.

them abroad; the undertaking
did not prevent obtaining nu-

clear weapons developed out- -

side or supplied by another
power; the bans on missiles,
warships, etc., could be amend-
ed or cancelled by a decision of
in the
European

Council of West

Union (WEU).

In the nine years since the

Brussels - Paris treaties West
Germany has made full use’ of
these loopholes. Nuclear weap-
ons development has been pur-
sued in cooperation with France
and others; missiles and nuclear
warheads have been obtained
from the USA (though the war-
heads are still under nominal
U.S. control); and almost all the
weapon restrictions have been
modified by WEU.

The Paris Treaty cleared the
way for formation of the Bun-
deswehr. The first inspector
general of the Bundeswehr was
General Adolf Heusinger, for-
mer operations chief to Hitler;
he. was succeeded by General
Friedrich Foertsch, sentenced
after the war to 25 years im-
prisonment for war crimes.

When the Bundeswehr was
formed, three features were
stressed:

1) It would be limited in size
(250,000 men).

2) Its arms would be strictly
limited.

3) It would never get nuclear
arms.

Here’s how that worked out
in practice:

-1) The annual report of the
Federal defense ministry, Dec.
19, 1963, showed a Bundeswehr
strength of 404,000 officers and
men.

2) A few modifications to the
arms restrictions laid down in
the Paris Treaty included: April
1958, WEU approved West Ger-
man manufacture of anti-tank

missiles; October. 1958, WEU
approved West German surface-

to-air missiles; December 1960, ©
WEU approved West German ~

construction of fighter-bombers
big enough to deliver strategic
bombs; May 1961, WEU doubl-

. ed the permitted size of West

German warships to 6,000 tons;
October 1963, WEU approved
West German manufacture of
1,000-ton U-boats, three times

- the size originally allowed.

3) The ban on nuclear weap-
ons began to dissolve. In April

1957, Chancellor Adenauer’

claimed West: Germany had a
right to atomic weapons. “since

these are only a further devel- ©

opment of modern artillery.”

- Events moved quickly. March
18, 1958, the West German de-
fense minister announced pur-
chase from the U.S. of 40 Ma-
tador missiles with nuclear war-
heads (range about 600 miles)
and 300 Nike rockets with nu-
clear warheads.

Mar. 1, 1960, it was announc-
ed in Washington that the GFR
had ordered a large quantity of
Mace missiles (range 1,000
miles).

Jan. 3, 1964, UPI news agen-
cy reported that members of
the Bundeswehr were in Okla-
homa training on Pershing mis-
siles (range 500 miles, warhead
0.5 megatons, about 25 times as

powerful as the Hiroshima
bomb).
Still not satistied

The men who run West Ger-
man armed forces were still not
satisfied; the warheads were all
still nominally under U.S. con-
trol. Public opinion in nearly all
NATO countries, and govern-
ments in some, were opposed
to giving West German generals
a free hand with nuclear arms.

But late in 1960 U.S. military
men and politicians began to
canvass the idea of a “NATO
missile force”. U.S. Secretary
of State Christian Herter, at a
meeting of the NATO council in
Paris in December 1960, sug-
gested “creation of a_ special
missile force which would be
truly multilateral, i.e. under

ry
SS
C7

——s

otsdam to multilateral force’
— path of German rearmament

multilateral ownership, financ-
ing and control.” West German
generals, providing the main
share of NATO forces in- Eu-

’ rope, were confident they would

dominate this multilateral force.

There was opposition from
France, developing its own nu-
clear force, and from: Britain,
which already had one; and
considerable reluctance in other
NATO countries.

‘About 1962, after various
forms for the force had been
suggested and rejected, West
German Minister Kai-Uwe von
Hassel suggested surface, naval
vessels. °

Some U.S. thinking behind
MLF was given. by W.W. Ros-
tow, chairman of the state de-
partment policy planning com-
mittee, in Philadelphia on Mar.
28. He urged: “We must take
active steps to bring European
partners more deeply and di-
rectly into the nuclear busi-
ness.”

Criticizing: those who asked

‘whose finger would be on the
_ Nuclear trigger of MLF, Rostow

said: “These ultimate questions
cannot and should not now be
settled.”

Since then intensive planning
has.been going on for MLF, al-
though according to Keesing’s
Contemporary Archives (Lon-
don, July 13, 1963), only the
West German and Turkish gov-
ernments have shown active in-
terest in the proposal.” Z

On April 8, 1963, the Soviet
Union protested to the USA and
West Germany against MLF,
which, it said,-would mean “the
nullification of disarmament
negotiations for at least 10
years.”

The German Democratic Re-
public is also completely oppos-
ed to arming West Germany
with nuclear weapons through
MLF. On Jan. 3, Walter UI-
bricht, chairman of the state
council of the GDR, pointed out
that multilateral nuclear arma-
ment was one of the main ob-
stacles to a policy of rapproche-
ment and peace in Central
Europe.

Wy a i.

“It we don’t let them in,”
rearm without us.”

a

argued Westen diplomats, “they'll

August 7, 1964—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 7