Condensed from AMERASIA

URING the months following V-J
D Day, British and Dutch forces, with

the full acquiescence of the US.,
made a determined effort to crush the Indo-
nesian republican movement and . restore
Dutch rule over this rich and strategically
important colony. Yet on November 15 last

the Netherlands government concluded an
agreement recognizing the. de facto authority
of the Republic of Indonesia over the islands
of Java, Madura and Sumatra, which to-
gether account for approximately 86 percent
of the entire population of Indonesia and

are by far the richest and most developed of

the thousands of islands in the
Malay archipelago.

The factors that brought
about the birth, consolidation
and de facto recognition of the
republic are of immense signifi-
cance because they illuminate
the new maturity and intensity
developed by colonial liberation
Movements;as a result of the
war. It is clear that the plans
for a restoration of Western
imperialist control over the
Colonies following Japan’s de-
feat overlooked the attitude of
the peoples involved and their
Stubborn determination to shake
off the chains of colonial de-
pendency.

The republic was born on
August 17, 1945, in the chaotic
period between Japan’s military
capitulation and formal  sur-
render, with proclamation of a
Declaration of Independence
signed by Achmed Soekarno and
Mohammed Hatta. .

Birth of the republic climaxed
a rising tide of Indonesian na-
tionalism and anti-Japanese re-
sentment that reached the boil-
ing point towards the end of
the Japanese occupation. An ef-
fective underground movement
translated the people’s griev-
ances into nationalist and anti-
fascist channels and popular

bitterness was so intense that
even the Japanese-trained Indo-
Nesian armed forces staged five

against

Major uprisings the

Japanese between 1943 and
1945.

Throughout this period the
underground resistance leaders
maintained contact with Soek-
arno and Hatta, who had en-
tered the government under the
Japanese as a strategy to aid
the nationalist movement. The
role of Soekarno and Hatta dur-
ing the war was not analogous
to that of Laurel or other Japa-
nese puppets in the Philippines.

For though they pursued tactics
that have been criticizied by
certain sections of the Indone-
sian resistance, they remained
loyal to the principles of Indo-
nesia nationalism and cooperat-
ed secretly with the underground.

APAN has erroneously, been

credited with voluntarily en-
couraging the independence
movement in Indonesia. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
The Japanese conquest of south-
east Asia did, of course, shat-
ter the legend of Western su-
periority and invincibility. But
Japan’s own policy called for
a colonial enslavement even
more harsh than that of the
Western imperialist powers. And
in Indonesia itself, Japan recog-
nized the independence move-
met only when her own defeat
was virtually certain.

' Even after the surrender the
Japanese did. nothing to aid the

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Indonesians in achieving their
freedom. The day the republic

was proclaimed the Japanese
began to disband and disarm
the Indonesian army they them-
selves had established. This
marked the beginning of a ser-

des of armed clashes between

Indonesians ang Japanese dur-
ing which several thousand
Japanese were disarmed and
interned by republican forces.

The unexpected ‘suddenness
of the Japanese surrender gave
the new-born Indonesian repub-
lic an opportunity to establish
its authority before the arrival
of any Allied troops. The flag of
the republic waving high in
Djakarta (the old name for
Batavia, revived by the repub-
lic) not only surpriseqd but in-
furiated the Dutch, who launch-

'ed an immediate: campaign
against the nationalists.
e

M <Australia Dutch author-
ities broadcast a frenzied or-
der placing Indonesia under the
interim command of the Japa-

nese. Rather than recognize the
right of the Indonesians to self-
government they preferred to
deputize the Japanese to act as
custodians of Dutch sovereignty.

Since no Dutch troops were
available, the re-entry of the
Allies had to be accomplished,
in the beginning, by other forces,
@nd Britain, the long-time pro-
tector of the Dutch empire, will-
ingly undertook the task. Indo-
resian leaders informed the
British they would cooperate in
disarniing the Japanese, but
they warned against return of
Dutch troops and officials.

It soon became apparent, how-
ever, that the British mission

‘was far more interested in the

reconquest of Indonesia for the
Dutch than in disarming the
Japanese. Dutch troops and of-
ficials were brought in as

quickly as possible, and Japa-

nese troops, far from being dis-
armed, were promptly mobilized
to fight the forces of the new
republic.

The Indonesian government
resisted the Allied attack and
the people rallied to its de-
fense, spurred on by the_ brutal
and arrogant conduct of the
Dutch troops. But just how

_Much support the republic could

command was still an unknown
factor.

T. had no official backing

from any recognized political
parties because the Japanese
had suppressed all political par-
ties. Soekarno, its president, had
the support of many nationalist
leaders, but he was self-appoint-
ed, not elected, with a cabinet
appointed by him and respon-
sible to him alone. The govern-
ment had to be democratized,
broadened and brought under
official control of the people’s
movement if it was to survive.
In October 1945, a national
convention representative of the
Indonesian nationalist move-
ment met in Djakarta at which

the central national committee, .

highest representative body of
the people’s’ movement, was es-
tablished. The convention took
the first important steps to fuse
the popular movement with the
government.

In the absence of an elected
parliamentary body, the central
enational committee assumeq the
functions and authority until a
people’s congress could be elect-
ed by a popular mandate. A
working committee was elected
to serve as the legislative body.

The convention also decided
that the cabinet should be re-
sponsible to the central national
committee rather than the
president, and elected 36-year-
old Soetan Sjahrir as president
of the central national commit-
tee and its working committee.

At the second national con-
vention, in November 1945, a
struggle developeq between the
democratic forces and a collab-
orationist, pro-Japanese section
which demanded that only one
party — a nationalist party —
should be allowed in Indonesia.
This proposal was defeated by
a vote of 84 to 8, with 16 ab-
staining, to uphold the Sjahrir
cabinet.

This convention marked the
triumph of the democratic forces
and opened a new stage in, de-

velopment of the Indonesian na--

tional revolution. The seven
political parties in existence at
the time included the Partai
Nasional Indonesia, the Indone-
sian Socialist Party, the Moslem
Party and the Indonesian Com-
munist Party, which had been
illegal since 1926.

Dutch had assumed that
time would enable them to
strengthen their military posi-
tion, dissipate the energies of
the revolutionary forces and
sow dissension in the nationalist
camp. But they underestimated
the military strength of the na-
tionalists and the extent of pop-
ular support for the republic.
Contrary to their expectations,
time enabled the republic to
consolidate.

The outcome of a long period
during which the failure of all
Dutch military, political and
economic maneuvers became ev-
ident was the draft agreement
initialed at Linggadjati in Java
on November 15, 1946. An obvi-
ous compromise, it goes beyond
any concessions the Dutch had
previously been prepared to
make.

It states that “the Nether-
lands government recognizes the
government of the Republic of
Indonesia as exercising de facto
authority over Java, Madura
and Sumatra. The areas occu-
Pied by Allied or Netherlands

Pattern for

American fascism
By HOWARD FAST

NCE, in Oklahoma, I
‘ travelled some five

hundred miles to find an
old man who, as rumor
had it, was with Custer
during his last stand. This
would have been no small
discovery, for, as you
know, Custer’s troop was
wiped out, lock, stock and
barrel; but when I caught
up with the old gaffer
and put it to him, he said:

“Better than that, sonny,
I wasn’t exactly there, but
I sure heard about it.”

The point being that I
would rather have heard
about it than to be pres-
ent in Washington, to see
the Communist Party, the
United States Constitution,
human decency and hu-
man dignity put on the
rack ang insanely shed-
ded.

I am a frightened man;
I have always been a reas-
onably frightened mar —
and three days in a mad-
house is not conducive to
mental tranquility. It is
one thing to see ‘The Hit-
ler Gang’ produced by Par-
. aMount Pictures and play-
ing in the neighborhood
RKO, with maybe loge
seats too, and a nice girl
next to you, and it is
something else entirely to
see demoniac frenzy im ac-
tion, with nothing between
you and the frenetic white
terror but a press table.
My own consuming inter-
est is the quality of that
incredible rump _ court,
wherein was staged a per-
formance which—and you
May believe me — outdid
anything Hitler or Musso-
lini ever achieved.

I refer not to the path-
ology of specifics, as for
instance, that incident
which concerned the eat-
ing of small children by
the flesh-mad Russians, or
the use of the two Bills
in question as a spitoon
by Representative Bonner,
or the wild, relieved laugh-
ter of a seditionist when
Dennis was throttled and
expelled, or the lust for
blood of millions displayed
by certain cultured wit-
nesses, or the heiling of |
the Legioneers — not to
those and a hundred other
specifics, but to the qual-
ity of the hearing itself.

For here were men gone
mad and eulogizing their
madness; here were logic

and reason abandoned; here
was fear turned into

frenzy and hysteria; here
was the outline, blueprint
and pattern of fascism,
Americar style, cotton belt
fashion, Rotarian design,
bigger and better than any
fascism the world has
tasted, streamlined, with
newsreel Cameras and a
national hookup too.

forces shall be included gradu-
ally, through mutual coopera-
tion, in republican territory.”
This process is to be complet-
ed by January 1, 1949.

_ Whatever new developments
there are, the future progress
of the Indonesian republic will
depend to a considerable degree
on the present government’s de-
termination to defend the demo-
cratic advances already won by
the Indonesian people. The de-
velopment of a free, independent
and prosperous Indonesia is of
vital significance to the world

at large. Freedom and a high- ©

er standard of living for 70,-
000,000 people would constitute —
a stabilizing factor in the
world’s unbalanced economy.