[ a By THE ED In ITORS ie any rember 1966 it was an- | thong b n the House of Com- ic ane then Prime Minister eon that the govern- Se oe established a “Task . Labor Relations,” head- a3 oe H. D. Woods. eet 31, 1968, Woods nudeau th to : Prime Minister had = at his four-man body hat, fed ected its studies. and its 250. Over to the government On meee report. ment ee 27, 1969, the docu- bi the streets—a neatly back soe and yellow paper Relations €d Canadian Industrial U * mre the Rand Report which | bate ae Bee of acrimonious de- ~ the Wood the day of its release, inmediat, S report was given an tia ‘ang € appraisal by the me- | Subject be since been only a Polite discussion. aah lies the difference? If labor, sy S report were good for et management would Were re its disapproval. If it COUld fe for management, we Teact ‘asonably expect labor to Dort, § it did to the Rand Re- trecth however, seem to be. levels ee matter, on higher Caution me with considerable to go to erefore, one is forced teport it the horse’s mouth, the e like} Self, for some clue to i “aad long range impact of lations, Y On Canadian labor re- Wi Woods poumusual candor the losonh ‘eport lays bare its phi- oad in paragraph two of the What poor report. Here is tO the Said in the introduction Public Teport: “Why has the the pre ebparently lost faith in 2 cting collective bargain- Which eal The rash of strikes in ree a caught the headlines ES years provides much of Planation. In. many of ee the protagonists lic, Suffer less than the pub- hension te still, there is appre- e ere the parties are using While me as their whipping boy ferences ey work out their dif- seats having divided Canadian eee three categories, Sue is €nt and labor who pur- Neparg fs own interests with no ; Bibi; the consequences, and Victim 2.¢ Which is the helpless big ite big management and igns oe the Commission as- br ae the task of making aa which will enable the both pi isan government to keep intere os bullies in line, in the Sents, of the public it repre- ae Says the Woods Report, : S more state intervention Cogs, pepective bargaining pro- in the ere is how it is placed Sek to Teport, para. 432: ‘““We State in, Minimize the role of the Process the collective bargaining tio and in places urge a re- On ay in state intervention; yet ¢ ence, we propose an in- Tent in government involve- More Where we recommend in Seep participation in the oh; al relations system, our tive is to facilitate more ag On, : labo Uctive relations between Prote. cud management and to nactthe public interest.” eport we to an area which the ship terms “Union Member- Para Bye veness, it says in issati 07: “The fact that worker Sfaction sometimes runs Collect against the union and ana Wve bargaining as against eae is reflected in the ai On of union members Nst their leaders. Signs of ee WOODS REPORT this rebelliousness have been un- mistakable. They include in- creasing turnover among senior union leaders, especially at the international union level, a num- ber of cases in which workers have refused to ratify collective agreement, a spate of wildcat strikes .. .” After dealing with what the Report considers to be the cause of this restiveness it goes on to say in para. 319: “A strong case can be made for assisting unions and their leaders to contend with membership - pressure without jeopardizing their own positions, the collective bargaining pro- - cess, or the welfare of society at large. But an equally strong case can be made for ensuring that labor organizations do not vio- late the basic democratic rights of their members, either as a group or as individuals. These competing interests call for a delicate balancing of member- ship rights and union responsi- bilities.” How is this delicate balancing to be accomplished? In para. 330 the Report gives a clear indica- tion of its approach: “Whatever is done to protect union mem- bership rights must be accom- plished without undermining the basic fabric of the labor move- ment or its ability to play a “re- sponsible’ role in society. With respect to the former a union is © like a country perpetually in con- flict with a neighbor without which it can’t get along. As a militant organization a union cannot afford the ultimate in de- mocracy. Nor would this be de- sirable from the viewpoint of so- ciety at large, since it might pre- clude a union from taking unpo- pular but responsible positions in the face of membership res- tiveness. Accordingly, the chal- lenge is to fashion a code of civil rights for union members, and machinery for administering it, that neither so weakens unions as to render them ineffective in bargaining nor so exposes them to membership pressures that they cannot act responsibly when circumstances dictate.” In case there should be any il- lusions as to what is meant by acting responsibly against union restiveness, the report spells it out in para. 313: ‘TInexperience in bargaining can also have a - deleterious effect. Newly orga- nized groups of workers may have. unrealistic expectations about the power of concerted ac- tion to solve their problems, pro- ducing an unhappy combination of naiveté and strike proneness. _,. A related point is the in- fluence of growing numbers of young people in the labor force. In contrast to earlier genera- tions, these young people have lived in a period of sustained prosperity, are better educated, are more impatient for the good things in life, are unintimidated by the experience of the depres- sion, and are generally more sceptical of the values of their elders and the need to respect authority. Unschooled in the tra- ditions of trade unionism and collective bargaining, unappre- ciative, perhaps unaware, of past accomplishment, and eager to share in the purported benefits, they are bound to have an un- settling impact.” Further on the same theme, speaking about militancy and il- legal strikes, the Document says in paras. 316 and 317: “Once having tasted the fruits of mili- tancy, union members may find it irresistible to display that militancy again. “When employers make furth- -above equation, “have the power to ATTACKS LABO er concessions in the face of rank and file militancy, they doubt- less weigh the short run cost of standing firm against the long run costs of backing down. The. short run burden must be grave indeed to offset the long run risk, for failure of management to stand up to such pressure not only invites repetition, it tends to undermine management cred- ibility and the position of incum- bent union leadership.” That seems to spell it out plain and simple. Management has a stake in responsible union lead- ership as a barrier between it- self and militant membership. Legislation should protect that leadership without seeming to infringe upon the rights of indi- vidual union members. Perhaps the less than critical approach of some top leaders of Canadian labor to the Woods Re- port can be explained by the because when one goes on to examine the over- all intent of the Woods Report, there is little to recommend it over the Rand Report. Mass picketing would be un- lawful. Strikebreaking would be legalized through provision for a striker to himself become a strikebreaker by resuming his job during a strike, replacing the scab already there. One of the recommendations would replace the present Can- ada Labor Relations Board, made up of employer and union repre- sentatives plus a neutral chair- man, with a so-called public board with unprecedented new powers. The new board would consolidate existing units into one bargain- ing unit and to order multi- union, multi-plant and multi-em- ployer bargaining. The Board would also have the power to determine different units for dif- ferent purposes, extending multi- unit bargaining to such specific questions as pensions, health and welfare, training plans and seni- ority, and would eliminate the union hiring hall. The immediate target of such governmental in- terference is the building and construction industry. The Report’s take-off for this proposition trades on the press- ing need recognized by large sec- tions of the trade union move- ment for bargaining unity, union alliance, amalgamation and mer- gers to meet the new conditions created by modern industrial de- velopment. But here any simila- rity of Task Force thinking with labor’s needs ends. For the Task Force would give the power of decision-making into the hands of the state. An instrument of the state would arbitrarily rule and implement decisions on bar- gaining units and consequently on bargaining tactics, as well as on the fate of the unions con- cerned. These unprecedented powers proposed for the new board need to be taken in conjunction with the suggested powers to be given to the three-man public interest disputes commission proposed by the Task Force. The proposed public interest disputes commission would be empowered to move, at its own discretion, into any industry un- der federal jurisdiction where a work stoppage would, in the opinion of the commission, be detrimental to the public inter- ests. In such cases the commis- sion would have the power to decide upon the bargaining pro- cedure, including binding arbi- tration. Further the commission would have the power to propose to parliament the measures to take to end a strike if one should take place. A third proposal of the Report which must also be taken to- gether with the two already mentioned is the so-called bill of rights for union members to be administered by a government appointed public review board. The proposal for such a board is likened to that of a union-estab- lished public review board, such as is the case in the UAW. But there can be no such compari- son. For the board proposed by the Task Force would be respon- ible to the government and it would be empowered to set union dues, assessments and ini- tiation fees. Further, it would have the power to determine if, and how, unions could make fi- nancial contributions to a politi- cal party. All of this constitutes government control] over vital aspects of union life. It could be the prelude to all-in government control. The Woods Task Force Report \ and the Rand Commission Re- port make some things clear. The big corporations in Canada are demanding restrictive labor legislation to weaken and divide labor in its economic and poli- tical battles. Governments are straining at the leash to provide such legislation. Unfortunately some sections of the trade union leadership would also welcome restrictions which would damp down the growing militancy of their membership. For the workers the road ’ ahead is clear. The enemy is the big corporation which exploits him at his machine. The cry of Ontario Labor: Away with restrictive labor legis- lation! Forward to a Charter of Rights for Canadian Labor! can be the rallying call which can unite all Canadian workers, and around them: all democratic minded Canadians, for an end to the perfidy of management rights, alienation on the job and towards a new era of workers’ power. WORK STOPPAGE AT SHIPYARDS About 700 shipbuilding workers of Canadian stopped work to hold an “information meeting” Vickers in Montreal at which they called on the Quebec government to nationalize that shipyard. Speaking of the wiping out of these 700 workers’ jobs, Pierre Vadboncoeur, technical adviser of the Confederation of National Trade Unions, said, federal government, dian Vickers with taxpayers’ “This is a major social, political and economic scandal.” The which has been generously subsidising Cana- money, has always rejected labor’s demand for the building of a Canadian merchant marine fleet. The British Hawker-Siddeley Group Ltd., which controls Canadian Vickers, was also the parent company of Dominion Steel and Coal Corp. whose Nova Scotia steel mills were last year nationalized by that government, following the company’s decision to close them down. The shutdown of the Canadian Vickers’ shipyard has moved Federal Labor Minister Bryce Mackasey to declare that it “convinces me more than ever that employers cannot be trusted to live up to their moral obligations.” PACIFIC TRIBUNE—MAY 30, 1969—Page 7 R MILITANCY