Se By VICTOR PERLO Poland’s economic problems arise from a series of developments and policy decisions, connected to one another, that have resulted in economic problems: ¢ Very rapid increases in wages and farm in- comes far exceeded increases in productivity. Be- tween 1970 and 1977 average wages more than dou- bled, increasing 108 percent, and peasants’ incomes increased at a comparable rate. Meanwhile produc-- tion per employed person increased only 58 percent. That is a very high figure, showing that there were great advances in the Polish economy. But the in- creases in wages were much faster than could be sup- ported by increased production. _ © Polish agriculture is mainly non-socialist, con- sisting of small farms with low productivity of labor. The peasants, paid good prices for their produce and aided in various ways by the state, consume a larger share of the national income then they produce. ¢ Poland pays a high price for the foreign cur- rency it gets from tourists and from remittances to relatives in Poland. While the official foreign trade zloty exchanges at alittle more than 3 to the dollar, the tourist and remittance rate is 33 to the dollar. Many people of Polish origin live in the United States and other capitalist countries. With the zloties they get as tourists or supply through remittances to Telatives in Poland, they and their relatives drain off a disproportionate share of the available supplies. Poland embarked on an extremely ambitious capi- tal investment program in the 1970s. Productive in- vestments increased two and a half times between 1970 and 1975. Part was financed by credits from the Soviet Union; more was assisted by borrowing from capitalist banks. Loans increased further during re- cent years when Poland had to import large quantities of feed grain to continue providing for the rapidly rising food consumption of the population in the face of a Series of crop failures. By now Polish debts to capitalist banks amount to about $20 billion, which is one-third of such debts owed by all socialist countries and far more, compared to its size, than the debts of any other socialist country. The annual interest burden on the debt comes to at least $2 billion, taking up a sizeable share of the $6-7 billion in foreign currency Poland gets from exports to capitalist countries. The Polish economy fared badly in 1979. Much in- dustrial production was lost during the extremely se- vere winter that hit much of Eastern Europe and the USSR. Drought caused a drop in farm output. For the * first time since the establishment of socialism, the real national income of Poland actually declined. Ob- viously the country could no longer afford very rapid increases in living standards. Indeed, because real incomes had increased more than could be supplied out of current output, a temporary retrenchment be- came necessary. * During the 1970s, the government increased prices of many consumer goods in order to reduce the excess of consumers purchasing power over the supply of goods. But prices of meat and basic foodstuffs were kept down, with increasing subsidies paid to the peas- ants to cover the excess of what they received over what workers paid. Meat became a big bargain in comparison with other items. Per capita consumption of meat in- creased from 42.5 kilograms a year in 1960 to 53.0 kilograms in 1970, 70.3 kilograms in 1975 and 73 kilog- rams in 1979. The explosive increase in meat con- sumption brought it well above the level in the USSR and in most countries of Western Europe. But this year meat output was curtailed because of last year’s drought. And simultaneously Poland had to increase exports of its famous hams to help finance its foreign trade. So a modest and temporary reduc- tion in per capita domestic meat consumption became necessary. The government tried to achieve this by selling moreinthehigher priced commercial shops. If not through higher prices, the reduced supply of meat would be affected through shortages in the stores. Speaking at the end of 1979, Communist Party leader Edward Gierek explained to the Polish people that it would be necessary to increase exports to-the capitalist countries so as to end the increase in the foreign debt, and that some temporary reduction in per capita real incomes would be necessary. Carrying out that program has been hampered by the economic crisis in the capitalist countries, which reduces markets for Polish exports and leads to lower prices received for some Polish export commodities. Benefits from earlier investment programs help to overcome these difficulties. In many cases, loans to Poland were connected with ‘‘co-production’’ ar- rangements, whereby parts of the output of new Polish factories and mines would be sold under long- term contracts to the lending country. And Poland actively engages in providing industrial equipment to Iraq for oil, to Brazil for iron ore, etc. Vic Perlo is head of the Economics Section of the Communist Party USA. ‘Economics of Polish strikes Polish industrial production increased 10 percent in the first quarter of 1980. According to U.S. News and World Report, the Soviet Union advanced a loan of $1 billion to ease the situation, although there has been no official report of such a loan. Arrangements were made for substantial additional credits from a consor- tium of West German banks and a consortium headed by the Bank of America, Lloyds Bank of Britain, and Soviet-owned Moscow Narodny Bank. With restraint in domestic production and con- tinued good production results, economic balance could be restored and the earlier advance in living standards resumed, but at a more sustainable rate than formerly. However, the prolonged strikes in the Polish shipyards affect a particularly vital industry. Exports of vessels pay for a significant part of Polish imports of feed for agriculture, consumers goods and capital equipment needed to meet the peoples’ con- sumption requirements. Presumably the strike settlement will include wage increases and other economic concessions. However, itis not clear where real material gains will come from. Poland has no capitalist class which en- joys soaring profits while real wages decline, asin the United States. There is no reserve army of unem- ployed and 25 percent idle capacity that could be put to work to increase the supply of consumers goods. There are no farm surpluses — as those regularly destroyed in the United States — which could be di- verted to increase the supply of foodstuffs. There is no short-run solution to the inefficiencies of small-scale private agriculture. __ For.the long run, a shift in emphasis from capital investment to consumers goods may be desirable. But there is nothing to be gained from cutting of projects in mid-stream — machines cannot be converted into meat — and presumably the investment projects aim _ either to increase capacity for consumer goods pro- duction or to provide commodities that can be ex- changed for consumers goods. In past crises, the Soviet Union has supplied Po- land with material aid necessary to satisfy striking workers. Perhaps strike leaders aré counting’on this. Or on the procurement of new credits that can be used to import extra food and consumers goods. _ That, however, would result in delaying a balanc- ing of the economy and, possibly, create conditions for a repetition of the current problems. The only real solution is to convince the workers that it is in their best interests to cooperate with the government in balancing the economy. This can be achieved by con- vincing the workers that they have a real stake in the successful operation of the publicly owned eco- nomy. ( Broadbent, Cassidy should have stuck to home For downright impertinence, Messers. Broadbent and Cassidy came in for top honors this Labor Day. — _ The working people of Canada find themselves face to face with the most difficult problems since the Hungry Thirties: mass lay- offs, plant shutdowns, out-of- _ sight prices, a housing crisis, in- flation and nothing but promises of more of the same, and worse. In these circumstances work- ers had every.right to expect labor leaders to come out swinging at Labor. Day rallies, demanding new policies and new govern- ments to change things around and place the cost of this crisis on the monopolies. Some of them did that. Jean- Claude Parrot put the respon- sibility for the crisis right where it belonged, on the shoulders of the big corporations. He called for ac- tion by the working people and all democratic Canadians to turn this situation around. Wally Majesky, president of the Metro Toronto Labor Coun- cil, and executive board member of the Canadian Labor Congress, promised big business a hot year of struggle, which would pale in comparison with the actions of the labor movement in the Oc- tober general strike of 1976. Dennis McDermott, while less than living up to the promises of the Canadian Labor Congress convention, dealt with the major issues before the trade union movement. . It remained for Michael Cas- sidy, Ontario leader of the New Democratic Party, and Ed Broadbent, federal leader of the same party, to use the occasion to attempt to divert the attention of Canadian workers from their problems by inviting them to bask in their superior ‘‘freedom”’ over their Polish counterparts. At the time when the attention of the Canadian working class needs to be riveted on their monopoly oppressors, and the total unity of the labor movement is required to organize the kinds of struggles needed to win vic- tories against these enemies of all the people, the NDP leaders offer division, internecine warfare and certain defeat. * * * The final chapter to the events in Poland has not been heard by the people of Canada. This col- umnist suggests that when it is, it will read not at all like the bilge pumped out by the big business press during the critical events in Poland. In the meantime, it would be quite advisable for the labor movement in Canada to wait to -hear the workers’ side of the Polish events and to concern itself meanwhile with uniting its ranks to win victories on the home front. The NDP has a perfect right to its opinions, however right or wrong. It has likewise a right to express those opinions on its own platform and before the press. I suggest however, it has no right to abuse the privilege of the platform of the trade union movement to introduce divisive, ill-conceived, and in the end wholly inaccurate ideological polemical matters. If Broadbent had taken the time to attend the entire Canadian Labor Congress convention, rather than sashay in to address the delegates then leave, he might have observed how out of place his red-baiting remarks were at that Parliament of Labor. Perhaps then he might have spared the workers his equally uninspiring - comments on Labor Day. Accustomed as they are to the sick and distorted mirror of Canadian parliament and the On- tario legislature, Broadbent and Cassidy obviously mistake this bourgeois environment with the real world in which Canadian people work and live. How else can one rationalize their mis- directed remarks. * * * Canadian workers have ob- served the events in Poland. They will learn, if they do not already know, that the right to strike al- ways existed in Poland. Haven't the workers just exercised it? They were able to observe the great:gains made by a small prop- ortion of the trade-union move- ment in a relatively short strike. Most of them wish it were so easy in this country. The Polish strike would have been completely illegal in Cana- da. Police would have moved in, the state would have levied mas- sive -fines. Governments would have passed additional legislation ordering the workers back to work. All hell would have broken loose. If you don’t believe me ask Jean-Claude Parrot. What happened in Poland?. Government leaders were dis- missed. Party leaders were re- moved and replaced, state and party leaders met with the strikers whose legitimate grievances were met. Most Canadian workers, in- cluding Saskatchewan workers who are denied the right to strike by the NDP government or long- shoremen and other workers or- dered back to work by legislation which Broadbent voted for, may see something of interest and value to them in the Polish events. Broadbent and Cassidy would do well to ask themselves how they find themselves in such har- mony with President Carter and Ronald Reagan. Perhaps when they find the answer to that riddle they may start better serving the cause to which they lay claim. PACIFIC TRIBUNE—SEPT. 12, 1980—Page 5 \