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place as the supreme authority, the real
decision-maker of the party.

When we say the party should continue
to be a vanguard party, we don’t mean in that
old sense that was enshrined in Article Six
of the Constitution. We mean that on all
issues of foreign and domestic. policy, the
party should work out its own concept and
put it forward through the work of com-
munists at all levels.

We are in favour of the party being a
political organization which utilizes all of its
options in the competition for power. This
means it should participate in the parliamen-
tary struggle —and therefore be in this sense
a “parliamentary party” — but it should also
work for its policies through its members
who are located everywhere within the
society. In this sense it is much more than a
parliamentary party. It lives in the grassroots
of society and participates in the formation
of everyday politics.

Therefore the debate over what kind of a
party it will be — parliamentary group or
mass political organization — is somewhat
ks We will be working on every
evel.

Tribune: How do you view the interna-
tional communist movement after every-
thing that’s happened in the past year?
How do you mean to develop your rela-

‘tions with fraternal parties now?

Yanaev: We should build our relations
bearing in mind those political realities that
are emerging in the world. We should not
convey a sectarian policy. We will be ad-
dressing all the democratic parties and for-
ces.

The international communist movement
is going through a crisis right now: a crisis
of objectives, a crisis of identity, a crisis of
influence and declining recruitment. Never-
theless, the communist movement has good
potential. I’m confident that even in Eastern
Europe, where political life has shifted
sharply to the right, the communist and left
parties have good long-term possibilities to
restore their lost positions.

I assume that one of our basic objectives
will continue to be the development of
party-to-party contacts. This should be car-
ried out in a businesslike manner on the
principle of mutual exchange. We should
jointly contribute to the development of
theoretical thought, to the re-assessment of
global processes, and to the implementation
of new political thinking.

We will be approaching our contacts in a
wider way, with communist, socialist and
social democratic parties and all the left-
wing forces. We already have exchanges
with many bourgeois-liberal parties. The
key principle that governs all this is open-
ness. We are giving a lot of attention to this,
because we can use each other’s experience
to generate new ideas, to mobilize the work-
ing people of all countries to the struggle for
peace, disarmament, for the resolution of
key global problems such as debt, creation
of a just economic order, the struggle against
hunger and poverty. These are basic human
principles, which should be taken as the
basis of all our work.

Of course, the relationship with some
parties will be of a different temperature,
shall we say, than with others. But as a basic
principle, we intend to be broader, more
open.

War in the Transvaal and surrounding
townships is part of campaign to undermine
the national liberation movement in South
Africa, the African National Congress
declared in a recent briefing paper.

Violence has cart-wheeled out of control
in the Transvaal and Natal in the past two
months, with the death toll already more
than 800. The ANC has warned that more
will die unless action is taken.

Most analysts have simplistically charac-
terised the conflict as ethnic strife between
Zulu and Xhosa speaking groups. Coupled
to this analysis have been calls, echoed by
Zulu leader Gatsha Buthelezi and South
African president F.W. de Klerk, that the
killings will continue unless ANC deputy
president Nelson Mandela meets the Inkatha
leader. Such a meeting they claim is essen-
tial to stopping the bloodshed. But the ANC
characterizes these calls as “nothing more
than political expediency.”

The ANC has refused a Mandela-
Buthelezi meeting, arguing it would be
negotiating with a non-player in the vio-
lence. The main perpetrator of the wars
emanating out of the hostels it maintains is
not Buthelezi and his Inkatha forces, but the
South African police and Special Services.

De Klerkhas additional reasons for push-
ing for a conference between the two. He is

trying to propel Buthelezi into the centre of

South African politics. A meeting with the
ANC leader would elevate Buthelezi’s ban-
tustan status to that of a national leader. This

.,. would bolster his bargaining position and set

him apart from other homeland leaders.

However, de Klerk’s argument runs into
problems when viewed against grassroots
opposition to such ameeting. This was dem-
onstrated during the Mandela’s visit to Natal
earlier this year, thereby poking holes in
suggestions that a Mandela-Buthelezi meet-
ing is the key to peace, says the ANC paper.
It suggests that more violence, rather than
less, would be a more likely consequence of
such an encounter.

This prompts the ANC toask ifthe blood-
shed in and outside Johannesburg was un-
leashed to further apartheid’s political agen-
da, and if the emphasis on a meeting with
Buthelezi is a means to divert attention away
from the state’s role in events?

The answers become clear when the out-
break of violence and the calls for a Man-
dela-Buthelezi meeting are analyzed against
the background of the political process un-
derway.

It is hardly coincidental that the strife
which is sweeping through the East Rand
and spreading in Soweto erupted as the
process set in motion by the unbanning of
the ANC moved into a crucial stage. The
liberation movement had suspended the
armed struggle and negotiations relating to
constitutional matters were the next logical
step.

Whatever agreement is reached on issues
relating to the next stage, who sits around the
negotiating table, which parties decide on
what form the constitution-making body
takes and what form the interim government
assumes — all hold immense significance
for the shape of a new South Africa. And it
is only reasonable that all parties will try to
proceed to this next stage from as strong a
position as possible.

In Buthelezi, de Klerk’s National Party
government has animportant ally. Given the
growth of the right-wing, de Klerk would
find it difficult to secure amajority vote from
his traditional constituency if he had to con-
test a constituent assembly election.

It is therefore not surprising that the

government has rejected a constituent as-
sembly elected on the basis of one person
one vote, on a non-racial voter’s role. Such
an election is not in Inkatha’s interest either,
given its flagging popularity. Recent surveys
put Buthelezi’s support at two per cent out-
side Natal. .

From the government’s point-of-view, a
route into the negotiating room will have to
be found for Buthelezi if de Klerk hopes to
boost his own position at the table.

The need to elevate Buthelezi’s bantus-
tan status to that of national leader, or at least
project that impression, is therefore under-
standable from the government's point of
view and important for de Klerk and In-
katha.

Inkatha has made it clear that it will not
allow itself to be exempted from any politi-
cal process. Any form of agreement reached
between the government and other political
groups should not attempt to exclude In-
katha.

Buthelezi has made the price for exclud-

position more important than any other
homeland leader.

In that context, allegations of police com-
plicity in the violence assumes a broader
political significance. Recent polls conduc-
ted by independent organizations indicate
that Inkatha does not command the sort of
political support or organizational mach-
inery to effect such a campaign on its own
in the region. The obvious question that
arises is: if it is not Inkatha, who is behind
this terror campaign?

It is a matter of record that the South
African government has developed a
capacity for undermining peaceful negotia-
tions. Its Special Services are well known
for their work in Mozambique, Angola,
Zimbabwe and other front line states. Addi-
tional evidence that the violence was being
instigated from outside the hostels has come
to light in the form of fake pamphlets bear-
ing outdated ANC logos.

Evidence that the state security appar-
atus, and the police in particular, have played

POLICE TEAR GAS IN TOWNSHIPS ... widespread evidence of security forces
involvement in tribal violence.

ing him clear: “Any attempt to exclude In-
katha will undermine the quest for peaceful
co-existence and plunge the country into
chaos.” :

But before Buthelezi qualifies fora place
at the negotiating table, de Klerk and Inkatha
will have to propel the KwaZulu-based party
back into the local and international political
limelight.

It will also suit the government to reduce
the ANC’s bargaining power in the process
as it enters the next stage of negotiations.

When viewed against this background,
the ANC’s interpretation of the violence
takes on an added significance. As far as it
is concerned, the destablization campaign
which has taken the form of violence in the
townships, is planned to achieve three
primary objectives: to give the population of
the Transvaal and the rest of the country the
impression that Inkatha commands support
among residents on the Witwater’s Rand; to
destablize the towns of the East Rand and in
Soweto which are known to be ANC stron-
gholds and where the organization is in the
process of establishing its branches; and to
provoke a backlash among Blacks and
whites in support of tough repressive
measures by the government in order to
undermine the process towards peace.

The cumulative effect of these objectives
will be a weaker ANC and a stronger
Buthelezi, who will occupy a bargaining

a central role in orchestrating violence con-
tinues to mount. COSATU, the trade union
federation, points to “extensive documenta-
tion” in its possession which cite police cul-
pability.

The police have denied allegations of
collusion with vigilantes in the hostels, and
have demanded evidence to support the
mounting number of claims. They have,
however, made no effort to disprove charges
against them and have clung to a stock res-
ponse that it is not possible that they would
conduct themselves in a partial manner in
favour of Inkatha.

However, no credible explanation has
been given as to why they have not taken
action to prevent the outbreak of violence,
despite ample wamings that attacks were
being planned from hostels in the region.
Nor has any credible explanation been of-
fered to justify their failure to arrest those
guilty of murder, although killings have
taken place in their presence.

In the final analysis, the question stands:
will the Transvaal war achieve the objective
the government and Inkatha have set out to
achieve? So far, there is little, if any evi-
dence to suggest that it will. While the
violence has succeeded in causing damage
to ANC strongholds and delayed consolida-
tion of support, anti-Inkatha sentiment in the
region has rooted itself far deeper than it ever
was. In the process, the violence has only
succeed in raising support for the ANC.

Pacific Tribune, October 22, 1990 « 9