The Communist Party of Canada has charg

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Pica: Canada

ed the Trudeau government with failure

to exercise the right won by its predecessors under the NORAD agreement to take
a stand against the proposed U.S. anti-ballistic missile system.

The charge is contained in a submission made by the party to the House Com-
mittee on External Affairs and National Defense.

The submission calls for withdrawal from NORAD, as well as NATO, and for

rejection of the ABM system.

_ As an alternative the party calls for a declaration by the government that Canada
is a nuclear free zone, seeking guarantees to this effect from the U.S.A. and the

Soviet Union.

The Party has renewed its request for the opportunity to testify before the House

Committee during its present hearings.

The following are excerpts from the submission:

Only at the peril of your own politi-
cal futures, can you afford to ignore
the now widespread challenge to the
conventional doctrines of the cold war
which are coming with mounting in-
tensity from wide circles of liberal and
democratic opinion throughout the
Western world.

Simply stated their argument is that
the Soviet Union which had suffered
terrible losses of lives and property in
defeating the Hitler invasion had no in-
terest whatever in pursuing an aggres-
Sive policy following World War II, but
that the United States government after
the death of Roosevelt, and depending
on their then monopoly of the atomic
bomb, concluded that they would be
able to dictate a peace which would
ensure the world-wide domination of
United States imperialism. In other
words, it is the United States which
bears the over-riding responsibility for
the launching of the cold war. The reac-
tions of the Soviet Union, about which
there has frequently been much inspired

clamor in the Western press and gov- -

ernmental circles, have been no more
than the understandable efforts of a
great state to defend itself and its so-
cial system against a clear and present
danger.

Many distinguished scholars are now
subjecting to the most devastating cri-
ticism the view, which Canadian public
opinion was conditioned to accept, that
the Soviet Union was preparing to
launch aggressive war.

It is, of course, impossible. to detail
here all the argumentation that is serv-
ing to establish the fundamental United
States guilt for the cold war.

Our point is that these are questions
which must be intensively studied by
those in Canada who are responsible for
the conduct of our country’s affairs.

Particularly since the unfolding of the ~

barbarous U.S. aggression in Vietnam,
Canadian public opinion is coming to
insist on nothing less.

We are quite sure this study will es-
tablish that Canadian foreign policy in
its close support for United States
world leadership has rested on a foun-
dation of falsehood for a quarter of a
century, and has hence been profoundly
inimical to the best interests of Canada.

We shall address ourselves now to
your Committee’s current review of the
North Atlantic Air Defense Command.

It is quite evident first of all that
if that further and deeper study of the
whole development of the cold war
which we are calling for establishes the
primary complicity of.the United States,
then Canada should never have allowed
itself to become involved in such an
Air Defense agreement.

‘But even though this kind of funda-
mental questioning was not nearly as
widespread in the late fifties as it is
today, it is worth recalling that NORAD
became even then a highly charged po-
litical issue. Jon B. McLin in his “Can-
ada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-
1963” notes perceptively: ‘The issue
which started the disintegration of the
remarkable degree of unity which had
theretofore marked Canadian thinking
about defense policy was the establish-
ment in 1957 of a joint international
command for North American Air De-

-fense." =. >— ; esas

It is also still worth recalling that
NORAD was never properly considered
by the government of Canada. The St.
Laurent government had not taken a
decision on it, when it was unexpected-
ly defeated at the polls on June 10,
1957. The Diefenbaker government was
rushed into an agreement which was
taken without even full dress ‘cabinet
discussion. Indeed, General Charles
Foulkes, then chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee, admitted later in his
book “Canadian Defense Policy in a
Nuclear Age’:

“Unfortunately — I am afraid — we
(the military) stampeded the incoming
government with the NORAD agree-
ment.”

At the heart of the debates of ’57 and
"08, was the uneasy, and usually half-
concealed recognition of the fact that
NORAD, to a greater degree even than
NATO, made Canada wholly a subor-

The

SO FEET

dinate part of the strategic operations
accidents arising out of mistaking flocks
of geese or rising moons for attacking
air craft.

In short, the essence of NORAD is
that it makes Canada a place d’armes
for the military-industrial complex of
the United States, and hence makes
this country a prime target, equally
with the United States, in any nuclear
conflict in which the United States may
involve itself. ; ;

In the Exchange of Notes between
Canada and the United States, the let-
ter of the Canadian Ambassador to
Washington, Norman Robertson, dated
May 12, 1958 contains this paragraph:

“The two Governments consider that
the establishment of integrated air de-
fense arrangements of the nature de-
scribed increases the importance of the
fullest possible consultation between
the two Governments on all matters af-
fecting the joint defense of North Ame-
rica, and that defense co-operation be-
tween them can be worked out on a
mutually satisfactory basis only if such
consultation is regularly and consist-
ently undertaken.”

McLin makes the following observa-
tion on the significance of this posi-
tion:

“Such a commitment was a highly
desirable, if not indeed a politically ne-

ABM story eet 2

CHeighh2ier
Range: 25 MI ee
Speed: 2,000MPH

“Height.41FT
_ Range: 75 Mi ~

Height: SOFT
Range: 400 MI

&.

Speed: 8,000 MPH

USARDTY.

decade at about 80 sites near cities and air bases by the nuclear Nike-Hercules (second left). In the Safeguard plc
Spartan (third left) is to intercept incoming enemy missiles and the Sprint (far right) is to provide close-in protectio

Sec ons ae

oe _ a ee oe S .
The Nike-Ajax (far left), which used conventional explosives, was deployed in the early fifties and replaced at the “ et

radars that are the “eyes” of the ABM complex.

of the Pentagon. It has never been pos-
sible to sustain the argument that
NORAD was purely “defensive,” be-
cause it is blatantly obvious that de-
fense cannot be separated from offense
—that if its purpose was to detect and
warn against attacking air craft, the
instant result of that detection would
be to send the U.S. Strategic Air Com-
mand on its mission of nuclear death.
Hence we were utterly at the mercy of
the U.S. military, and could in fact be
plunged into war by actions taken by
them ranging from a political decision
to “strike first” at the Soviet Union;
or from a total breakdown of civilian
control in the United States; even to

_ taking in the agreement, did so against

cessary, part of the agreement for the
Canadian government. It was needed to
meet the criticism, which was often
made despite this paragraph’s inclusion,
that NORAD would involve Canada,

“more automatically than before, in any

war in which the U.S. engaged. The im-
portance of the commitment might be
disparaged, since without the will to
consult it would be worthless. But Sid-
ney Smith’s expression of the determi-
nation in Washington as well as Ottawa,
to fulfill the undertaking had a convinc-
ing ring, and the military negotiators,
who successfully insisted on behalf of
Canada on the inclusion of this under-

substantial U.S. resistance, |
sumably would not have ex!s he 2
Americans had not regarde
ance as meaningful.” utp tel!
It is however, this single fra
of independence, which the a
government of that day ™m@
insert into the original NO
ment, that has now been
upon’ by the present gove
Canada. ee sys |
For the anti-ballistic missile - ait
projected by President Nixon - ete
ly a matter “affecting the jo” inst
of North America.” Yet Pr, oa :
Trudeau finds it possible be cant |
that it is a matter about whie ist
can do nothing, nor even iNS™ og
consultations in any meaning i
of the word.

“Height: 27 FT
“| Range: 25Mi
_ Speed: Unreleased

doy
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; ti
In the House of Commons O°
26, the Prime Minister said: “TH gh
U.S. government) at no time —
our agreement to their intention ys
sue the implementation of that ao,
nor did we give them any such vest
ment.” Asked if Canada had lO, y
he replied: “No, Mr. Speaker, We “ag A!
at any time protest against the ri
the United States to progress weir”
system. It was entirely within th
jurisdiction .. .” Mini 4%
Later on May 23, the Prime 5 oY
is quoted by the Globe and Mail ®
ing: $
“If the Canadian governmé
power to make decisions in

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