BLOCKED BY~ U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY Why don’t they agree on a test ban! By PROF. E. H. BURHOP (British Daily Worker) Fr thé inspection of a test ban treaty the Soviet Union, during the period of 1958-61 accepted proposals for the estab- lishing of monitoring posts on its territory and for the dispatch of inter- national inspection teams to investigate possible un- derground explosions that could not otherwise be distinguished from earth- quakes. Arguments about the num- ber of control posts and the number of on-site interna- tional inspections to be allow- ed contributed to the break- down of these negotiations. When the negotiations were resumed in the new 17-nation Disaramament Commission at Geneva earlier this year the attitude of the Soviet Union had stiffened. DETECTING METHODS It was no longer prepared to agree to _ international monitoring posts on ,its ter- ritory and international in- spection teams would be per- mitted to conduct on-site in- vestigations of suspicious events only at the invitation of the country concerned. This change in Soviet pol- icy is partly justified by the progress that has been made in recent years in the devel- opment of methods of detect- ing and indentifying small underground explosions. In an article in the journal Scientific American in June the distinguished seismologist Prof. L. D. Leet, of Harvard University, concluded that it was now possible to detect and identify underground ex- plosions of yield greater than a few kilotons (that is, with an energy yield greater than a few thousand tons of TNT) with certainty, relying only on ‘a reasonable network of seismograph stations’ and without any on-site inspec- tions. Recent discussions in the British and American press indicate that this conclusion is becoming widely accepted. By still insisting on a quota of on-site inspections, there- fore, the Western powers seem to be asking for a de- gree of inspection § greater than that necessary to control a nuclear test ban. This rouses the suspicion of the USSR that the real aims of the Western proposals are related to espionage rather than to detecting under- ground tests. SMOOTH WAY The achievement of a test ban would smooth the way to a disarmament agreement but in itself it is not actually a disarmament measure at all. On actual disarmament the Soviet Union is prepared to go farther in the way of in- spection than for a test ban. It is prepared to allow in- ternational inspectors to ver- ify the destruction or dis- manhtling of armaments and ,armament installations as ‘agreed in a treaty. It is not, however, prepared to allow international inspec- tion of what remains after ‘August 31, 1962—PACIFIC TRIBUN the agreed disarmament mea- sures have been carried out, on the ground that this would be tantamount to espionage. In 1957 the Soviet Union was prepared ‘to go farther. It was prepared to ‘allow aerial photography, by inter- national inspectors, over large and specified zones of its ter- ritory. Both in the policing of a test ban and of partial dis- armament measures its atti- tude to inspection has stiff- ened. One must look for an ex- planation in the change that has been taking place in Am- erican strategic policy. The old discredited policy of Dul- les was that of ‘deterrence by massive retaliation.” The United States long ago built up a nuclear striking force adequate to destroy every city in the Soviet Uni- on — always provided their bombers could get through to them. In a widely read and pene- trating analysis published in the New Statesman last March, Prof. P. M. S. Black- ett showed how the USSR in its turn had responded by itself building up a striking force and means of delivery capable of destroying all the main Western centres. They had the capacity to build up their strength be- yond this but have not done so. The U.S., however, has gone on building up its nu- clear arsenal far beyond this level. Prof. Blackett suggests that the American stockpile of nu- clear weapons may now be as much as 30 times as large as that of the USSR. The reason for this ap- parently senseless build-up of American nuclear stockpiles to such an extent has been made clear in a widely pub- licized- speech: of American Defense Secretary, McNam- ara, at the University of Michigan last June. The Americans have chang- ed their strategy. It is now based on the destruction of the rocket bases from which Soviet retaliatory attack would come. ‘COUNTERFORCE’ Much larger stockpiles of nuclear weapons are needcd for this purpose. Of course many Soviet cities would be In 1957 the Soviet Union was ready to make significant concessions to U. ie tion demands. Prof. Burhop explains in this article how U.S. strategy caused 5? ov attitude to stiffen. g, inspe destroyed too, but this would be incidental to the main strategy. This new strategic policy of ‘counterforce’ as it is called, requires an accurate know- ledge of the location of Soviet rocket sites. If the Americans had this they would be in a position to destroy the retaliatory ‘power of the USSR. Soviet strategic policy, on the other hand, has been based on the so-called “mini- mum deterrent.” That is, to build up just sufficient striking power to enable it to retaliate against American and allied cities and installations — not to eliminate the so-called “hard” American bases which would be required for larger stock- piles.. Is it any wonder that the development of the new Am- erican strategy has made the Soviet Union more sensitive than ever on the question of espionage? If American policy were successful many American military planners would cal- culate that they could attack the USSR with impunity without fear of nuclear. retali- ation. Can anybody in _ their senses, having read some of the bellicose threats of these gentlemen, doubt that the risk of nuclear war would be enormously increased in these circumstances? It is true that President Kennedy has said that Am- erican nuclear strength would only be deployed as a “‘second strike’ force — that is, in re- taliation to an initial Soviet attack. But can one be sure hat ! a all circumstances Ke? pt could resist pressure fre” ’ ultras for a preventive tt at And can one be § even if Kennedy could no such pressure he w0U be succeeded by another aA sident more accommodat it to the plans of nucleat iacs? 5° The key to the whole ue tion lies in the rapid fot clusion of an agreemem total disarmament. at The Soviet Union has # ae and again made it clea? ne once a treaty on tota . armament is agreed 48° 4, plemented it would agree rf any and every measut inspection the Wester? ers might desire. There would then P° a fear of espionage be@ there would be nothine keep secret. — Israeli workers protest sewing uniforms for Nazi-led Bonn army — TEL AVIV—Pinhas Sapir, Minister of Commerce and Industry stated he will not order the Israel textile firm Ata, to cancel its contract making uniforms for the West German army. Replying in the Knesset to a question by Communist Deputy Esther Wilenska, Sapir declared that he did not think that ‘the supply of uniforms to the Bundeswehr constituted an affront to Jewish workers.” Sapir also said that the tex- tile firm denied the charge ‘that some workers who were former inmates of Nazi con- centration camps were forced to work on these uniforms! ISRAELIS AROUSED Public opinion in Israel has been aroused at the scan- dalous facts that in a Jewish state uniforms are being made for the West German Bundeswehr, headed by for- mer Hitier generals. To top it off, a special emissary from West Ger- many came to Israel in order to inspect, check and con- trol. He visited the factories, and made comments as to the quality and quantity of the production of these uniforms. The factories making the uniforms for the new Wehr- macht belong to the textile enterprise, Ata, which con- sidered their manufacture so urgent that it cancelled the vacation of the workers. Besides this, high produc tion norms and very demand- ing work was forced upon the employees (all women). to comply with “German thoroughness” even to the point where certain parts of the uniforms were returned from Bonn for correction. RESENTMENT This entire transaction, and particularly the work condi- tions that went with it has caused the greatest ment not only amoné textile workers, but @ pol the population ¢hrous f the country. ail The workers, the mal? ‘al of whom were either ip ne’ concentration camps he tos in Europe duriné jis war, have acted again" sot deal to supply uniform ght 2 the new Wehrmacht. ae demand the right to Te Me tof work for Hitler’s inher 0 as they were once f0F work for Hitler hims¢~ of Besides uniforms ot hath factories, near Ramat we are making belts for the German army. It is considered neré tut” Israel, with its manu ar of uniforms, belts a%© oul (Uzzis) has become t nde fitter for Adenauer’s wehr.