By TOM MORRIS

The dirty role played by giant
foreign corporations in Latin
America who use the continent
as a ready source for super pro-
fits is well known. Cheap labor,
willing politicians and flunkies,
vast natural wealth and-standing
military forces to protect their
investments and smash the peo-
ple’s struggles for liberation are
all an open book.

Recent bloody events in Chile
combining the military with do-
mestic and foreign capitalism
have dealt a severe blow to the
effort by the Popular Unity gov-
ernment to repatriate Chile’s
natural and human wealth for
the benefit of the Chilean people.

For three years, President Al-
lende and his colleagues argued
strenuously that the big inter-
national corporations which held
sway in Chile prior to the 1970
elections were subverting and
plotting to reverse the course of
history. The Popular Unity gov-
ernment warned that these for-
ces were combining with domes-
tic capitalism, right wing ele-
ments inside and outside the
Chilean armed -forces to create
a state of economic and political
chaos within the country and
eventually set the stage for a
military coup to restore the old
order in Chile.

“The government that as-
sumed supreme cémmand of
the nation on September 11,
1973, has decided to inform
governments, Banking Institu-
tions, International Credit Or-
ganizations, Suppliers and
Foreign Creditors in general
that it recognizes all debts in-
curred legally by the Republic
of Chile...”

—Junta press release,
Sept. 17, 1973

Allende, in an interview on
Jan. 30, 1971 described the
chronic problem of foreign in-
vestment in Chile: “Without
exaggeration, estimates establish
that from Chile in the last 60
years approximately $9,800,000,-
000 have been taken out of

Chile. That is to say, the total
value of all the capital accumu-
lated in Chile over the last 400
years has left its frontiers .. .”
On July 11, 1971 Chile national-
ized the three largest copper
mining companies—Cerro, Ana-
conda and Kennecott—all U.S.-
owned. Copper, the life blood of
Chile, accounts for 80% of its
exports.

“On the day of the coup,
Sept. 11, president Allende
was to have announced new
measures to advance the Po-
pular Unity-program. A plebi-
cite on the policy was rumour-
ed.”

—Morning Star, Sept. 15, 1973

The Popular Unity government
began the process, vital to
Chile’s development, of repatri-
ating major foreign companies
in all fields. Among these was
International Telephone and
Telegraph, nationalized in Sept.
1971.

IT&T through its companies,
Standard Electric, Telefonos de
Chile, All American Cables and
ITT World Communications, was
the second largest producer of
radio and TV equipment, ac-
counted for 95% of the tele-
phones in use and operated the
telegraph and telex services of
the country.

But it did much more, as a
book, “The Secret Documents of
IT&T”’, published by the Popu-
lar Unity Government on April
3, 1972 reveals. :

The book, complete’ with
photocopies of documents, let-
ters and position papers follows
the activities and plans of the
directors of this multi-national
cartel beginning on Sept. 14,
1970 (10 days after Allende’s
election victory), their efforts to
prevent his confirmation by Con-
gress on Oct. 24, 1970 and in-
auguration on Nov. 4, 1970, by
any means and, failing this, their
plans to sabotage, boycott and
strangle the Popular Unity gov-
ernment politically and econom-
ically.

The first photocopy letter,
dated Sept. 14, 1970 and stamp-

A Sa ad
Wa.

“Viva Libertad”—Long live Liberty is erased in downtown Santiago

Pai. ¥

by the hoses of the military junta, marking a new epoch of terror and

ScreR for the people of Chile.

ed ‘Personal and Confidential’,
expresses IT&T’s “deep concern
about Chile” and its $95-million
investment there. It is from J.
D. Neal of IT&T to W. R. Mer-

riam, IT&T vice president, ex-,

plaining that he has “telephoned
Mr. Kissinger’s office and spo-
ken with Mr. Valky”, Kissin-
ger’s Latin American adviser.
“J told Mr. Valky to tell Mr.
Kissinger Mr. Geneen (ITT
World President) is willing to
come to Washington to discuss
ITT’s interest (in Chile) and that
we are prepared to assist finan-
cially in sums up to seven fig-
ures 35° <2

The letter goes on to describe
Neal’s efforts over that week-
end—how he tried to meet with
U.S. Secretary of State Rogers
and did speak to Attorney Gen-
eral John Mitchell as well-as
Assistant Secretary of State
Charles Meyers — giving them
the same ITT offer.

On Sept. 17, 1970 E. J. Ger-
rity, ITT senior vice-president,
sent a letter to H. Hendrix, ITT’s
director of public relations for
Latin America outlining the re-
lations of forces in Chile. He
speaks about pressures. that
could be put on Frei (then still
Chilean president) to manoeu-
vere in order, to make another
election necessary, pitting Frei
against Allende and removing
the third candidate, Alessandri.
This, they reasoned, would as-
sure Allende’s defeat. “Late
Tuesday night (Sept. 15) Am-
bassador Korry (U.S. ambassa-
dor to Chile) received a message
from the State Department giv-
ing him the green light to move
in the name of President Nixon.
The message gave him maxi-
mum authority to do all. possible
—short of a Dominican Republic-
type action — to keep Allende
from taking power... .”

Later in the 7-page letter,
Gerrity discusses the chances
for military intervention by the
army: “Is the Chilean military
capable of coping with nation-
wide violence or civil war? Opin-
ion is divided on that in Santi-
ago. .. . the anti-Allende effort
more than likely will require
some outside financial support.
The degree of assistance will be
known better around October 1.
We have pledged our support if
needed ...

“A U.S. State Department
official admitted that the Ad-
ministration knew 48 hours in
advance that the attack was
planned . . . Nixon’s ambas-
sador to Santiago rushed to
Washington last Friday for
talks. He stayed only one day,
returning to Chile on Sunday.
Just after his return the Penta-
gon sent a message to U.S.
warships waiting off Chile’s
main port of Valparaiso.”

—Morning Star, Sept. 14.

“. .. The threat must be pro-
vided one way or another
through provocation. At the
Same time, subtle but firm pres-
sure must be brought to bear on
Frei so he’ll respond . . .”

A “personal and confidential”
cablegram dated Sept. 29, 1970
to ITT World President Geneen
from Gerrity sets out the steps
for economic pressure to be ap-
plied:

“Banks should not renew cre-
dits or should delay in doing so.

\

“WE PLEDGE ALLEGIANCE TO THE FLAG AND TE
CORPORATIONS FOR WHICH IT STANDS «*

“Companies should drag their
feet in sending money, in mak-
ing deliveries, in shipping spare

parts, etc. ae

“We should withdraw all tech-
nical help.”

At this point extreme pessi-
mism prevailed about prevent-
ing Allende’s confirmation.

A day later a letter was circu-
lated critical of the U.S. State
Department’s role in Chile. “For
years they have been predicting
an upsurge of: Marxism jn Chile
. . . knowing this, the U.S. step-
ped up its AID program in an
attempt to keep Chile democra-
tic ... the 1969 figure was over
$100-million as, no doubt, fiscal
year 1970 was the same or more.
Why should the U.S. try to be
so pious and sanctimonious in
September and October 1970...
why can’t the fight be continued
now that the battle is in the
home stretch and the enemy is
more clearly identifiable?”

October 9, a letter to John
McCone, ex-director of the CIA
and now a director of IT&T
from Merriam: “Approaches con-
tinue to be made to select mem-
bers of the armed forces in an
attempt to have them lead some
sort of uprising — no success to
date...

“. . . Practically no progress
has been made in trying to get
American firms to cooperate in
some way so as to bring on eco-
nomic chaos. GM and Ford, for
example, say they have too much
inventory on hand to take any
chances . . . the pressures re-
sulting from economic chaos
could force a major segment of
the Christian Democratic party
to reconsider their stand in rela-
tion to Allende in the Congres-
sional run-off vote. More impor-
tant, massive unemployment and
unrest might produce enough
violence to force a military move

”

Nine days left to Oct. 24 and
a letter describes a meeting be-
tween IT&T’s Merriam and U.S.

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PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1973—PAGE 6