GENEVA SUMMIT 1985 he Reagan nuclear arms buildup is essentially different from pre- vious phases of the nuclear arms race because, for the first time, the U.S. weapons drive is predicated upon the be- lief that nuclear war can be successfully fought and won by the United States. This belief accounts for the rapid acquisi- tion by the Pentagon, not only of vast numbers of new nuclear weapons, but also qualitatively new types of nuclear arms. It also explains the Reagan admin- istration’s reluctance to negotiate strate- gic arms limitations with the USSR: they are convinced that they can win an arms race against the Soviets and, if neces- sary, “prevail” in any. nuclear exchange. In previous decades, nuclear strategists accepted the doctrine of Mutual. Assured Destruction (MAD). This view basically held that any attack by one side would result in instant and devastating retaliation from the other. Nuclear war was unthinkable because it meant global suicide. The only way out of the MAD box was to negotiate, and learn to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a rational fashion. Ac- cordingly, during the 1970's, a number of crucial arms control treaties were worked out, and signed between the superpowers. However, new advances in tech- nology over the past decade, particularly in missile accuracy and radar-evading electronics, have raised the’ theoretical possibility of a ‘‘first-strike’’ capability. This would be an attack directed at the military capacities of the enemy, his abil- ity to retaliate, his government structure, his communications, and so on. The Ses Department of Defence defines a first-strike as ‘the neutralization of a majority of the opponent's nuclear strike force in order to avoid unacceptable reta- liation’’. Under the Reagan administration theorists who advocate developing such a ‘“‘war-fighting capability’’ have, forthe first time, become predominant in the U.S. government and Pentagon. De- fence Secretary Caspar Weinberger made this official when he told Congress in 1981 that the Reagan program was de- Wh signed to expand the U.S. capability ‘‘for deterring or prosecuting a global war with the Soviet Union’’. Reagan’s Soviet ‘‘expert’’ (now mem- ber of the National Security Council) Richard Pipes also expressed the new mood when he told an astonished repor- ter that ‘‘Soviet leaders would have to choose between peacefully changing their Communist system ... or going to war’’. Or, as Reagan-adviser Colin Gray wrote in a highly influential article in the journal Foreign Policy: ‘*The United States should plan to de- feat the Soviet Union and to do so ata cost that would not prohibit U.S. recov- ery. Washington should identify war aims that in the last resort would contemplate the destruction of Soviet political authority and the emergence ofa postwar world order compatible with Western values.” This is much more than an abstract theory, it is the guiding strategic doctrine of the Reagan administration. The new types of nuclear weaponry that the Pen- tagon has been acquiring in recent years, all fit the specifications of a first-strike strategy. = Leading up to the summit “The atmosophere for the summit is shaped well in ad- The political to 1 Naat, !* Soviet leader Gorbachev told Time magazine. **Today’s ac- _ tions will largely determine the scenario for our November dis- cussions.” 2. gcse ac gaa ie a : Re Se EI so 15: USSR anounes ital maraxu o e se cin eae It pro- ie Sean. 1985: USSR announces unilateral moratorium on nu- “coe ate ar uy 8 ‘1986. It invites U.S. to join. | — U.S. rejects offer. iedecdues Gobieteest batt“ “giatpagennts” oe ee eae t 18, 1985: USSR, inaletter to UN ec y er de Cuellar along with a copy of a proposed cooperation, aban on space militarization, a word ane ke. c e The MX Missile: Ronald Reagan has fought long and hard for the MX, a weapon that he calls the ‘‘Peacemaker’’: The main characteristic of the MX, which makes it first-strike capable, is the extraordinary precision of its ten independently-targeted warheads. It has . what the generals call ‘‘house-address accuracy’’, and this is necessary for a weapon that is intended to destroy small ‘‘hard”’ targets, such as missiles in their silos, command bunkers, etc. PA x AMER (CRNA “In concert with offensive weapons, Star Wars could accelerate the likelihood of a U.S. first-strike by blunting the impact of a Soviet retaliatory attack.” U.S. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan has observed that the Reagan administra- tion’s insistence upon acquiring at least 100 MX missiles is a disturbing sign that the U.S. is now committed to a first-strike strategy. He notes that, ‘‘the MX, a weapon that has the capacity to be used to great advantage ina first-strike, is going to be deployed in a fashion in which it can only be used as a first-strike weapon. e The Trident II (D-5): The Trident II (D-5), due to be deployed beginning in 1988, will be the first submarine- launched missile with the accuracy to carry out a first-strike. This is of critical importance, because submarines are very difficult to detect and they can get in very close to launch their missiles at the * enemy, giving very little warning time. Each Trident II missile will carry up to.14 independently-targeted warheads, and have an accuracy comparable to the MX (within a radius of 400-500 ft.). Former nuclear weapons designer Robert Al- dridge calls Trident II ‘“‘the ultimate first-strike weapon’’. e Cruise Missiles: These small, jet propelled missiles can be launched from air, sea or land platforms. They are highly accurate, and capable of evading radar defences, which makes them an ideal component of an overall first-strike, nuclear war-fighting strategy. Over 9,000 Cruise missiles will be deployed during this decade — more than 2,000 already — at a total cost of around $27-billion. Be- cause of their small size, Cruise missiles defy attempts to verify them for arms control purposes. : e The B-1B Bomber: This program ,Was ¢ cancelled by the Carter administra- “tion in 1977, but revived by Reagan in 1981 because the U.S. Airforce wanted a supersonic, penetrating bomber to carry Cruise missiles into Soviet airspace. The primary task of the $400-million per copy B-1B, which is now being deployed, is to act as a Cruise missile launch platform. A more sophisticated bomber under development in the U.S. is the STEALTH, an aircraft that will be invis- ible to radar and therefore able to pene- trate Soviet air defences even more ef- fectively. e The Pershing II: The Reagan ad- ministration moved heaven and earth to ensure that the Pershing II would be de- ployed in Europe beginning in 1983. It is not hard to see why. The 108 Pershing II’s based in West Germany will be able to reach their Soviet targets with less than 10 minutes warning. They are exceptionally accurate (within 65-130 ft. of their target), and their 1,800 kilometre range puts them within striking distance of many critical command centers and nuclear storage sites in the Western USSR. e Star Wars: Although it has been touted as a “defensive system’”’ to pro- tect North American cities and popula- tions, it is clear from the feverish pace of research and testing that the Reagan administration is looking for something much sooner, and much less perfect than that. Critics have already pointed out that some Star Wars weapons may be ready for deployment within a few years and, though they may not be adequate to defend cities, they may be capable of warding-off any residual Soviet reta- liation following a U.S. first-strike. Washington’s independent Centre for Defence Information has noted that *‘in concert with offensive war-fighting weapons, (Star Wars) could accelerate the likelihood of a U.S. first-strike by blunting somewhat the impact of a Soviet retaliatory attack’’. When President Reagan stated at his recent press conference that ‘‘under no circumstances’’ would Star Wars be up for negotiation at the Summit, or beyond, he was reaffirming his administration’s commitment to create and maintain a vi- able first-strike capability against the USSR. e C3 I: Known as the ‘‘nuclear infra- structure’, Command, Control, Com- munications and Intelligence (C? I) is the invisible underbelly of nuclear war preparations. Under the Reagan admin- istration, programs designed to make U.S. military installations capable of surviving a nuclear conflict have prolif- erated. Huge sums have been spent to make warning systems, command posts, and communications links able, as De- fence Secretary Weinberger has put it, **to support controlled nuclear counter- attacks over a protracted period.’’ The tentacles of the ‘‘nuclear infrastructure” now extend around the world — and Canada is a major arena of such development. These are some of the key elements of the new approach to nuclear war es- poused by the Reagan administration. Taken together they constitute — or will soon constitute — a ‘clear first-strike capability over the USSR. And then we may find out what on earth Reagan’s top arms adviser, Eugene Rostow, meant when he _ told flabbergasted reporters that, ‘‘we are liv- ing in a pre-war and not a post-war world.”