Sema liit tL Lt tt By RICHARD BARNET he President’s sudden decision to invade Cambodia - dramatizes the dangers of permitting the war to drag on and exposes the American people to many risks. Specifically, the serious risk that nuclear weapons might be used in similar mistaken effort to achieve a decisive military victory must now be faced. There is a likelihood that if the war continues for many more months Presi- dent Nixon will find himself in a position in which he may be strongly disposed to use tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina. The risk is based on the following evidence: 1. As of 1968 there were more than 5,500 nuclear weapons in the Southeast Asia area. Most of these wea- ons are aboard carriers and can be brought to Vietnam extremely rapidly. A substantial number of nuclear wea- pons are located on the mainland in Korea. Nutlear wea- pons are also located in Thailand, according to reliable reports of knowledgeable Pentagon officiais and military officers. 2. Until 1965 the Commander in Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC) had no plans or weapons capabilities to fight other than a nuclear war in Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam buildup both plans and weapons for non-nu- clear war were developed. However, -senior officers of the area still appear to subscribe to the view that nu- clear weapons are ‘‘conventional.’’ There is substantial military doctrine developed in the 1950s and early 1960s prescribing the specific circumstances under which nuclear weapons would be used in terrain such as Viet- nam and their effects. In ‘‘Nuclear Weapons and Limited War,” an article appearing in Air University Review (1960), General Frederic H. Smith, Jr. ‘writes: ‘‘We cannot afford to lose friendly nations and territories to the USSR, Red China, or their satellites under any cir- cumstances... The purpose of this article is to demon- strate that not only can the intelligent use of nuclear firepower in limited war give us the greatest possible opportunity to win such wars at minimum cost... but that it is highly probable that without the use of such weapons, our chances of winning in many areas are slim indeed.” One of such areas described in detail is typical of Viet- nam. 3. President Nixon appears to. share the view ex- pressed by General Eisenhower to his biographer that the threat to use nuclear weapons in Korea was instru- PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, 1970—PAGE 6 mental in bringing an end to that war. On March 17, 1955, Mr. Nixon, then Vice President, told the Executive Club of Chicago, “... Our artillery and our tactical air force in the Pacific are now equipped with atomic explosives which can and will be used on military targets with precision and effecti- veness. “It is foolish to talk about the possibility that the wea- pons which might be used in the event war breaks aut in the Pacific would be limited to the conventional Korean and World War Il types of explosives. Our forces could not fight an effective war in the Pacific with those types of explo- sives if they wanted to. Tactical atomic explosives are now conventional and will be used against the military targets of any aggressive force.”’ In his press conference of May 8, 1970, President Nix- on pointedly observed that the days of incremental or piece-meal escalation were over. He defended the Cam- bodian adventure as a decisive step and hinted that there would be others in the event of major enemy action. 4. Twice before the United States has seriously con- sidered the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina. At the time of the Battle of Dienbienphu, Admiral Rad- ford and John Foster Dulles proposed to French generals, and political leaders that atomic bombs be used to relieve the garrison at Dienbienphu. The plan was known as ‘‘Op- eration Vulture.” _ Under pressure from the military, President Johnson gave serious consideration to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to relieve the garrison at Khe Sanh in 1968. Re- ports that the White House was sounding out Congression- al reaction to such a move elicited a strong public reac- tion and all such plans were dropped. 5. The most plausible evidence that there is a sub- stantial risk is the lack of alternative military options given the character of the war and the ‘‘Vietnafnization’”’ program. Let us assume that President Nixon does re- duce the American force level in Vietnam to 200,000 or less and confines them to enclaves. Assume further that at such point the North Vietnamese and the NLF launch major offensives against South Vietnamese forces, a highly probable contingency unless they believe that the. U.S. means to pull all its troops out in a reasonable time. It is equally likely that they will overrun the South Viet- namese army, thus leaving the U.S. with the options of executing a Dunkirk-like evacuation, sitting idly by in enclaves while the forces they are supposedly there to ’ THE | BUTTON wa Mr. Barnet, co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies in ‘Washington, D.C., served in the State Department a the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during t! : ‘Kennedy Administration, and. was later consultant int é Department of Defense. He is the author of the books, In tervention and Revolution” (1968) and ‘Economics ° Death” (1969). In May, he addressed a meeting of the Business Ex tives Move for Vietnam Peace and New National Pri ties. The text of the speech follows: ecu- ori- protect are slaughtered, or carrying out a sudden dra- matic escalation. The possibilities of escalation are severely limited. Bringing massive numbers of US. troops back would be tactically and politically impos” sible. Bombing the North would be tactically irrelevant, since the enemy forces would already be in the South. Under these highly plausible circumstances the pressure would mount to explode a nuclear weapon as a qe stration of American will. It would be justified as the timate psychological pressure to convince Hanol tha they must negotiate on our terms. It should not be for gotten that the only time nuclear weapons have actually been used in war, the sole justification was ‘‘to save lives.”’ 6. It is impossible to know how substantial thes¢ risks are, although it is clear from the structure of the military, military doctrine, the President’s own past thinking, and the developing situation on the battlefield, that the risks are not trivial. Once such weapons are “used, events will move very fast and it will be exceeding: ly difficult for public or Congressional protest to hav any effect. The only effective Congressional role in suc a world tragedy is to prevent it. The Congress shoul press for a much stronger and clearer denial from the President that the use of nuclear weapons is being col sidered in Indochina than the perfunctory statement re cently issued by a low-level spokesman. The Congress should also inquire why nuclear weapons are present 10 Thailand and on the fleet operating in and around the waters of Indochina and take appropriate legislative steps to secure their removal. There is no reason, if in fact we are not going to usé those nuclear weapons, that they should be there. The threat that we are going to use them, or reserve the Op tions to use them, can only have the effect of bringing this war into a much greater conflagration and convince the other side that we have absolutely no intention of negotiating or of getting out. 3:3: I raise the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons, horrible as it is, because although it is something ap- parently mad, people should confront it in a straightfor- ward fashion. The lack of public protest and demonstra- tion of real public anger will, by the momentum of events, allow the President to take the fateful chance. So I would ask all of you to raise your voices, write, protest, and de- mand that these nuclear weapons not be used and that they be taken out of the area.