Hungary:

What are the

real issues?

By JOHN GOLLAN

tapes svents In Hungary have the hands
} YN nN l

concern p-e anc

of the working peo-
People’s Democracy
was established, reaction was
by no means defeated, nor its

influence ended.

an People’s Democ-
faced the difficult
tep by step overcom
king its in-
> on the working people
ing through reconstruc-
coun- anization of ag-
semi-fas- Ticulture and industrialization
rking cl and winning the people for
and perse. the advance to socialism.
: ; a development — so-
political and industrial—
-+h had to be pressed for-

all the problems

; hie
ing reactlon—pbre

tion, the me

hese

the time of liberation

very small indeed. The
‘hurch cess of amalgamation with
Democrats took

Times "1 :

50: the fight against reac-
en- tion was started, but the crea-
rights tion of a new state system had
would un- to go on and industrialization
proceed, and all this had to be
compressed into the short per-
iod of a single decade.

The process of industrializa-
tion has always been a hard
and painful one.

These problems would have
been difficult enough to over-
come if there had been no
abuses and mistakes.

But as we know, the system

lack of party democracy,
personal leadership, violations
law and police ex-
ses and crimes, exposed at
h congress of the So-
viet Communist party, deep-
ly penetrated the People’s
Democracies in Eastern Eur-
as well as the Soviet Un-
so that while big success-
and fundamental socialist
gal were achieved, there
were also acute problems and
i ntent among masses of the
which the Hungarian
kers party was not handl-
1d. = solving quickly

been challeng-

of socialist

situation the recti-

of the mistakes 1r
d by the 20th congress
provided the biggest opportu-
nity for reaction, which played
on the demands of the
the bitter end. people.

Hungarians Bold initiative was taken af-
s role in’ ter the Soviet 20th congress
resistance to restore the state and party
relations regarding the dam-
age which had been done to
Yugoslavia.

Not the same speed or
thought had been applied to
the question of the proper
forms of-relations between
the USSR and the People’s

ar and the

rman fas

just

to

ration. Even
wer came into

Democracies.

In general, the politically
autocratic attitude behind the
cult of the individual led to
the mistakes pointed out in
the self-critical Soviet govern-
ment statement on the rela-
tions between the socialist
states—a statement since en-
dorsed by the Chinese Com-
munist party.

The real problem in Hun-
gary seems to have been that

the initial rectiilcation of
mistakes was not sweeping
enough and was too slow,
the movement got out of con-
trol of the leadership of the
Hungarian Working People’s
party and the working class,
and order and unity collaps-
ed at a decisive moment.

We can understand the back-
ground, of which I have al-
ready spoken: industrializa-
tion, the peasant problem, the
deeply rooted reaction and its
connection with the U.S. sec-
ret service; a party which’ was
big in number but lacking
ideologically strong
members; a government and
party not working collectively;
and the excesses and crimes
which were alien to socialism.

*

Behind the just demands of
the people all kinds of forces
were organizing and arming.

Noel Barber of the London
Daily Mail, boasted that he
had dined with the very men
who “for a year plotted this
week’s revolt.” Similar state-
ments have been published
in the press generally.

Therefore there were the
two trends in the situation:
the just demands of the peo-
ple on which steps were being
taken, too slowly; and the
forces of reaction determined
to use the situation for an all-
out effort to break socialist
power.

But one thing is clear: that
no worker who took part in
the rising wanted to go back
to 1938—and why?

3ecause whatever the ex-

cesses and abuses in Hungary,
it was a workers’ and peas-

ants’ state. It gave the iand to
the peasants; it brought social
advances and power was taken
out of the hands of the feudal
landlords and exploiters of the
masses. Whatever mistakes
were made, they could have
been put right, given proper
political handling.

It is equally clear that the
role of counter-revolution was
not that of clearing up the ex-

; nor was its aim Hun-
Sarian national independence
—but the restoration of capi-

cesses

Demonstrators in Budapest

talism and landlordism and
the destruction of the peopie’s
power as such.

From the first they seized

the Western frontier with
Austria. It was from there

that more emigre forces cross-
ed over; the Gyor Radio be-
came their political. instru-
ment in making their demands.
Nagy, as premier increasingly
retreated before the reaction.

The security police were
dissolved; the promise of a
so-called “free election” was
made; the revival of the old
parties, including capitalist
parties, took place; the demand
for Soviet withdrawal from
the whole of Hungary was
made; the matter was raised
with the United Nations; the
proposal for a neutral Hun-
gary under Four-Power con-
trol was put forward.

Even this, did not satisty
the counter - revolutionary
forces, -who called for full
Western intervention and po-
litical and material help from
the West. While all this was
going on, reports were pub-
lished of what can only be des-
cribed as White Terror against
the working class forces.

*

It is in the light of all these
things that the question of the
Soviet troops has to be judged
The Hungarian authorities
called them in on the first oc-
casion. Nobody questions that,
while Nagy might deny he was
responsible. It is a_ tragedy
that they had to be involved,
because it placed them in the
most difficult position. They
certainly did not wish to pro-
tect anything wrong in the
lungarian situation.

Memories are too short. We
must recall the suffering and
agony caused because Hitler

NOVEMBER 16, 1956 — PACIFIC. TRIBUNE —

and fascism came to pow?
There is a tendency to fore
how the Warsaw powers cam
into existence and why ee
troops were stationed 11 th
countries.

It was the collectiv
answer of the socialist 5@
to the North Atlantic Tree
to the plans of
forces in Western Europe * Pe

i A regan.
sspecially srican org
especi ully Americé forget

tion, and we must not # Bas

the U.S. aim to “liberate
tern Europe.

Above all, it was an
to Adenauer and the
regular German
atomic weapons, an
made no bones about h
of revision of frontiers ©”
tern Europe, especially
land.

new

h

clear that if the Warsa¥
signatories want with@™ 94
of troops from Hungary is
it will take place; - DU
for them finally to dec! vert
As soon as the Nagy Brawl
ment requested with
from Budapest, the troones yp’
withdrawn. It would paserd
peared then that a demo os-
socia ist solution was stl yolu-
sible, and that counter-L@
tion could be overcome: Nagy
But with every SteP.”_ qe
took, reaction increased
mands, As the Londo — 7 ny
put it in its editorla\-
of the insurgents, feeling,
power, demanded more
~ All the conditions seter? }
ing prepared for a Wes tion of
tervention, the elimin@ wy pile
socialism and a virtua. “1919,
Terror, reminiscent Re pus
wiping out the flower |
- class

gary’s working
95:
ment. sant We
The Nagy governmen pe
in fact, disintegratine:

CONTINUED ON PAGE ‘
pack

S viet

4 nsw {

jg ai

e
: ; . mad fe
The Soviet governmcB aty

ye