By MAUREEN EASON

ine months after
the uprising
began in Gaza
and the West
Bank, the
Palestinian
people are
edging closer to

: the goal of
attaining their own state. Wittingly or
not, King Hussein of Jordan’s
announcement on July 31 advanced
this process. On Jordanian television
the king said: “Jordan is not Palestine.
The independent Palestinian state will
be established on occupied Palestinian
land after its liberation, God willing.”

These statements, made in
conjunction with the severance of
administrative ties between Jordan and
the West Bank, the cancellation of a
$1.3-billion U.S. development plan for
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the
dissolution of the lower house of
Parliament (half of whose members
were from the West Bank), signal an
end to the “Jordanian option,” the
favoured mechanism of the Israeli
Labour Party to settle the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.

One writer described the Jordanian
option as facilitating “the creation of
Palestinian ‘enclaves’ in the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank.

“These enclaves, separated from one
another by Israeli settlements and
suburban blocs, as well as military
enclosures, would amount to 60-70 per
cent of the Gaza Strip and about 40
per cent of the West Bank. The River
Jordan would constitute the
international frontier behind which the
Israeli army would remain in control
... internal security would remain in
Israeli hands. Jordan would be invited
to ‘co-police’ the enclaves, with Israel
and presumably to extend its
citizenship to all the inhabitants ...
Face-to-face talks with a Jordanian
delegation containing local Palestinians
virtually chosen by Tel Aviv would
negotiate this settlement at an
otherwise ceremonial international
conference,” Dr. Walid Khalidi wrote
in the Spring 1988 issue of Foreign
Affairs.

Khalidi stated that the Jordanian
option would solve the Palestine
problem “over the heads of the
Palestinians” and “keep the PLO
(Palestine Liberation Organization) ...
out of the peace process, drive a wedge
between the PLO and Jordan, present
a ‘conciliatory’ Israeli face to the
outside world, and throw the burden of
rejectionism and ‘missed opportunities’
on the Palestinians.” He argued
(correctly) that “no West Bank or
Gaza ‘leader’ anointed by the U.S. or
Israel could look his compatriots in the
eye, much less negotiate away their
birthright.”

“Far from stabilizing Jordan, the
Jordanian option would strike at the
very roots of the regime ... would
involve it in mortal combat with all
factions of the PLO and pit it against
last-ditch Palestinian resistance in the
occupied territories,” Khalidi warned.

With insight, he added that “as the
senior statesman of the Arab world,
King Hussein must know this, and his
sound political instincts will lead him to
the obvious conclusion,” as indeed they
did, Still, one can reasonably ask why,
with such ominous political
implications, King Hussein would ever
entertain such a plan.

During his 35 years on the throne,
King Hussein has survived many
intrigues and proven himself an adept
player at realpolitik. Relations between
the king (whose kingdom is 60 per cent
Palestinian) and the PLO have often
been strained — the 1970 Black

bag

<3

Vise

Jordan’s King Hussein:

advancing the process
to Palestinian freedom

King Hussein says shows there is no

September crisis which triggered civil
war being the most vivid example. But
like all political survivors, his sense of
timing is acute.

Although Hussein is what
Washington classifies as a “moderate”
Arab leader, and moderates generally
do whatever Washington asks of them,
they do not like to go out so far ona
limb as to commit suicide. Since the
PLO was founded in 1964, its political
momentum has periodically risen and
fallen — with King Hussein adjusting
his position accordingly.

Prior to the Dec. 9, 1987 “intifada”
(uprising in the occupied territories),
PLO political fortunes were at a low
point. Much has been written about the
November 1987 Arab Summit agenda
which relegated the Palestine question
to a place well below that of the Iran-
Iraq war, and how shabbily Yasser
Arafat and other PLO officials were
treated by their J ordanian hosts.

But the intifada has forced King
Hussein to re-evaluate his position vis-
a-vis the U.S. sponsored “peace”
proposals. The longer intifada lasts
(with Palestinians murdered, tortured,
deported, and so on), the more
destabilized the entire Middle East
becomes — a situation which threatens
Hussein’s kingdom and endangers his
throne.

By cutting ties with the West Bank
and Gaza, Hussein sent a powerful
reminder to Israel and the USS. that the

PLO is “‘the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people
(a position reaffirmed by the 1987 Arab
Summit).” Furthermore, it is a tribute
to the steadfastness and resistance of

- those under military occupation that he

refuses to serve as the velvet glove
behind the Israeli iron fist.

The king’s move was greeted with
surprise in many circles, especially
those in Israel and the United States.
One reason for this reaction, according
to Dr. Rashid Khalidi of the University
of Chicago, is that “unfortunately
many American and Israeli leaders
have selective perception where the
king is concerned: they only hear him
say what they want him to.”

Yet all along, the king has sent clear
warning signals that the status quo is
unacceptable. He repeatedly told US.
Secretary of State George Shultz that
his so called “‘peace initiative” was
going nowhere without the PLO. Dr.
Adel Safty, a visiting professor at
Simon Fraser University who is writing
a book on U.S./Palestinian relations,
notes that even at the June 1988 Arab
Summit in Algiers, Hussein discussed
key points of his imminent
pronouncement —statements the
western media ignored.

The reaction of what Noam
Chomsky calls the “super-rejectionists”
(Israel and the U.S.) to King Hussein’s
action is noteworthy. For his part,
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir

expressed delight at the king’s decision,
on the mistaken belief that, “What

longer a partner to the idea of
territorial compromise.”

Meanwhile, Shimon Peres and his
Labour Party have bemoaned the
king’s retreat, since he was the linchpin
of their “peace” platform in the
upcoming election. As one left-wing
Knesset member said, “In Labour HQ
they're holding seances, moving the
magic glass around and looking for the
lost soul of King Hussein.”

As usual, George Shultz continues to
trumpet the tired line that the PLO
must “change its ways” before being
allowed into the “‘peace process.” Since *
intifada began, the Shultz strategy has
been one of allowing Israel to wield a
big stick over the West Bank and
Gaza, while preventing the revolt from
spilling over into another Arab
country. In other words, to keep the lid.
on until November, when the whole
problem can be shifted on to a new
administration.

If that administration is headed by a
Michael Dukakis, the Palestinians
could find the United States more
intransigent that it is today. In early
June, Dukakis advocated relocating the
U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, thereby
legitimizing the occupation. He has |
refused to criticize Israel for human i
rights violations, dismissing them with !
the pronouncement: “Dealing with civil a
disturbances is not an easy job, as . |
anyone who ever tried to deal with
them knows.” Dukakis considers
Israeli ownership of Jerusalem as non- |
negotiable “except for the rights of |
religious groups that Israel has ‘
accepted.”

According to James Zogby, an
advisor to Jesse Jackson on Arab
issues and Arab American Institute
director: “Shultz’s declaration that the
political rights of the Palestinian must
be met goes beyond the language the
Dukakis people are willing to use.
There’s a failure to understand the full
humanity and aspirations of the Arab
people.”

Within Israel itself, a sharp turn to
the political right finds pollsters
predicting a majority government for
Yitzak Shamir’s Likud Party. If this
should occur, there is an expectation
that Ariel Sharon will be granted the
defence portfolio. Sharon is not alone
in his view that “Jordan is the
Palestinian state.”

This is King Hussein’s worst
nightmare as Jordan cannot possibly
absorb another 1.5 million people. And
this is why Hussein said, “Jordan is not
Palestinian.” By acting now, with
world attention still focussed on the
West Bank and Gaza, King Hussein
has tried to pre-empt any expulsion
fantasies from becoming a reality. A
mass expulsion of Palestinians from the
occupied territories may still be
attempted, but not without receiving
world condemnation.

Regardless of U.S. and Israeli
manoeuvers to deny the Palestinian
people their freedom, the Palestinian
road to self-determination is
irreversible. As Rita Giacaman, a
professor at Bir Zeit University in the
West Bank, said recently: “For the first
time, we understand the meaning of the
word empowerment ... And I don’t
think we can be broken, because we

_ have reached a point of no return.”

While international public opinion

continues to gather behind the

' Palestinian demand for justice and

freedom, the “super-rejectionist” policy
makers in Tel Aviv and Washington f
would do well to heed the words of an |
editorial writer in The Nation: “... 4
those who were once pawns may soon |
be kings of their own destiny.”

SN

Pacifié Tribune, September 7, 1988 +5 |,