In the current negotiations
between Canada and the United
States to establish new maritime

boundaries on both the east and.

west coasts, one of the most
Secretly guarded and politically
explosive documents is the position
Paper of the B.C. provincial
government.

As early as December 1976, the
Provincial government had quietly
come to a position similar to that of
the United Fishermen and Allied
Workers Union: that. the federal
government had failed to present
Canada’s best arguments in the
negotiations with the Americans
and that it was retreating before
the Americans on a course which
Could only result in the loss of
Canadian sovereignty over
valuable territory and fishery and
Mineral resources.

In April, 1977; the provincial
S0vernment completed a com-
prehensive position paper sharply
Critical of the federal position and
Proposing a tougher stand by
Canada in the negotiations.

This position paper, obtained this
Week by the Tribune, was kept
Secret from the public ‘by the
s0vernment until NDP MLA
Graham Lea tabled a copy of it in
the legislature last week.

Lea’s action prompted a curt
response from, premier Bennett
who declared that Lea had com-
Promised Canada’s negotiating
Position by making public B.C:’s
“secret”? arguments.

In fact, the existence of the
document and the main arguments
Contained in it were made public in
February of 1978 at the annual
Convention of the UFAWU, and
reported in the February 3 issue of
the Tribune. UFAWU secretary-
treasurer George Hewison told the
Convention about the B.C. position
Paper because only the week

of using different arguments to
gain ‘‘the best of all worlds.”’ So far
that method of argumentation has
worked to the detriment of Canada.
Nevertheless, the B.C. government
position paper is an important
document of which the people of
B.C. and of Canada should be
aware.

In the disputed boundary areas
on the west coast — the Straits of
Juan de Fuca and the northern,
boundary at Dixon Entrance, near
Prince Rupert — the B.C. govern-
ment listed valuable fishing and
mineral resources.

Significant mineral deposits in

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argued that the maritime boun-
dary in the Straits of Juan de Fuca
should be established on the basis
of an ‘‘equidistant’”’ line through
the Straits and proceeding out to
the 200 mile limit. The U.S. agrees
with the principle but differs on the
delineation of the line. The B.C.
government disagrees strongly
and states: —

“The equidistance line proposed
by the Government of Canada, if
adopted as a boundary line on the
continental shelf, would ignore the
Juan de Fuca canyon as a boun-
dary area, and would divide the
continental shelf to the west of the

A lateral boundary line that did not recognize
the Panhandle as a special circumstance would
constitute ‘‘manifest unfairness’’ or ‘‘manifest

hardship.”’

before he heard U.S. negotiators
Temark on the supposedly secret
document at a cocktail party in
Washington, D.C., where Hewison.
Was as an advisor to the Canadian
negotiating team. ‘‘Who are they
keeping in the dark: the U.S. or the

anadian people?’’ he asked
Thetorically.

The Tribune has presented below
Summaries and quotations from
key sections of the B.C. govern-
Ment position paper as a graphic
illustration of the weakness of the

anadian government’s stand in

€ maritime boundaries
negotiations.

While most observers have given

a

the disputed areas include
petroleum and natural gas in Juan
de Fuca and copper in Dixon
Entrance. j

More important to B.C. is the
fishery resources in the disputed
areas, notably the multi-million
dollar salmon fishery in the waters
near the B.C.-Washington —boun-
dary. In addition, the B.C.
government s a y 5, the U.S. have
been taking about four million
pounds of groundfish (especially
shrimp) annually fron the boun--
dary area. The Juan de Fuca
region is also crucial to the future
potential of a herring food fishery.

In Dixon Entrance the 1976

“The course currently pursued
by the Government of Canada
can only work to the disad-
vantage of the Province of

B.C.”

ee

the position paper a positive
assessment, it should be pointed
Out that the B.C. position is not
necessarily the best stand for
Canada in all respects. In par-
ticular, the B.C. position is very
Much a provincial. one which ad-
Vances argunients w hich, while
Securing advantages in the Straits
of Juan de Fuca would, if applied to
the east coast, prejudice Canada’s
Position on Georges Bank. The B.C.
government argues that different
Principles should be used for
determining different maritime
boundaries. International law has

Tecognized the use of differing

Principles where ‘‘special cir-
cumstances” prevail, but the B.C.
Position is similar to the U.S. tactic

- halibut catch amounted to $225,000.

“The area is also important for the
cod, sole and salmon fishery,” the
documents states. ‘‘In fact, 98
percent of the salmon taken by
Canadian fishermen off the coast
of Alaska are taken in Dixon En-
trance.3, :

“The waters off the Alaska
Panhandle have traditionally been
fished by the fishermen of British
Columbia for such stocks as
salmon, halibut, sole and cod.
Exclusion from these grounds
through the extension of United
States fisheries jurisdiction to 200
miles will cause a grave
dislocation to the fishermen of
British Columbia.”

The Canadian government has

canyon, granting to the United
States areas which are naturally
part of the continental shelf of
Canada. . .”

The B.C. position paper con-
tends that the Juan de Fuca
canyon is a_ ‘‘special cir-
cumstance,”’ as it divides the shelf
that is the natural prolongation of
Vancouver Island from the shelf
stemming from the Olympic
Peninsula in the State of
Washington. It cites international
precedents and the 1958 Geneva
Convention on Continental Shelf to
support its argument the the
canyon should be the boundary.« It
then states sharply:

“The course currently pursued
by the government of Canada can
only work to the disadvantage of
the Province of British Columbia.
By drawing boundary lines for the
200 mile fishing zone (which are
implicitly boundaries for the
continental shelf as well) on the
basis of an equidistance principle,
the Government of Canada has lost
any advantage that would accrue
to the west coast through any
concession made to the» United
States in respect of the Gulf of
Maine. (Georges Bank)’’

The B.C. government supports
the federal government’s position
that the 1903 Alaska Boundary line
is the international boundary line
in the Dixon Entrance. The U.S. is
demanding that the boundary be
moved south by several miles and
the B.C. government expressed
concern that Ottawa has already
conceded too much to the
Americans.

“In its Diplomatic Note of Dec.
22, 1976 to the United States, the
Government of Canada referred to
the waters south of the A-B line as
the ‘‘internal. and territorial

waters”’ of Canada. The Province
is concerned that this reference to.
“territorial”? waters’ might be
taken as a concession from earlier
positions that the waters south of
the A-B line are historically
Canadian ‘‘internal’’? waters: If
such a concession is intended, then
it is unacceptable to the Province.
It is the view of the Province of
British Columbia that the waters
south of the A-B line are the “‘in-
ternal’ waters of Canada.”

The B.C. government calls the
U.S. position to draw a ‘‘median
line’ through Dixon Entrance
‘totally unacceptable.”’ Any
movement of the boundary south,
it stated, ‘‘would deprive B.C. of a
large proportion of its halibut,
salmon, sole and cod fishing in the
area. . . and would increase the
opportunity for U.S. fishermen to
intercept Canadian salmon.
Moreover it would take from
British Columbia seabed areas
that have potential for copper and
other hard minerals, for oil and gas
exploitation. . .”

Not only are the American
demands on Canada unacceptable,
the B.C. paper argues, but Canada

prolongation of the land mass of
Canada. Though the Panhandle is a
feature that entitles the U.S. to
claim a boundary line that gives it
some area of the continental shelf,
it does not provide a basis for a
claim to the whole continental shelf
off the Panhandle.

“Once it is recognized that the
coast of the Alaska Panhandle is a
special circumstance it is in-
cumbent upon the U.S. and Canada
to negotiate a boundary in ac-
cordance with equitable principles.
.. There are a variety of ways such
a boundary can be drawn; it
should, however, ascend in a
northwesterly direction in a
manner that will pay due respect to
the peculiar geographic feature of
the Panhandle and to the interests
of Canada and the U.S. in the
continental shelf and seabed off the
Panhandle.”

The document proceeds to
outline five possible ways of
drawing a new maritime boun-
dary, each of which grant to
Canada fishing rights to a
significant area of the coastal
waters off the Panhandle and in the
Gulf of Alaska.

“It is the view of the Province
of British Columbia that the
waters south of the A-B line are

the
Canada.”’

‘‘internal’’

waters of

has, on the contrary, legitimate
demands on the U.S. In the most
startling section of the document
the B.C. government lays out. a
comprehensive claim — com-
pletely ignored by the federal
government — to large areas of the
waters off Alaska and the Alaska
Panhandle.

The Alaska Panhandle, the B.C.
government says, is a “special
circumstance.” It is not merely a
group of Islands because of the thin
strip of coastal land that is a part of
it. It is, in effect, a peninsula
feature which falls within the
categories of ‘’special — cir-
cumstances” recognized by in-
ternational precedent in setting
martime boundaries. ‘“‘A. lateral
boundary line that .did not
recognize the Panhandle as a
special circumstance would
constitute ‘manifest unfairness’’
or ‘‘manifest hardship’? as con-
templated by members of the
International Law Commission,”’
the document says.

“The continental s h e1 f off the
Alaska Panhandle is the natural

The arguments presented by the
B.C. government are far stronger
than those of the federal govern-
ment, and although not necessarily
Canada’s strongest position, they
vividly demonstrate the failure of
the federal government to uphold
Canada’a interest in the
negotiations with the U.S.

The federal government has not
yet abandoned the idea of putting
the maritime boundaries issue to
third..party. binding. arbitration.
that’ is a move which the B.C.
government says would be
‘fnappropriate’”’. Instead, Canada
should prepare its. strongest
arguments and negotiate a set-
tlement in its interest.

In addition to the strongest
possible arguments regarding
maritime boundaries, however,
the best negotiating position that
Canada could have is an aware,
informed and aroused public which
will make it clear that Canadians
will not stand for their sovereignty
on either coast to be ‘Sacrificed to
U.S. expansionism.

Submission of the

Province of British Columbia
on West Coast

Maritime Boundaries Between

Canada
and the United States

Province of British.Columbia

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—June 9, 1978—Page 3