OUTH-EAST Asia remains the area
of the United States’ most aggres-
sive activity, where large U.S.

forces are not only concentrated but
are also used on an increasing scale
against the Vietnamese people. creat-
ing a growing threat to Vietnam’s
neighbours and undermining the foun-
dations of universal peace.

Experience shows that wherever the

bellicose circles of imperialism are op-
posed by a strong united front of the
peoples, these forces refrain from risky
adventures. Although in Western Eu-
rope the United States has such a
zealous partner as the Bonn ruling cir-
cles ready to support any “initiative”
to aggravate the tension, the situation
in that area has in recent years been
developing in favor of the forces of
peace and security, although Bonn does
not give up either hope or attempts to
halt that process and to reverse it. But
the vigilance, the preparedness of the

countries and peoples of Europe, deter-
~ mined not to allow a new conflict on
the continent, are having their effect.
Is it possible to create a similar
situation of isolation of the forces of
aggression in Asia? The USSR and the
other fraternal socialist coufitries show
by all their actions in that area that
this is both possible and extremely
necessary. This is not merely a theo-
retical confidence. It is based on ex-
perience. It is a fact that in 1954 it
was possible to prevent the United
States’ armed interference in the war
in Indochina and to settle the conflict
on terms corresponding to the interests
of the peoples of that area and to the
interests of peace and socialism. That
the aggressive plans of John Foster
Dulles were frustrated was to no small
degree due to the fact that the leaders
of the People’s Republic of China at
that time followed a single, coordinated
policy together with the other socialist
states.
e
In the course of almost ten years
after the conference in Geneva, the
United States refrained from exten-
sive armed intervention in Vietnam. It
developed when the Mao Tse-tung
group in Peking announced to all and
everyone that it flatly rejected the pro-
posals of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and of the other Com-
munist Parties for the unity of actions
in the struggle against the imperialist
aggression and began carrying on its
narrowly nationalist, great-power and
anti-Soviet line. That actually amount-
ed to Peking inviting Washington to
unrestrained escalation of the conflict
in South-East Asia, including the re-
cent escalation of the air war against
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

September

on such a scale when the areas adjoin-
ing the People’s Republic of China are
also subjected to blows.

It is hard to imagine anything more

~ pernicious for the maintenance of peace

in Asia, for the interests of the cause
of socialism in the People’s Republic
of China and for its position in Asia
than the Maoites’ present policy. While
raising a hue and cry about the U.S.
aggression and the danger to China,
Mao Tse-tung and his group in Peking
are by all their actions bringing grist
to the U.S. aggressors’ mill, creating
difficulties for the  anti-imperialist
struggle in South-East Asia. They are
calling toa the surface that’ against
which the Peking propaganda leaflets
rage when they anathematize ‘“imper-
ialism” spearheaded against Asia. And
the. U.S. ruling circles are trying to
strike while the iron is hot, are mak-
ing efforts to take advantage of the
present disturbances in China.

sia-W

The escalation of the Vietnam war
is not the only example of it, it is but
one of the links in the chain of other
actions of U.S. imperialism in South-
East Asia.

U.S. STRATEGY

Local war strategists overseas re-
gard South-East Asia as the main field
of actions. Yet, they have more far
reaching plans. :

“The balance of forces in the world

‘depends in the long run on the poli-

tical and strategic orientation of the
countries of that continent,” said Cyrus
Sulzberger, the New York Times com-
mentator, as wrote about Asia. “The
American strategy now lays its main
stress on Hawaii,” intoned the maga-
zine Fortune, a mouthpiece of Ameri-
ca’s Big Business. Airfields, ports,
docks, barracks and military depots
are hastily being built on the islands
of Guam, Midway, Wake, Okinawa,
Taiwan, in Thailand and in South Viet-
nam. Work is nearing completion in
Sattahip, on the coast of the Gulf of
Siam, of America’s biggest airfield on
the continent. Besides, those in Wash-
ington are saying outright that its
purpose is to be used for operations
not only against Vietnam. As much
as 500 million dollars have been in-
vested in the equipment of the port
and runways in the Khamran Gulf in
South Vietnam, and this is another big
American base situated directly on the
continent of Asia.

29, 1967—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 6

It was also Fortune that pointed out
that the generation of Americans now
shaping the policies with regard to
Asia “is the same generation which
formerly was glad to see the crushing
of the system of imperial power which
Japan tried to impose upon Asia.” The
U.S. used Japan’s defeat in the Second
World War to intensify American ex-
pansion in Asia. At present America’s
purchases in South East Asia increas-
ed at least six-fold, as compared to the
pre-war level. By imports* from that
area America meets its requirements
in rubber—by 85 percent, in tin—by
50 percent, in jute and mica—by 90
percent, in tea—by 77 percent, in sugar
—by 24 percent. True, falling to Asia
and Australia is only 1/15 part of all
of America’s foreign capital invest-
ments—the same as to Africa. Britain,
the Netherlands, and Japan have bigger
investments. However, the dollar is not
to be caught napping. And the Ameri-
can government is becoming ever more
active in this respect. It is assuming
control of the levers of the commer-
cial and economic expansion. At pre-
sent up to a half of the U.S. exports
to Asian countries are based on gov-
ernment credits and loans.

"SPECIAL PROJECT'

Nation, a liberal magazine, said that
the USA is trying to “monopolize the
market in Asia with the force of arms.”
However, this is not the only thing.

&

America’s “interests” in this part of
the world, interests stemming from the
expansionist aspirations of. U.S. im-
perialism, go to form an intricate knot.
Not so long ago Washington Post call-
ed upon the government to set up “an
institute which would have a know-
ledge of China andthe rest of Asia
with nothing to match it in the world.”
Such is the scope of their plans. Work-
ing in the USA is a multitude of re-
search establishments engaged inten-
sively in developing Asian problems.
In one of the biggest centres of this
kind, extensive work is being done
over the so-called “special project”—
the USA and China in international
affairs. Among the topics of the pro-
ject are: China and Asia’s security; the
importance for the USA of the pre-
sence of nuclear capacities in China,
etc. Attention is being devoted in the
USA to the analysis of the prospects
of transition of young and independent
countries to non-capitalist develop-
ment. For instance, the Rockefeller
Fund has set itself the task of analys-
ing how “Marxist influence has pene-
trated Asian thinking.”
e

In a word, this is a case of working
out a strategy which is now shaping
out, though not in all details. Much
in this respect will depend on how re-
lations between the USA and China
will develop.

In March 1966, the U.S. Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, in the course
of several days, examined diverse as-
pects of U.S. policy as regards the
People’s Republic of China. The Com-
mittee’s proceedings were opened with
a statement to the effect that “the
attitude towards China is today one
of the’ most important foreign policy

questions confronting the ©» 4 iy
importance would not dimin’
coming decade.” It Ww: hi
during the debate that ©
on the eve of a certall pet
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policy of the Chinese leaders nos
ened Peking’s internation
which was profitable fof

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the results were positive this
American point of vieW. .(
nection special attention wo
potential whch creates ™ yi
for the Unted States: ris
Halpern of Harvard, ™ grote
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