UT Tt Ee TT tT Ut te ee Et Te Te The long road to peace The record of the Korean truce negotiations Oe Te tf 1951 June 23—Jacob Malik, Soviet delegate to the United Nations, announces in a radio talk that the Soviet Union believes the Korean conflict can be settled. He proposes that “discussions be started between the belliger- ents for a cease-fire” on ‘the basis of withdrawal of both sides from the 38th parallel. The North Koreans and Chin- ese propose truce negotiations, with worldwide support from peace forces. U:S. government agrees, but issues “warnings” about what may happen. “~ July 10—Truce talks begin at Kaesong. U.S. wants question of prisoners of war first item on agenda after adoption of agenda . itself. Koreans and Chinese say it should come in proper place. U.S. finally agrees. July 12—Admiral C. Turner Joy, chief U.S. negotiator, breaks off talks because newsmen not admitted to Kaesong. Also adds demand for ban on armed per- sonnel in five mile radius around truce site. \ July 15—Korean-Chinese dele- gates announce their assent to immediate admission of news men, agree to the neutralization of the truce site. July 19 — Talks deadlocked over inclusion on agenda of ques- tion of withdrawal of foreign troops. 3s July 25—North Koreans agree to defer question of troops until after the ‘truce conferences. July 26—An agenda is agreed upon. July 29—Discussion on mili- tary line of demarcation for the truce begins. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had said many times that the U.S. would agree to the 38th parallel. Joy now demands the line be the ac- tual battleline, in some places north of the 38th parallel. August 4 — Joy proposes. a truce line that would require North Koreans to withdraw from their battleline. A small body - of Chinese troops carries weap- ons inside the neutral zone, and the U.S. breaks off talks. : August 22—Koreans and Chin- ese. charge a U.S. bombing and strafing of neutral zone almost wipes out their delegation. : September 15—North Koreans charge that U.S. planes violate the truce zone 139 times in the first eight days of September. U.S. charges that Koreans are able to “manufacture” incidents in the city of Kaesong and pro- pose that the talks be moved. A bloody U.S. offensive fails to gain ground. October 10— Twenty Chinese prisoners of war killed and- wounded by guards as a result, prisoners charged, of an effort to force them to raise Chiang Kai- shek’s Kuomintang flag. October 22 — After weeks of meetings between liaison officers, the Chinese and Koreans accede to the U.S. demand, and the truce talk site is moved to Panmunjom. October 25—Talks resume. : November 27 —Cease-fire line of demarcation agreed upon, at the battleline instead of the 38th parallel, as originally proposed by both Acheson and the Kor- eans. If the truce is not signed within 30 days, the line is to be re-surveyed at the time of sign- ing, on the principle of the then existing. battleline. Battleline proposal originates with Koreans and Chinese. November 29—Fighting stops, although Truman and the mili- tary staff later say that no “‘cease- fire’ order was issue. Public pressure mounts for speedup in talks. Widespread belief “mili- tary solution” impossible. December 18—Lists of prison- ers exchanged. Koreans and Chinese list all non-Korean. pris- oners in English with rank and serial number. South Korean prisoners in Korean characters. Admiral Libby, U.S. delegate, turns over 132,000 names of Chin- ese and North Koreans in Eng- lish. No other details. Chinese, Koreans protest vigorously that list is useless. December 25—Two days before expiration of truce line agree- ment, Libby presents new list, also branded as worthless by Ko- rean and Chinese because of poor translation, missing data. Hope for peace by December 27 van- ishes. 1952 January 15 — Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky pro- poses to the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly meeting in Paris that there be an immediate arm- istice in Korea, withdrawal of all foreign troops within 90 days, with the issues of the war to be settled by high level Security Council negotiations. January 28—Libby finally turns over 132,000 names with proper symbols, 41 days after receiving lists of prisoners held in North Korea. Koreans and Chinese claim 44,000 names still missing. February 6 — Top negotiators resume sessions. Sub-committees have been discussing prisoner of war exchange, supervisory teams, airfield buildup and troop rota- tion since November. February 19 — Agreement reached that a top-level : diplo- matic conference will meet 90 days after the truce to settle the peace issues. Koreans, Chinese protest brutal shooting of prison- ers in U.S. camps. March 30—Agreement is reach- ed on troop rotation. Each side may rotate up to 35,000 a month, during armistice. Progress, seem- ingly, is being made at a rapid rate. April 4 — U.S. command an- nounces it has “screened” North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, and claims that only 83,000 of 170,000 wish to go home. The principle of so-called “voluntary repatriation” was on the table. It was to become a major stumbl- ing block. May 2—All issues settled ex- cept prisoners of war. Nam IL declares internationally agreed principles of return of all pris- oners of war must be kept. Talks still in secret session. May 6—Joy demands indefinite recess until Korean-Chinese side accepts U.S. ultimatum providing for return of only 70,000 Korean, and Chinese prisoners. May 7 — Truman, Ridgway, Acheson, Van Fleet, British and Canadian Foreign Ministers an- nounce support “‘to the end” of Joy ultimatum. At this point 63 of 64 paragraphs on armistice pact have been initialed. May 7 — Brigadier General Francis Dodd seized by Korean prisoners on Koje island in pro- test against forcible “screening” on question of repatriation. May 10—Dodd released after U.S. had signed an agreement with the prisoners admitting that there had been brutalities and forcible “screening.” Prisoners assured that thereafter they “can expect humane treatment in this camp according to the principles of international law.” June 7—UN negotiators start a series of “walk-outs” in the truce sessions discussing prison- er exchange. June 10—Massaére on Koje [s- land as General “Bull” Boatner transfers prisoners to small com- pounds. Forty-one prisoners are killed and 279 wounded. Dodd release agreement broken. June 24 — U.S. planes bomb power plants on the Yalu river. U.S. allies protest bitterly that this endangers the fruce and de- clare they had not approved the action. July 4-25—Secret talks, which | Seas REE) || | | aan end in deadlock on prisoner ex- change. August 15—North Korean Pre- mier Kim Il Sung says in radio broadcast that the war should be .ended with “no winners and no losers.” October 1—Massacre of Chin- ese prisoners who were celebrat- ing China’s Liberation Day, on Cheju Island, with 56 killed and 120 wounded. North Korean and Chinese “negotiators continue to press for a truce settlement. October 3—Negotiations brok- en off by the U.S... Later it is learned that the Korean-Chinese had made fundamental conces- sions on the prisoner issue. The U.S. did not discuss the proposal before breaking off negotiations. . October 11 — Korean protest ending of negotiations, and pro- pose that an armistice be signed immediately, leaving the prison- er issue for future negotiations. October 14 — United Nations General Assembly begins debate on Korea truce. October 30 — Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky proposes est- ablishment of a UN Commission for peaceful settlement of the war, which would include the Soviet Union as a member, and which would repatriate prison- ers according to the Geneva con- vention. _ November 18 — India places plan _before UN for settlement of prisoner of war issue through a five-member repatriation com- mission. December 1 — Vishinsky tells main political committee of UN: “T£ you want to open the door of peace, why not open it with a recommendation that hostilities in Korea be halted?” Criticizes India proposal because it con- tains no cease-fire provision. December 4—UN endorses In- dia plan. : 1953 March 28 — Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai announces that Koreans and Chinese are willing to exchange sick and wounded prisoners. He proposes resumption of talks and that prisoners not wanting to go home be handed to a neutral commis- sion, April 1—USSR Foreign Min- ister V. M. Molotov supports the Chinese proposal. ‘ April 11 — Agreement signed for exchange of sick and. wounded. April 20—Exchange begins. April 26 — Truce negotiations resumed. May 7—Koreans and Chinese propose detailed eight-point set- tlement of prisoner issue. Prison- ers who allegedly do not want to return home would be kept in Korea under custody of five neutral nations where questions of repatriation could be explain- ed: to them in an atmosphere free from threats, coercion and torture. Any prisoners still not wanting to return would have their fate referred to the post armistice political conference. May 13—U.S. makes 26-point counter-proposal, insisting that all Koreans be freed immediate- ly after a truce; and only the Chinese be held by neutral na- tions. May 15—Nehru supports Chin- ese-Korean plan. May 25 — US. proposes new secret plan. Talks recessed t0 June 1, ; May 28—South Koreans de- nounce U.S. plan. June 4—Koreans reply to May 25 plan. : June 8—Agreement on prison- ers is finally signed. It provides that prisoners who want to 9° home will do so within 60 days- ‘A five-nation neutral commission will take charge of the others, who will be able to talk to reP- resentatives of their nations- Those who finally decide not t0 go home will be allowed to go to a neutral nation to live, but may thereafter return home if they. wish to. June 9 — Staff officers start drafting the final cease-fire line. June 13— President Syngman Rhee of South Korea unilateral “releases” 27,000 prisoners in his custody in effort to disrupt truce agreement. . June 29—General Mark Clark proposes that the truce be sign- ed without the South Koreans. July 7—North Koreans droP their demand that the relea Prisoners be returned and agree — to sign, accepting Clark’s assuU! ances that he will do everything in his power fo prevent Rhee from sabotaging an armistice. July 12—Rhee and U.S. Special Emissary Walter Robertson a nounce agreement on truce a! rangements. July 183—Rhee qualifies this. July 19 — Korean, Chinesé pgain pave way for truce bY accepting at face value U.S. 45 surances Rhee will abide by art istice terms. July 23—Rhee continues to e” danger truce with talk of unt lat@ral action. R. A. Butler, act ing British prime minister, fuses to disclose to House of Commons details of secret agreements made with Syngmal- Rhee by Walter Robertson. He says that “publication must d& ae upon the decision of the July 27—Armistice signed. PACIFIC TRIBUNE — JULY 31, 1953 — PAGE 10