~ Grave dangers stem from]

summit crisis says Buck

TIM BUCK.

As this is written, a full week after the momentous confrontation in Paris, the
daily papers and radio and television programs, in Canada as well as in the U.S., are|#
still loaded with alleged “analyses” of the breakdown of the summit conference that |i
had been awaited with such high hopes by the majority of mankind.

_Except for its volume, the
only thing about this torrent
‘of written and spoken words is
the servile uniformity - with
which 90 percent of the: self-
styled’ “experts” and commen-
tators continue to repeat vic-
ious and silly nonsense about
the reason for the breakdown
—tlong after some of the more
responsible public advisers of
the capitalist class have warn-
ed that this nonsense is liable
to ‘boomerang.

“Most of the 90 Siont who
mouth the vicious nonsense
that “Khrushchev acted as he
did because he is in danger of
‘being ousted from his position
at home,” or because =
needs a dramatic incident,”
the even more childish ne
ialist warmongers’ dream of

“a split between the Soviet
Union and China,” do so simp-
ly because it is their job.

’ As the wife of the most pom-
pous of the “radio personalit-
ies” with which this area is
afflicted once said to me in
Spontaneous reaction to my
criticism: “But, ‘Mr. Buck,
that’s what my husband is
paid for.” .

Whatever their personal
reasons for spreading it, the
sole effect of most of their
‘propaganda during the past
‘week has been to distract in-
‘terest and attention away from
ithe real significance of the
dangerous crisis which came tc
‘a head in Paris on May 16.
CAUSE OF CRISIS

‘The crisis was not created
by Premier Khrushchev read-
ing to the other three heads of
state his indictment of the Un-
ited States government for its
calculated acts of aggression
and vulgar double-dealing.

The crisis was created by a
Series of events of- which, as
is shown in the statement is-
Sued by the Communist Party
of Canada, ‘the spy plane
crisis was the breaking point.”

In their Camp David talks
President. Eisenhower agreed
with Premier Khrushchev that
“the situation in Berlin is ab-
mormal and must be changed.”
Kisenhower repeated this to a
press conference and it was
his position for several months
During February Christian
Herter stated publicly that he
believed it to be possible to.
negotiate an improyement of
the situation in Berlin.

But, shortly after that Kon-
rad Adenauer visited Washing-
ton, and Eisenhower agreed
with ‘him that no concessighs
Sere ee

‘made

dered a world-wide :

should be made to the Soviet
Union in the matter of Berlin.

It is quite likely that Eisen-
hower expected this renegacy
on his agreement with Khrush-
chev to be kept secret but Ad-
enauer had other ideas — he
sure that it became
known so that his friends in
the U.S. State Department,
those who continue the Dulles
tradition, would be able to act
upon it as United States policy.

A series of provocative inci-
dents followed with the state-
ments of United States repres-
entatives becoming more and
more bellicose. Then, when
the spy plane -was brought
down 1,300 miles inside the
Soviet Union, on May Day, the
Eisenhower administration de-
clared that neither the presi-
dent nor his secretary of state
knew anything about it.

A few days afterwards, after
Premier Khrushchey accepted
this diplomatic formula and
expressed to the deputies of
the Supreme Soviet of the Sov-
iet Union confidence that the
president had not’ approved
personally of the invasion of
Soviet air space, Eisenhower
made a public statement con-
tradicting the first lie.

This time he claimed to be
in complete personal control of
the situation - and associated
himself with the State Depart-
ment’s declaration that the ag-
gression was to be continued,
describing it as ‘a distasteful
but necessary task.”

To commit the heads of the
imperialist states collectively

to the “hard. line,” Eisenhower,

Macmillan and de Gaulle were
brought together in a last min-
ute meeting with Adenauer in
Paris a few hours before Khru-
shchey arrived there. ~
Again Adenauer made sure
that the private meeting be-
came well known and that the

other three were in agreement

with him.

It is evident that, for Eisen-
hower, Macmillan and de
Gaulle, their real summit had
taken place with Adenauer be-
fore Khrushchey arrived.

The sole question for them
was “support the line of proy-
gcation or oppose the U.S.”

There | was talk of vice-presi-
dent Nixon replacing Hisen-
hower after the first few days

while the president visited the

fascist dictator
Salazar. s

~ The: U.S. war degakiment or-
“action

af a

FE

alert” of all U.S. armed fore-
es, along with the British air
force, during the night before

the summit conference was to }

have opened.

It was more like the eve of
a declaration of war than the
eve of a conference to relax
world tensions.

PERFIDY AT SUMMIT

The complete reversal of Eis- |}

enhower’s. position from the
one he had taken immediately
after the Camp David talks

was the cause of the crisis and |.

its sole cause.

The spy plane incident alone
would have been more than
enough to have disrupted the
projected conference because,
as the Financial Post pointed
out in its issue of May 21:

“~ . . Sending photographic
reconnaissance planes over
Russia, no matter who was dir-
ectly responsible; was both
dangerous and’ provocative.
Imagine the howls and screams
of anger that would rise from
Washington if Soviet planes
were flying over the U.S., from
say, Cuban bases? “*

But, in the situation that ex-
isted on May 16, the spy plane
aggression was the extreme
expression of systematic hostil-
ity.

‘The manner in which the
U.S., government had dealt
with the incident and its un-
concealed repudiation of the
purpose for which the summit
meeting was called, made un-
equivocal condemnation of the
aggression by the head of the
United States government the
minimum requirement to re-
establish conditions for genu-
ine negotiations.

By confronting President
Eisenhower with the realities
of the situation that his alli-
ance with Adenauer is bring-
ing about, the Soviet govern-
ment performed . an historic
service for all mankind.

|LESSON FOR CANADIANS

The first and most evident
lesson for Canadians in the
summit crisis is that we should
act promptly to stop the use
of bases in our country for this
“dangerous and provocative”
aggression. Protestations by
the Diefenbaker government
that’ U.S. air bases in this
country are used only ‘for “le-
gitimate”’ flights all evade the
reel: issue.

The United States govern-
ment claims that its spy flights
over Soviet territory are pice
gitimate. ” “Its ~ representative

“Help! Let’s all

stick together.

: (Eccles in British Daily Worker)

in the United Nations tried to
justify the spy plane aggres-
sion by arguments which, if
they were accepted, would be
a step towards making all es-
pionage legal.

But, the fact remains that no
sovereign people is going to
allow military forces of an-
other country to deny their,

-sovereignty by ignoring their"

frontiers and their laws. Peo-

| ple who do allow such actions

won’t remain sovereign for
very long.

Authoritative servants of
the United States government
have told Canadian newspaper-
men that Canadian bases have
been used for U-2 “reconnais-
sance”’ over Soviet territory.
The Soviet government has
warned that, if necessary, it
will treat any country which
allows the use of its territory
for such flights as an accom-
plice in aggression. The gov-
ernments of Norway and Pak-
istan have protested tothe Un-
ited States against the use of
their territory for such flights
and have demanded that the
practice be stopped. The peo-
ple of Canada must press the
Diefenbaker government to do
at least as much.

There should be a mass de-
mand for a public declaration

by the prime minister that-no |

such activities will be permit-
ted from Canadian territory
and that Canada condemns the
use of spy planes over any.
country at all. — ; .
WHERE DO Ww
FROM HER: 2
It is quite evident that the
grave dangers that all thinking
men and women fear will, de-

GO

velop as a result of the crisis |

at the summit. They will stem

from the. United States-Aden-

auer line of renewed intensifi-

June 3, 1960—PACIFIC TRIBUNE—Page 2 -

cation of the cold war and the

U.S. elections.
- In spite of the strength of

there is danger that this com-
bination may provoke world
nuclear war. Our couniry

drive towards this danger now.

more strongly than ever be-
fore that because of the gen-
eral political climate and the
level of political activity in
our country, the one alterna-

in the United. States policy of —
aggressive provocation that.

be won to support now, is a

trality..
ACT FOR NEUTRALITY
NOW
Popular demoCratic pressure

ited States preparations for

gression in any form and,
thereby, one of the best means

{to save our country and her .

people from the horrors of nu-,
clear war.

vided a sharp reminder that ~
ly as, and to the extent that,

alist interests which JTree
‘the United States are curbed .

‘is another reason why we must

neutrality.

summit is that we may not |
have much time.

“Hate Russia” campaign in the -

the peace forces of the world

should be disengaged from the >

It is necessary to emphasize —

tive to our present integration .

‘the majority of Canadians can ,

foreign policy of positive neu- _

upon the federal government —
to disengage Canada from Un- ©

war and to proclaim Canadian
neutrality is one of the best

means by which to stop the ~
use of Canadian bases for ag- —

The crisis at the aimipit pro- ~

peace will be made ‘secure on- _

and, eventually, defeated. This :

develop a mass “movement for |

The lesson, of the crisis at the