Cruise a ‘watershed’ choice for Canada The choice before Canadians on the testing of the Cruise nuclear missile is no less than a watershed one. It involves opting for a Canada that will play a con- structive role for peace and disarmament, or opting fora Canada that will lead in sharply escalating the nuclear arms race in the service of the U.S. military. A close look heralds that testing the Cruise in Canada at U.S. request has as much to do with a boosted-up nuclear NORAD, as with Prime Minister Trudeau’s al- leged NATO ‘“‘commitments.”’ If not more so. It appears ever more clearly that if Canada tests the Cruise, Canada will be turned into a nuclear front-man for the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and will become a full-fledged actor in the nuclear arms race. Once the Cruise is tested here, Canada is inextricably entangled with U.S. aims for NORAD, in which Ottawa is junior partner to Washington. Those aims are to de- velop a first-strike nuclear capability against the Soviet Union over the arctic. Front-line Stance Such a front-line stance by Canada would inevitably invite a front-line reaction. Frightening for Canada. Frightening for the world. But consider: e The Cruise the U.S. wants to deploy in Europe, for which testing is said to be necessary in Canada, is a land-launched missile. But the Cruise to be tested in Canada is air-launched, destined for use on U.S. Strategic Air Command B-52G bombers, to be used in vast numbers as a strategic weapon against the USSR. e The terrain for the proposed testing over Cold Lake, Alberta is not similar to the terrain in western Europe or the western part of the Soviet Union. It is similar to the terrain in the northern part of the Soviet Union. e By thus aiding the U.S. to refine its Cruise missile attack procedures against the Soviet Union, Canada is going way beyond its NATO role and involving itself in the larger strategic designs of the U.S. e Concern is therefore totally justified that Cruise ‘missile testing is merely the starting-point. If Canadians can be induced to accept this, there will almost certainly be further pressure to expand and update Canada’s NORAD role, to bring our involvement into the era of first-strike weaponry and space warfare. e That involvement is already far advanced. For example, critics have pointed ominously to the potential of the Canadian space-shuttle arm to be used as a weapon to blind or kidnap Soviet satellites. Unless Canadians take a stand, we may find our- selves little more than an involuntary reflex of the U.S. strategic war machine. High-stakes Dangers Since that war machine is aimed at the Soviet Union, and since, with testing, the barrel of that machine will cross over Canada, the Soviets would have no alterna- tive but to aim back — across Canada and into Canada. The argument that the Cruise to be tested will not be armed seems of little relevance. Testing only makes sense if it is done for the purpose of making sure the missiles will work, when nuclear-armed. Thus, testing of the Cruise in this country would jump the NORAD nuclear ante tremendously, with high- stakes dangers for Canada — and the world. Because of this, and quite apart from the equally ur- gent campaign to prevent deployment of the Cruise — and Pershing-2 — in Europe, the campaign to refuse the Cruise, and to make Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone takes on intense and direct urgency for Canadians. There is, of course, a NATO connection. Supporters of the Cruise argue that the air-launched and ground- launched missiles share the same guidance system. Even if true, however, why the testing has to be done in ~Canada is (see above) very much open to question. But, despite the dangers, perhaps the Cruise is neces- sary as a ‘“‘deterrent’? — to ward off possible Soviet aggression? The ‘‘deterrent’’ argument fails on two grounds. First: e There is no Soviet aggression to be deterred. To take only some major examples, it is the Soviet Union that has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (a pledge not taken up by the U.S.); it is the Soviet Union that has called for a nuclear freeze, and it is the Soviet Union that has offered to reduce its nuclear Four scientists representing Science for Peace, whose | paper, The-:Cruise Missile: A Canadian Perspective, was j released in February this year, had earlier challenged the | deterrent argument on just that basis. They emphasized | that ‘‘the Cruise missile is not expected to be needed as4 countervalue weapon at any time during its projected, period of active service.”’ a Rather, they stated, ‘‘the Cruise provides a means fof conducting limited nuclear war (and) ... it also exacel | bates the excessive risks involved.”’ 4 And as Ernie Regehr noted in Canada and the Nucleal | oe at Arms Race, ‘‘Canadian testing (of the Cruise) is not 4 \ demonstration of continued support for nuclear deter rence ... but demonstrates instead support for a new; more dangerous role for nuclear weapons.” In fact: q e The Cruise is part of a U.S. strategy of fighting 4 | ‘nuclear war and is intended as an instrument of first us¢ | The federal government points to the relatively low ) speed (850 kmh) of the Cruise, to argue that it is not #7 first-strike weapon. But that deludes and misleads. The fact is that the Cruise is an integral part of the nuclear war fighting strategy of the U.S. defence de warheads (not just missiles) by two-thirds — to the level of warheads held by Britain and France. Second: e The Cruise missile is not necessary as a deterrent nor is it intended as a deterrent. Cruise supporters insist it is necessary in Europe to deter Soviet SS-20 missiles. In fact, the SS-20 may provide the pretext but it has nothing to do with planned U.S. deployment of the Cruise and Pershing. NATO, in 1978 — by which time Soviet intentions to deploy the SS-20 to replace existing, outdated missiles were known — indicated that the existing U.S. and NATO missiles provided an adequate deterrent. A year later, in June, the NATO Review reaffirmed the ‘“‘non- dramatic’’ nature of the SS-20s. ‘Exacerbates Risks’ The deterrent argument was also refuted more recent- ly last June’ 21, by Admiral Robert Falls, the senior Canadian officer in NATO. Falls stated that the existing U.S. arsenal, particularly the submarine-based missiles, provided an adequate deterrent and leaders should ‘‘think again’’ about the need for new missiles. The real Soviet peace movement The foremost Soviet peace organization is the Soviet Peace Committee. Established in 1949, the Committee is an entirely volun- tary public body, not dependent on government, and elects its leader- ship at regular public conferences. Here is one overall example of the Committee’s work in 1983: In support of the World Assem- bly for Peace and Life, against Nu- clear War, held in June in Prague, events were held, involving more than 50 million Soviet citizens. Extensive as is the work of the Soviet Peace Committee, it is not the only focus for peace action in the Soviet Union. Soviet trade unions together constitute the biggest mass organ- ization in the USSR, with a membership of 130 million. For them, peace is a priority. And there are many other more particularized peace groupings that make peace a Czechoslovakia, more than 30,000 atte, ee Thousands at peace rally in Tbilisi, USSR, last May. main concern, ranging through as- sociations of scientists, lawyers, youth and women. As one sum- mary put it: ‘“‘Taken together, these organ- izations... are a tremendous expression of support for their government’s policies for peace and disarmament.”’ And that’s the nub. As pointed out by Dr. A. P. Romodanov, So- viet Peace Committee member: “The main aim of the Soviet peace movement today is the achievement of complete disarmament — both in the east and the west.’’ And he added: ‘Since our government openly favors disarmament and makes concrete proposals for this aim, there’s not much point in our “‘opposing’ it.”’ Yes, indeed. There is a real So- viet peace movement, which sup- ports a real Soviet peace policy. partment. As former U.S. arms control consultant Al 7 thur Macy Cox noted in his recent book, Russian Roulet- te, ‘‘ ... there is no need for any more NATO missiles unless there is an intention to adopt a policy of nucleal war fighting.”’ ‘First-use Weapon’ Authors Simon Rosenblum and Ernie Regehr, i Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race, state: ‘‘the Cruisé . is a first-use weapon and represents the threat 0 pre-emptive attack against ... Soviet military targets. The threat of pre-emptive attack, they stress, depends \ not on speed or surprise, but ‘‘reliability and high acc’ p, racy, both of which are characteristics of the Cruise (bu! }, neither of which, Canadians should note, can be ob tained without extensive testing).”’ e The Cruise is virtually non-verifiable, posing # grave danger to arms control. Even the U.S. Nation Security Council has voiced concern about control, not ing in 1977 that because of the small size and versatility of the Cruise, ‘‘ verification of arms control limitation i54 difficult problem.”’ The background documents tabled with the Canada U.S. umbrella agreement on weapons testing, acknoW” ledge that ‘‘these (Cruise) missiles will unquestionably present new challenges,’’ and that the ground-launch missiles present ‘‘greater possibilities for deception.’ e Cruise missile testing is not necessary to ful Canada’s role in NATO. As seen, the missile Canada ha’ been asked to test is not slated for attachment to NATO forces in Europe, but for U.S. strategic B-52G bombers: Yet Canada has committed itself to a non-nuclear rolé in NATO. If the federal cabinet agrees to the testing; it will not only violate that role, but will make Cana¢@ directly complicit in a dangerous escalation of the arms race. 9 (TRIBUNE ) Published weekly at Suite 101 — 1416 Commercial Drive, Vancouver, B.C. V5L 3X9. Phone 251-1186. City or towne hr Asian Cees Province, 6895. : \ Postal Code \ VF A AE LE ES LE | am enclosing: Tyr. $14 0 2 yrs. $25 6 mo. $8 0 Old 0 New. Foreign 1 year $16 (7) Bill me later () Donation$.......... J OL BE MD LR! EY AP LAD LY LP LEY LY 6B Me = MMMM )