he obvious absence of a ined alternative, the i the growth of the Canadian da falling further behind ina e, combine to force those e problem to consider the } ed Canadian auto industry. rn’ ‘threatening to get worse; the Canadian Government had already been forced to act to ease the situation and the U.S. Government feared that any heavy handed American retaliation might force Canada towards a more “‘radical’’ solu- tion. The trade agreement which ‘‘re- solved’’ these problems included the fol- lowing: a) Tariffs would essentially be re- moved thereby leading to the total ‘‘rationalization’’ of the industry on a Canada-U.S. basis. b) Canada would have certain safe- guards to guarantee it some protec- tion. ; The outcome of this agreement was that Canada did increase its share of jobs in the period immediately following the signing of the Auto Pact. But since the fundamental problem facing the industry — its integration with and dependence on the U.S. — remained unchanged (in fact, it was worsened), it was inevitable that all the past problems would recur with added emphasis. The latest deficit in auto parts — $4-billion — is only the most visible symptom of this unequal re- lationship. One apparent solution would be to re- negotiate the Auto Pact to gain a fairer share. This however is more apparent than real since there is no reason for the U.S. to agree to force the big three to provide such investment in Canada. An- other, even more dangerous approach has been to situate renegotiation in the broader context of our whole resource sector: that is, trade off autonomy over our resources for more auto jobs. But this is only jumping out of the frying pan into the fire: in the name of greater Cana- dian autonomy, overall economic (and political) autonomy would in fact be de- creased. The jumping off point for a long term policy designed to achieve the full bene- fits of a domestic auto industry has to be recognition that technological depend- ence on the U.S. and the integration of production and markets within the U.S. must be broken. The Auto Pact signal- izes such dependence and integration; it is ‘now clearly counter productive for fanade, ‘and an alternative must be und. Twenty years ago, when the Royal Commission. on the auto industry was holding hearings, two groups within the UAW warned of the problem of TRIBUNE PHOTO — MIKE PHILIPPS economic integration with the U.S. and proposed an alternative direction. The GM Intra-Corporation Council (repre- senting Oshawa, St. Catharines, Windsor and Toronto) advocated an immediate goal of 75% Canadian content in Canadian-sold cars, rising to 100% over a specified period: And UAW Local 444, representing Chrysler workers in Windsor, advocated that the mechanism for achieving this be a crown corporation for the auto industry. : The Communist Party of Canada was the only political party to oppose the Pact, pointing out that its short haul. benefits would be cancelled out by the Jong term consequences, not only on the auto industry, but the entire Canadian economy. It also called for the Canadianization of the industry around the production of a Canadian car. _ The main criticisms of the Canadian car were that the variety of models Canadian consumers wanted and, given the small size of our market (half that necessary for efficiency), the Canadian car would be uneconomical. Whatever the merits of these arguments at that time, the present facts are that: a) The move of down-sizing and standardization is making the dif- ference between models less and less relevant; b) The size of the Canadian market has doubled since the introduction of the Auto Pact. In short, the failure of the Auto Pact, the obvious absence of a Canadian-based privately-owned alternative, the standardization of the market, the growth of the Canadian market, and the threat of Canada falling further behind in a period of rapid structural change, com- bine to force those seeking a serious solu- . tion to the problem to consider the estab- ~ lishment of a publically-owned Canadian auto industry. A CANADIAN AUTO INDUSTRY The technological problem cannot be underestimated. The danger of technological dependence is that — whatever the short term gains — future options are severely curtailed. Right now we do not have the technolog- ical base to build an independent auto industry; we therefore have to address the question of how we will get it in the future. This involves putting forth an in- terim policy explaining how some of this base can be prepared in the immediate _ future. . GM and Ford have the capital, engineering and facilities to bale out Chrysler but the rules of private ownership obviously deny The limits of taking over just one com- pany must be understood. One publicly- owned company within an. industry otherwise under pri ste ownership risks discrediting the concept of public owner- ship. It would mean that the capacity necessary for efficient production could not be reached since it would only have part of the market; it would mean that duplication and waste of private owner- ship continue (e.g. GM and Ford have the capital, engineering and facilities to bale out Chrysler but the rules of private ownership obviously deny such co- operation and the security of half a mil- lion U.S. and Canadian workers are con- sequently expendible). For such reasons we have emphasized a Canadian auto industry rather than just one company limited by the laws of capitalist competi- tion. As long as the rest of the economy re- ~ mains capitalist, public ownership of auto production remains only a partial solution to the problems facing autoworkers. On the one hand, the auto industry must siil! ‘conform to the state’s overall policy and this is still dominated by private capital; this point has been confirmed by the state’s policies towards its employees as far as wages, working conditions, and manpower reductions are concerned (in Europe and in Canada). On the other hand, since the rest of the economy re- mains capitalist and unplanned, the busi- ness cycle will persist and this makes inevitable job insecurity and wasted pro- ductive capacity. In short, we can’t achieve our goals unless our perspective extends beyond the auto industry. such cooperation and the security of half a million U.S. and Canadian workers is consequently expendable. formulations to include the issue of education, organization, strategy and tactics. We will have to answer the con- cerns of non-auto workers who are wor- ried that nationalization of the auto industry will lead to U.S. retaliation with resulting effects on non-auto sectors in Canada. We will have to answer the con- cers of Canadians worried about higher car prices. We will have to answer the concerns of auto workers who know that a national auto industry will mean re- structuring and therefore different facilities and different jobs. We will have to be able to demonstrate that emerging problems will generally imply the need to take the struggle another step forward rather than retreat to the old relation- ships. The relationships between the problems in the auto industry and social- ism as a solution will have to be clearly raised. : CONCLUSION The recurring problems in our auto industry reflect much of what is wrong with Canadian manufacturing as a whole. The bankruptcy of the solutions of the right is clear (corporate grants, worker sacrifices, no guarantees), but neither has the left yet put forth an adequate program around which to mobilize concerned workers, in this new stage of the general crisis of the system and the particular crisis of auto. In this article we have tried to initiate a basis for some serious discussion leading to a pro- gram of action. Future articles will elaborate specific points raised here. Meanwhile the Tribune welcomes comments and criti- cisms of the above introduction to the problem. — “NO HITCHHIKERS I” PACIFIC TRIBUNE—APRIL 18, 1980—Page 7