he obvious absence of a

ined alternative, the
i the growth of the Canadian
da falling further behind ina
e, combine to force those
e problem to consider the

}

ed Canadian auto industry.

rn’

‘threatening to get worse; the Canadian

Government had already been forced to
act to ease the situation and the U.S.
Government feared that any heavy
handed American retaliation might force
Canada towards a more “‘radical’’ solu-
tion. The trade agreement which ‘‘re-
solved’’ these problems included the fol-
lowing:

a) Tariffs would essentially be re-
moved thereby leading to the total
‘‘rationalization’’ of the industry on
a Canada-U.S. basis.

b) Canada would have certain safe-
guards to guarantee it some protec-
tion. ;

The outcome of this agreement was
that Canada did increase its share of jobs
in the period immediately following the
signing of the Auto Pact. But since the
fundamental problem facing the industry
— its integration with and dependence
on the U.S. — remained unchanged (in
fact, it was worsened), it was inevitable
that all the past problems would recur
with added emphasis. The latest deficit in
auto parts — $4-billion — is only the
most visible symptom of this unequal re-
lationship.

One apparent solution would be to re-
negotiate the Auto Pact to gain a fairer
share. This however is more apparent
than real since there is no reason for the

U.S. to agree to force the big three to

provide such investment in Canada. An-
other, even more dangerous approach
has been to situate renegotiation in the
broader context of our whole resource
sector: that is, trade off autonomy over
our resources for more auto jobs. But
this is only jumping out of the frying pan
into the fire: in the name of greater Cana-
dian autonomy, overall economic (and
political) autonomy would in fact be de-
creased.

The jumping off point for a long term
policy designed to achieve the full bene-
fits of a domestic auto industry has to be
recognition that technological depend-
ence on the U.S. and the integration of
production and markets within the U.S.
must be broken. The Auto Pact signal-
izes such dependence and integration; it
is ‘now clearly counter productive for
fanade, ‘and an alternative must be

und.

Twenty years ago, when the Royal
Commission. on the auto industry was
holding hearings, two groups within the
UAW warned of the problem of

TRIBUNE PHOTO — MIKE PHILIPPS

economic integration with the U.S. and
proposed an alternative direction. The
GM Intra-Corporation Council (repre-
senting Oshawa, St. Catharines,
Windsor and Toronto) advocated an
immediate goal of 75% Canadian content
in Canadian-sold cars, rising to 100%
over a specified period: And UAW Local
444, representing Chrysler workers in
Windsor, advocated that the mechanism
for achieving this be a crown corporation
for the auto industry. :

The Communist Party of Canada was

the only political party to oppose the
Pact, pointing out that its short haul.

benefits would be cancelled out by the
Jong term consequences, not only on the
auto industry, but the entire Canadian
economy. It also called for the
Canadianization of the industry around
the production of a Canadian car. _

The main criticisms of the Canadian
car were that the variety of models
Canadian consumers wanted and, given
the small size of our market (half that
necessary for efficiency), the Canadian
car would be uneconomical. Whatever
the merits of these arguments at that
time, the present facts are that:

a) The move of down-sizing and
standardization is making the dif-
ference between models less and
less relevant;

b) The size of the Canadian market
has doubled since the introduction
of the Auto Pact.

In short, the failure of the Auto Pact,
the obvious absence of a Canadian-based
privately-owned alternative, the
standardization of the market, the
growth of the Canadian market, and the
threat of Canada falling further behind in
a period of rapid structural change, com-

bine to force those seeking a serious solu- .

tion to the problem to consider the estab-

~ lishment of a publically-owned Canadian

auto industry.

A CANADIAN AUTO INDUSTRY

The technological
problem cannot be underestimated. The
danger of technological dependence is
that — whatever the short term gains —
future options are severely curtailed.
Right now we do not have the technolog-
ical base to build an independent auto
industry; we therefore have to address
the question of how we will get it in the
future. This involves putting forth an in-
terim policy explaining how some of this
base can be prepared in the immediate

_ future. .

GM and Ford have the capital, engineering and facilities to bale
out Chrysler but the rules of private ownership obviously deny

The limits of taking over just one com-
pany must be understood. One publicly-
owned company within an. industry
otherwise under pri ste ownership risks
discrediting the concept of public owner-
ship. It would mean that the capacity
necessary for efficient production could
not be reached since it would only have
part of the market; it would mean that
duplication and waste of private owner-
ship continue (e.g. GM and Ford have
the capital, engineering and facilities to
bale out Chrysler but the rules of private
ownership obviously deny such co-
operation and the security of half a mil-
lion U.S. and Canadian workers are con-
sequently expendible). For such reasons
we have emphasized a Canadian auto
industry rather than just one company
limited by the laws of capitalist competi-
tion.

As long as the rest of the economy re-

~ mains capitalist, public ownership of auto

production remains only a partial solution
to the problems facing autoworkers. On
the one hand, the auto industry must siil!

‘conform to the state’s overall policy and

this is still dominated by private capital;
this point has been confirmed by the
state’s policies towards its employees as
far as wages, working conditions, and
manpower reductions are concerned (in
Europe and in Canada). On the other
hand, since the rest of the economy re-
mains capitalist and unplanned, the busi-
ness cycle will persist and this makes
inevitable job insecurity and wasted pro-
ductive capacity. In short, we can’t
achieve our goals unless our perspective
extends beyond the auto industry.

such cooperation and the security of half a million U.S. and
Canadian workers is consequently expendable.

formulations to include the issue of
education, organization, strategy and
tactics. We will have to answer the con-
cerns of non-auto workers who are wor-
ried that nationalization of the auto
industry will lead to U.S. retaliation with
resulting effects on non-auto sectors in
Canada. We will have to answer the con-
cers of Canadians worried about higher
car prices. We will have to answer the
concerns of auto workers who know that
a national auto industry will mean re-
structuring and therefore different
facilities and different jobs. We will have
to be able to demonstrate that emerging
problems will generally imply the need to
take the struggle another step forward
rather than retreat to the old relation-
ships. The relationships between the
problems in the auto industry and social-
ism as a solution will have to be clearly

raised. :

CONCLUSION

The recurring problems in our auto
industry reflect much of what is wrong
with Canadian manufacturing as a
whole. The bankruptcy of the solutions
of the right is clear (corporate grants,
worker sacrifices, no guarantees), but
neither has the left yet put forth an
adequate program around which to
mobilize concerned workers, in this new
stage of the general crisis of the system
and the particular crisis of auto. In this
article we have tried to initiate a basis for
some serious discussion leading to a pro-
gram of action.

Future articles will elaborate specific
points raised here. Meanwhile the
Tribune welcomes comments and criti-
cisms of the above introduction to the
problem. —

“NO HITCHHIKERS I”

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—APRIL 18, 1980—Page 7