-bomb myths exploded has been published this year. Professor Blackett is uniquely , Qualified to write such a book for the following reasons. He is not only one of our leading physicists but from 1945 til] its abolition in 19- 48 he was a member of the British government’s Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, but in disa- greement with the opinions of most of its members. He has the additional advan- tage that he started life as a pro- fessional naval officer, and left the navy in 1919 to study physics under Rutherford. He was also, of course, on war work from 1939 to 1945, Finally, he was one of the few British scientists who figured in Hitler’s list for immediate arrest had the Nazi invasion in 1940 suc- ceeded. The first chapters of the book deal with “strategic bombing” in the recent war, and the effect of atom bombs. The British and American air forces dropped 1,350,000 tons of bombs on Germany. They had kill- el 300,000 to 500,000 people. But they did not stop German indus- try. For example, the Germans made 12,100 tanks in 1943 and 19,- 000 in 1944, Even in the last three months of the .war German industry, though declining, was producing armaments at a greater rate thar. in 1942, Now a plutonium bomb releases as much energy.as would a single, lump of 20,000 tons of TNT. But this would be a very inefficient way of using TNT, as it would do far more destruction than is needed at the center of the area destroyed. Two thousand tons of many lives and buildings as were destroyed by one atom bomb. That means that 670 atom bomhs on Germany, would not have won the war. Allowing for certain ’ “improvements”, Blackett puts the equivalent figure at 400. Of course, a much smaller number Would have done so had they all been dropped in the right places. But this cannot be done in the ' face of opposition. e ‘ The Soviet Union and the U.S. are? both vastly less vulnerable than Germany because their in- dustry is more scattered and it is much more practicable to evac- uate their cities; airplanes seek- ing to bomb Moscow or Chicago, Kuznetzk or St. Louis, would have to cross hundreds of miles of ter- ‘vitory from which fighters could rise to attack them, and above all, Tadar could detect them. For this reason the atom bomb - ould not be a decisive weapon Against either of these great _ Powers. Unfortunately, it could be ®gainst Britain, where the poPu- _ lation is much denser and the op- portunities for interception much ess. ' Now the Soviet government has never carried out mass de- Struction of enemy civilians. For _ €xample, in the first Finnish war, the Finns say that they lost 646 Civilians from air bombing. Ne reason is, of course, that ordinary bombs will destroy as . By J.B.S. HALDANE CAN best begin a review of Professor P. M. S, Blackeit’s book, “Miltary and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy,’ stating that I regard it as the most important book on any subject which > by the Soviet government does not want to make the masses of ene- my countries hate it. ‘Further, a surprise attack on America with atom bombs could only win a war were it followed by an invasion across,an ocean, for which the means are not avail- able. If not so followed up it would unite America against the Soviets as nothing else could. The placing of bombs by agents (and seeing that they appear to weigh over four tons’ they cannot be carried in one’s pocket) would have the same effect. Blackett therefore regards such an attack as extremely unlikely. Plenty of American writers have talked about wiping out the USSR in a week. Their experts know better. That is why they are trying to organize the unfor- tunate nations of Western FeunePe as their allies. _ The fate’ of these allies is vivid- ly depicted in the U.S. Navy’s memorandum on bases for launch- “ ing rockets. “These bases may themselves be vulnerable to atom bomb at- tack, but so long as they are Guns, By Max Gordon E overpowering impression “you get from conversations with Communist leaders, both in eastern and western Europe, is ‘that the result in the struggle “petween the world socialist forces and imperialism has already been determined. Wall Street can still connive and intrigue, perhaps even start an- other war out of desperation— though | this is not inevitable— put it cannot win. ‘Not the least factor in sasitield buting to this feeling were the events in China. It is not hard to understand why you get this feeling in east- ern Europe. The only city I visited there was Prague, but it was clear that in this most recently established popular de- mocracy, the revolution is irre- versible\ and socialism well on- its way. It is even further con- solidated in the other eastern European lands. Whatever opposition still exists in Czechoslovakia is scattered, unorganized, and confined to the. middle and upper classes. The working class and a“ bulk of peasantry, as well as a con- cei section of the intellec- tuals are solidly behind the revo- lution. In western Europe, Loxantuhint leaders expect sharp economic struggles in the near future as the Marshall Plan continues to demoralize their economies and to compel lower living standards for the workers, which are near starvation level today. The economic effects of the there, they are not likely to be ' by-passed. In this respect the ad- vanced base may be likened on a chess board; meagre though their power may be individually, So long as they exist and the king stays severely behind them, he is safe.” Whoever wins a game of chess, there are seldom many pawns at the end. Do you want Britain to be a pawn, Mr. Attlee? Blackett’s solution is as fol- lows. “If Great Britain adopted a policy of armed neutrality and was prepared to oppose by force the attempts of either major contest- ant to occupy the country and use it as a*base against the other, it is very probable that she would be successful,” Unfortunately there is already an American base in England. ‘° e ; Much of the book is concerned with the Baruch plan and other efforts for “international” control of atomic energy. The author holds that the Soviets need atomic energy for their industrial devel- opment, though curiously enough, the nation in the long run that haS most to gain from atomic energy is India. Under the Baruch plan an inter- national authority would have ownership or managerial] control of “all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security” —-in other words a stranglehold over the economic development of all nations. Given that owners of coal and water power in the U.S. are op- posed to the development of atom- ic power even in their own country, the Sovjet Union may well doubt whether an international author- ity on which the representatives of capitalist states would certainly form the majority would allow atomic power to be used to build socialism. I hope that.in a future edition, of which/ there will certainly be many, the author will give his views on the Spaak compromise plan, which the Soviet Union has now accepted in principle. I have no space to quote the extremely interesting sections on radioactive poisons and _ bacter- iological weapons, nor the chap- ter in which it is pointed out that , the bombs were dropped on Japan when they were not so much to save American lives as to force Japan to capitulate before the Red Army reached Peking. The book ends on a note of hope: “On balance, therefore, the military and moral arguments against the initiation of a preven- tative war by America in the near future are very strong.” Still less does Professor Blackett be- lieve that the Soviet Union = start a war. He thinks that the period of greatest danger may come in four years or so, when the American staffs hope that, as a result of the Marshall plan, the Western Euro- not butter, for Marshill Plan are thus blocking consolidation of imperialist power in the west European nations, and beginning to undermine the position of the Social Democrats, leading agents of the imperialists, among the workers. : Of the six nations I visited— France, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Czechoslovakia — -only in the last are the condi- tions of the working class and peasantry better than they were before the war. The Czech worker today lives better than the Belgian, French, or Danish worker, which is a ‘reversal of the pre-war situation, though there is still much he can- not get. j A shortage of industrial goods exists, partly due to the fact that the Czechs had to export ' hugely to buy food from the out- side to make up for a disastrous drouth in 1947. But where the Czech worker cannot buy enough ‘goods because they are not avail- able, the Dutch or Danish or French worker cannot buy them because he must spend every , available penny to ee his fam- ily alive. The low food prices, plus the fact that rents range from about $8 to $12 a month, give the Czech worker spare cash which he wants to spend for better living but which he cannot yet achieve._ But he is far better off for food than the other workers mention- ed, and even more important, his position is constantly improv- ing while the west - European workers are suffering continual deterioration in their standards. The ew five-year plan, plus the joint planning of Czech econ- omy and those of othef east i European lands will greatly strengthen them all. : eo 4 v These, I would say, are the political and economic effects of the Marshall Plan. on the coun- tries I visited: — @ Rapidly expanding military budgets, demanded by the U.S. as part of its world military plan, are causing runaway inflation and are forcing further cuts in con- sumption by the are aey: erished peoples. _ @ Shifts to armament making have compelled cuts in produc- tion of industrial goods for re- habilitation and for export, there- by forcing increased.exports or reduced imports in needed food and consumer goods. @ Food and fuel subsidies are being eliminated and price ceil- ings either jacked up or ended altogether, while wage ceilings remain static. All this is a part of the plan to cut national con- sumption so as to provide for armament and to “stabilize” fi- mances, @ In some countries, consumer goods from the U.S. are flooding a domestic market which has _ been supplied by native industry, causing a shut-down of the na- tive industry and large-scale un- employment. @ The U‘S. has forced western Europe to forego reparations in the form of basic machinery from Germany and refuses to send such machinery to these countries from the U.S., thereby keeping production low. @ Trade with eastern Europe is limited by the terms of the Marshall Plan, which prohibits as export to these countries all products labelled war potential, This compels the west European nations to depend on the US. pean powers will be _ strong enough to act at least as pawns. That does not mean that we are in danger now, but it means that we may have time to build up a peace movement SEPONE, enough to save us. Blackett is not a Communist, but a Fabian; his book is written with a severe objectivity which some readers wil] find provoking, but which will, in the long run, increase its influence. Had he been a Communist he would have added certain points. For example, he would have stated that Churchill did not keep his promise, made on the radio when the Soviet Union was in- vaded, to inform the USSR of technical war developments, and that this is doubtless a further reason for the Soviet rejection of the Baruch plan. A Communist writer would have laid more stress on the economic motives behind the drive for war in America, and less on its psy- chological motivation. He would probably differ from Blackett in several other details. Nevertheless, the book will be of immense value to all powers of peace, and to all patriots in West- ern Europe who do not wish their _ countries to be devastated. — It contains facts amply suffi- cient to meet the arguments of _ the pro-American faction in this country. Even if Blackett is out by a factor of two or three in his estimate of the efficiency of atom- ic weapons (and I think this un- : likely) his main thesis is un- affected. : Everyone who is taking an dc- tive part in the struggle for peace © will need a copy of this book. And they should also see that their public library contains one. Its translation into French, Dutch, and Italian is a matter of urgency. And I hope that it may soon be made available in the Penguin or Some other cheap series. For it is up to us to make it a major weapon in the peace campaign. urope for trade, meaning they can ex- port chiefly raw materials and ae food instead of industrial goods and must import American pro- ducts at high prices. fly Tt eee turning them into colonial hin- _ terlands of the U.S. Added to this, there is increas- ing bitterness, even on the part of the business elements, as they see western Germany being re- constructed rapidly with the aid : of American machine imports — while their economies flounder through lack of modern | stat inery. The Marshall Planner will shout “Communist propaganda” at these charges. But they are be- ing confirmed daily by such rabid backers of the plan as the strident, arch-hypocritical New York Times in a series of cau- tiously-worded technical articles repeating virtually bc SS, ¢ made: here. playing around with giving up the “recovery” myth and coming — straight out with a Sree instead of butter” Thus do the ‘Mat ‘Planners _ admit to the first charge | here. Every other one can documented in the same way! PACIFIC TRIBUNE — DECEMBER 1%, a one