Static copy? Rankovic repHed that
7 “there Was no sense in playing hide and
**séek with me since I must know ef their
~ policy and their contacts. He -aqujd tell
“me that they were linked with the Am-
~ericans, that he knew of my conversa-
_ tion with Himmler in 1946, of the task
Himmler had given me of placing right
forces in power and undermining the
unity. of the Communist Party.

He knew that Himmler had informed
me that in all probability, in the near,
future I would receive instructions not.
directly from the American but through
Yugoslav channels. And so, said Ran-
kovic, the Yugoslav channel is Tito and .
myself, In the future you will receive
instructions from Tito or a person ap-
pointed by him.

This fact made it perfectly clear to
me that not only the Yugoslavs who had
been recruited in France but also many
in Yugoslav government circles, includ-
ing Prime Minister Tito, were in close
contact with the Americans.

Here, I must also point out that after
Rankovic had shown me the photostat-
ic copy there was absolutely no need to
recruit me formally, for I was political-
ly in full agreement with them.

Rankovic, however, said that I, as
Minister of the interior, considered it
important from the professional point

of view, to observe these formalities. In-

cidentally, he assured me that I would
not be given minor assignments since
they were aware of my capabilities due
to my position in the government and the

Party.

In this connection Rankovic said that
We would discuss everything later and
that in the meantime, on behalf of Tito,

I should follow the instructions given

me at the end of 1946 by Himmler, one of

_the leaders of the American Intelligence
Service. ~

Bares Tito’s involvement

Chairman: So even then he referred to
Himmler?

Rajk: Rankovic again mentioned the
fact that the Americans had informed

that Prime Minister Tito and he knew

of this, Rankovic laid particular empha-

sis on the demand that I should start

a strong movement against Rakosi in-

Side the Communist Party; that is, that

I should start a national anti-Soviet fac-

tion. As I stated earlier, I saw for myself

that Prime Minister Tito, Home Minister

Rankovie and other leading Yugoslav

statesmen were in close contact with

the American intelligence organs. I as-

Sumed, and it was later proved correct,

that this contact was of long standing,

_ for such complete collaboration would

have been impossible had the contact

only been of recent origin. . . . Even now

I cannot rid myself of the thought that

the Americans have a hold on Tito him-

Self, just as they have on other Yugo-

slays whom they recruited in France.

f They evidently have in their hands ma-

_. terial dating back to the time of fascist

Yugoslavia that would compromise Tito.

Chairman: Parallel with this, did you

maintain contact with the Yugoslav of

ficials Brankov, Mrazovic, Javorsky and

Cacinovic who were operating in Hun-

sary?

Rajk: I regularly supplied political and

_ other information to Brankov and others.

After my first meeting with Rankovic,

_ the nature of my contact with Brankov

changed; I began to receive one kind of
instruction after another from him.

When I returned, one of my assign-

- Mente transmitted through Brankov was

to do everything to facilitate the ap-

 Pointment to leading position in the po-

| _ ice and army of people who fitted in

i _ With our policy, people on whom we

Could rely, that, nationalist, chauvinist

and anti-Soviet elements.

these elements to important posts was
-. Not enough and that I must see to it
that the police and army as 4 whole
“Were influenced by Tito’s policy, that
they follow a nationalist anti - Soviet
line with orientation on the United
States. (

To achieve this Rankovic suggested
that delegations from the police and
the army should be sent to Yugoslavia
Where they would enjoy all kinds of
Privileges and be shown the achieve-
Ments of Yugoslavia. Tito would be pop-
Warized among them so that on their
Teturn home they would carry on 4
 Pro-Yugoslav. policy inside the police
“8nd the army.

them in detail of my talk with Himmler, -

He stressed that the appointment of |

As a means of carrying out Yugosla-
via’s policy on the Hungarian army and
police, Rankovic recommended that I
should suggest that the government
should send Hungarian army and police
officers to Yugoslav military and police
schools where they would be trained as
reliable army commanders for the Tito
order, :

Rankovic’s instructions indicated that,
in place of the Smallholders’ Party
which had been smashed after the dis-
covery of the conspiracy of right-wing
forces and that I, ag minister of the in-
terior, was not to obstruct the election
propaganda of the SBarankovics and
Pfeiffer parties.

In other instructions Rankovie de-
manded that I should close my eyes to
the activities of the right social demo-
crats who were pursuing a policy direct-
ed against the People’s Democracy and
the Soviet Union—a pro-British and pro-
‘American policy; that in the leadership
of the Communist Party, as a member
of the Secretariat of the Central Com-
mittee, I should suggest a tolerant at-
titude to this policy. -

The instructions stated that inside the
party I should put forward the argu-
ment that it was impossible to fight
on two fronts simultaneously during the
elections: that it was impossible to fight
at one and the same time against the
rights whose policy bore a fascist nature
and against those rights who neverthe-
less were members of a workers’ party.

In connection with this, Rankovic
pointed out that according to his in-
formation — the right social democrats
would try to use the elections, the elec-
tion campaign and afterwards the elec-
tion results to blackmail the Commun-
ist Party, and deprive them of various
government posts.

Thus, wrote Rankovic, there are wide
possibilities for giving leading posts to
the right social democrats in differ-
ent spheres of state life, especially in
the military units of the ministry of
the interior, state security organs, eco-
nomic police, political departments of
‘the army and in the’army. _

Through Brankoy, Rankovic explain-
ed the purpose of these measures. He
said that there was a common platform
with the right social democrats, namely,
that they were orientated on the US.,

were anti-Soviet, and that if they held —

positions in the army, the police, armed
forces and in various organs of the state
apparatus, this would correspond to our
political aims, that is, aims directed
against the people’s democracy, anti-
Soviet aims.

To undermine army
Finally, in the second half of 1947,

after the meeting in Kelebia, I received

yet another assignment from Tito and
Rankovic. It was necessary to deprive
‘the Communist Party, and the people’s
democracy in general, of its influence in
the police and armed fortes and to
pring these under the influence of the
rights. One of the means of bringing
this about was to stop the work of the
party organizations in the police force.

At the end of 1947, the tieaty of
friendship between Yugoslavia and Hun-
gary was about to be signed. In this con-
nection Brankovic told me that I must

use the occasion to popularize Tito. To |

discuss the details, Rankovic sent a
delegation headed by Milic, one of the
chiefs of the UDB, a few days in advance

of the official Yugoslav’ government

delegation.

Milic visited me. at my home together’

with Brankov. They told me that the
occasion must be used to carry out in-
tensified security measures to protect
Tito and thus emphasize his importance
as a recognized leader.

They suggested such measures as mov-
ing people from houses whose windows
faced the streets through which Tito
would pass; to examine the sewage SyS-
tem along the whole route in case time-
great demonstration of guarding each
manhole so that everybody would real-
ize it was 4 question of ensuring the
safety of Tito, Mrazovic, who was am-
passador at the time, insisted that Tito
be given the most beautiful villa in

\ Budapest. —

When I did not succeed in making
these arrangements, Mrazovic visited me
in his official capacity as ambassador
to convey the following staterhent of the
Yugoslav government;

bombs had been - planted, making a

in view of the,

fact that} the Hungarian government
has not been able to procure a villa
suitable for Tito, and-does not agree to
give the corresponding orders that would
assure Tito’s safety, the Yugoslav goy-
ernment delegation refuses to come to
Hungary to sign the friendship agree-
ment.

This statement was made about 36
hours before the arrival of the delega-
tion. I did my best to try to satisfy these
demands. That they were not carried
out 100. percent did not depend on me.
The Hungarian government intervened
in the matter and forbade me, as minis-
ter of the interior, to take extra exag-
gerated measures.

In 1948, I spoke to Brankov about the
decision of the Information Bureau long
before it was published (I did not have
the decision in written form). Thus,
thanks to me, the Tito-ites knew of the

Cominform decision long in advance and |

long before it was published.

Plot to break government

CHAIRMAN: Now about the meeting
in Kelebia?

RAJK: After the agreement was
Signed, the Hungarian government ar-
ranged a hunting trip in honor of the
Yugoslav delegation.

Rankovie informed me through Bran-
kov that after the hunt he wished to
speak to me in one of the compartments
of the Yugoslav train. The meeting took
place. Brankoy acted as_ interpreter.
There was nobody else in the carriage.

Summarizing the political gist of Ran-
kovic’s conversation with me, I can state
the following: it was necessary to influ-
ence things in such a way as to bring
about the disintegration of the people’s
democratic state systems, of the people’s
democratic republics and to prevent
thein socialist development. Part of the
revolutionary democratic forces were to
be drawn over to our side, wrested from
the Soviet Union. Where these forces
could not be won over, they were to be
destroyed.

Instead of a people’s democratic state
order, a bourgeois democratic govern-
ment was to be. set up in all the People’s
Democracies; that is, instead of develop-
ing toward socialism, capitalism was to
be restored. These bourgeois democratic
governments would orientate themselves
onthe United States instead of the So-
viet Union. Grouped around Yugoslavia
they would form a federation under
Yugoslavia, that is, under Tito and the
Yugoslav government, and this federa-
tion would rely on the United States.

At the same time, this federation would
constitute a military bloc on the side of
the U.S. against the Soviet Union.

CHAIRMAN: What was the plan pro-
posed by Rankovic?

RAJK: I told him that I did not quite
understand how Yugoslavia and the
Tito government meant to realize this
policy. For there were definite contra-
dictions, at any rate there seemed to be,
between the situation that had, as its

ultimate aim, the restoration of capital-
ism and the overthrow of the people’s
democratic order. :

CHAIRMAN: What did Rankovic say
to this?

RAJK: Rankovic replied as follows:
In the first place it should be known
that neither Tito nor the other members
of the Yugoslav government wanted a
people’s democratic order and socialist
construction after the liberation of Yugo-
Slavia, ; ‘

The fact that they nevertheless were
compelled to introduce revolutionary
changes which in essence and defacto
led to the liquidation of capitalism came
about not because they seriously wanted
to realize this program but ause they
were forced to do so under pressure
from the working masses of Yugoslavia.

Reason for ‘Marxist’ talk

‘Then again after World War II, the
situation in Central and Southeastern

_Europe was such that Yugoslavia, «in

this case Prime Minister Tito and his
hirelings, had to take the Soviet Union
and the new People’s Democracies into
consideration. Hence, these factors
forced them to introduce measures for
the abolition of capitalism.

Rankovic particularly stressed that
they were “forced to do so,” there and
then adding that from the very outset
they carefully ensured that really revo-
lutionary, socialist elements did not get
into power in Yugoslavia and that the
centralized state power rested in the
hands of Tito and his accomplices.

He said that the People’s Front in
Yugoslavia was organized on a nation-
alist basis. They did not allow the Com-
munist Party to play an independent
role but dissolved it in the People’s
Front so that there should be no crystal-
ization of a revolutionary rallying force
in the form of an independent prole-
tarian party in Yugoslavia. ;

Rankovic told me that after the libera-
tion, in 1945-46, the situation was such
that Yugoslavia could calmly remain in
the background, outwardly presenting
a revolutionary semblance to the Soviet
Union and the People’s Democracies.

As yet, Yugoslavia did not have to take
upon itself unpleasant obligations
against the Soviet Union, for in all the
People’s Democracies, just on the thresh- —

old of their political development, there

was still a comparatively large number
of old reactionary forces who could be
relied on to be victorious and who, in
the event of victory, could also be re-
lied on to establish a bourgeois-demo-
cratic order in these countries.

Thus, for instance, stated Rankovic, if
the Ferenc Nagy conspiracy had not been
discovered, Hungary would have closely
approached this stage of development.
Had things turned out this way, con-
tinued Rankovic, Yugoslavia would have
become active in its foreign policy only
after the forces of reaction had been
victorious in some of these countries,

PACIFIC TRIBUNE — OCTOBER 21, 1949 — PAGE 5 |