La PRVER since July 26, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain’s Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden has been Preparing the crime of aggres- Sion against Egypt. Now the crime has been COmmitted: an act of aggres- Sl0n as flagrant, as wanton, as Me€xcusable as any in the bloodstained history of imperi- alism. Britain and France have no Night to invade Egypt on the Petext of protecting the lives Of their citizens or the security Of the Suez Canal: for pretext this is; the real aim being to Put Britain back in occupation Of Suez. The action of the British abor party in dividing the 9Use of Commons, and the failure of Britain and France to win the support of a single Nation in the Security Council, ” Pfove that the British Conser- Vative government stands fondemned by the British Working class and by world Pinion. * This was not an unpremedi- lated crime, No thief planning ® bank robbery has prepared @ ground more thoroughly than Eden has prepared his attempt to rob Egypt of the Mez Canal. When Egypt nationalized the anal Eden would have liked 0 strike at once. Two things Prevented him. He lacked the strength; Bri- lain’s forces in Cyprus, Malta and Libya were insufficient % the purpose. He lacked the excuse; for despite all the blustering, the &t remained that Egypt was “titled to nationalise the ‘nal, particularly as it con- Wnued to observe the conven- 8 guaranteeing freedom of Passage, So Eden set about the job * *ccumulating the forces and fating for (or cooking up) © excuse. a he reserves were hurriedly led up and large forces he to the Mediterranean. ais ugh a promise was given at the numbers in the gen- Teserve called up would & small, the government got © Permission of parliament fall up the entire reserve. a the British Conservative hag Y; from ‘the very start, Who been screaming and on] ping for war. Eden has Y maintained his position in t we Darty by placing himself “he the head of the Suez Nai] &ls,” who fought tooth and fro against the withdrawal fe Suez under the 1954 8 0-Egyptian treaty. Nd Eden has never given ledge that he. would not es trans to force. On the con- 4," the right to use force € last resort.” : he... S0-called “pledge” that of “Ve at the end of the House be, -™Mons debate in Septem- fop es utterly meaningless: Sut Was a pledge only to con- dig : © Security Council, and or mt commit Eden either 8 on from force, or to do ty. Y If the Security Coun- Proved, British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden (right) and French Premier Guy Mollet confer with their foreign ministers Selwyn Lloyd and Christian Pineau on the crisis precipitated by their invasion of Egypt. Here they are seen after’ delivering their ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, an ultimatum which was heavily leaded against Egypt. Eden planned for war from the outset Now the reason for all these ambiguities, all the verbal hedging and dishonesty about pledges becomes clear. For all the talks and nego- tiations have been a smoke- screen behind which the act of aggression was being pre- pared. They have been designed also to put the British people off their guard, to make them think that all thought of in- vading Egypt had been drop- ped, to persuade them that Eden — the “man of:peace — was sincerely trying to find a way out. The reservists complain they were kept in idleness, until a clamor went up to send them home on leave because there was nothing for them to do. But Eden refused to let the reservists go. Why? Because, although everything was not yet ready, there was going to be plenty for the reservists to do as soon as an excuse turned up, or had been cooked up. Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet tried to provoke an “excuse for intervention | at the start by blocking Egyptian funds in Paris and London, and ordering the British and French shipping companies not to pay their dues to the Egypti- an government, but to con- tinue paying them to the old Suez Canal Company in Paris. This, it was thought, would soon compel Egypt to refuse passage to ships which had not paid their dues to Egypt, and enable Britain and France to accuse Egypt of refusing pas- sage. Egypt, showing admirable restraint, has so far refrained from enforcing its legitimate claim to the dues payable for the services which it renders. Then Eden and Mollet open- ly incited the British and French pilots to quit. But this plot failed also, because the Egyptians proved well able, with the help of Russian and other pilots, to keep the canal working smoothly and effici- ently. The next step was to set up the Suez Canal users’ associa- tion which, according to Eden’s statement to parliament in September, was to attempt to send ships through the canal without using the pilots pro- vided by the Egyptian govern- ment. But the other nations invit- Secs BS By MALCOLM MacEWEN The Suez Canal is the key. NOVEMBER 9, 1956 — PACIFIC-TRIBUNE — PAGE Il ed to take part were not pre- pared to join in such an ad- venture. The association was formed, but the provocation collapsed. * Whether Eden or Mollet put the Israeli government up to the idea of invading Egypt is not known. Anybody who did suggest it was Israel’s worst enemy, for Israel can only hope to survive if the breach with the Arab world is healed. There are facts which. give rise to suspicion, among them the fact that the British invad- ing force sailed from Malta 24 hours before the Israeli army invaded Egypt, and the fact that U.S. nationals -were being evacuated from Egypt even earlier. But whether it was a put-up job or not,-one thing is clear: never was an act of aggression more welcome to Eden than was Israel’s invasion of Egypt. Here was the excuse; poor excuse, admittedly, but a plausible one. The canal could, at last, be said to be “in dan- ger.” It is to be doubted whether it is not endangered far more by the British-French invas- ion than by the Israeli invas- ion. And never was there a more weighted. ultimatum than thet delivered to Egypt and Israel to withdraw ten miles either side from the Suez Canal to allow the British and French forces to occupy the canal zone. For it means that Egypt was told: to abandon the most vital part of its territory, while Is- rael, the aggressor, was to re- main 100 miles within Egyp- tian territory. And, whether Egypt or Is- rael agreed or not, the Anglo- French forces were to occupy the canal zone in any event. But only, said Eden, ‘“‘tem- porarily.” The Egyptians have heard that one before. Gladstone said the same thing in 1882, when the. British fleet bombarded Alexandria and the British army occupied Egypt to make it safe for the financiers of London and Paris. The “temporary” occupation did not end until four months ago; it lasted 74 years. Eden’s occupation will not last as long. Egypt and the world have changed a lot — and so has Britain.