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TRIBUNE FEATURE SUPPLEMENT

range missiles would be a fine prelude
to a breakthrough at the talks on large-
scale — 50 per cent — reductions in
strategic offensive arms in conditions of
the strict observance of the ABM Trea-
ty. I believe that, given mutual effort,
an accord on that matter could become
a reality as early as in the first half of
next year.

While thinking of advancing toward a
nuclear weapons-free world, it is essen-
tial to see to iteven now that security be
ensured in the process of disarmament,
at each of its stages, and to think not
only about that, but also to agree on
mechanisms for maintaining peace at
drastically reduced levels of non-nu-
clear armaments.

All these questions were included in
proposals set forth jointly by the USSR
and other socialist countries at the
United Nations — proposals for the es-
tablishment of a comprehensive system
of international peace and security.

What should it be like, as we see it?

The security plan proposed by us
provides, above all, for continuity and
concord with the existing institutions
for the maintenance of peace. The sys-
tem could function on the basis of the
UN Charter and within the framework
of the United Nations. In our view, its
ability to function will be ensured by the

A system

for security

strict observance of the Charter’s de-
mands, additional unilateral obligations
of states, as well as confidence meas-

ures and international cooperation in all .

spheres — politico-military, economic,
ecological, humanitarian and others.

I do not venture to predict how the
system of all-embracing security would
appear in its final form. It is only clear
that it could become a reality only if all
means of mass annihilation are de-
stroyed. We propose that all this be
considered by an independent commis-
sion of experts and specialists which
would submit its conclusions to the
United Nations.

Personally, I have no doubt about the
capability of sovereign states to assume
obligations in the field of international
security. Many states are already doing

this. As is known, the Soviet Union and
the People’s Republic of China have
said that they will not be the first to use
nuclear arms.

The Soviet-American agreements on
nuclear armaments are another exam-
ple. They contain a conscious choice of
restraint and self-limitation in the most
sensitive sphere of relations between
the USSR and the United States. And
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is
a unique example of a high sense of
responsibility by states.

In today’s reality there already exist
‘*bricks’’ from which to start building
the future system of security.

The sphere of reasonable, respon-
sible and rational organization of inter-
national affairs is expanding before our
very eyes, though admittedly timidly.
Previously unknown standards of
openness, of the scope and depth of
mutual monitoring and verification of
compliance with adopted obligations
are being established. An American in-
spection team visits an area where So-
viet troop exercises are held; a group of
United States Congressmen inspect the
Krasnoyarsk radar station; American
scientists install and adjust their
instruments in the area of the Soviet
nuclear testing range. Soviet and
American observers are present at each
other’s military exercises. Annual
plans of military activity are published
in accordance with accords within the
framework of the Helsinki process.

I do not know a weightier and more
impressive argument in support of the
fact that the situation is changing than
the stated readiness of a nuclear power
voluntarily to renounce nuclear weap-
ons. References to an effort to replace
them with conventional weapons in
which there supposedly exists an im-
balance between NATO and the War-
saw Treaty in the latter’s favour are
unjustified. If imbalance and dispropor-
tions exist, let us remove them. We
continue to repeat this and have pro-
posed concrete ways of solving this
problem.

On all these issues the Soviet Union
is a pioneer. It shows that its words are
matched by deeds.

The question of the comparability of
defence spending? Here we will have to
put in more work. I think that given
proper effort, within the next two or
three years we will be able to compare

the figures that are of interest to us and
our partners, and which would sym-
metrically reflect the expenditures of
the sides.

The Soviet-American talks on nu-
clear and space arms, the convention
on the prohibition of chemical weapons

Practical sieps

to peace

which is close to being concluded will
intensify, I am sure, the advance to de-
tente and disarmament.

An accord on ‘“‘defence strategy”’
and *“‘military sufficiency’ could impart
a powerful impulse in this direction.
These notions presuppose a structure
of the armed forces of a state which
would be sufficient to repulse possible
aggression but insufficient for conduct-
ing offensive actions. The first step to-
ward this could be controlled with-
drawal of nuclear and other offensive
weapons from borders and subsequent
creation of strips of reduced armaments
and demilitarized zones between poten-
tial adversaries. As well, in principle we
should work for the dissolution of mili-
tary blocs, the liquidation of bases on
foreign territories and the. return home
of all troops stationed abroad.

The question of a possible mechan-
ism to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear
conflict is more complex. Here I ap-
proach the most sensitive point of the
idea of all-embracing security: Much
will have to be additionally thought out,
re-thought and worked out. In any
case, the international community
should work out agreed upon measures
in the event of a violation of the all-em-
bracing agreement on non-use and
elimination of nuclear arms or an at-
tempt to violate this agreement. As to
potential nuclear piracy, it appears pos-
sible and necessary to consider in ad-
vance and prepare collective measures
to prevent it.

If the system is sufficiently effective,
the more it will provide effective
guarantees of averting and curbing
non-nuclear aggression.

The system proposed by us precisely
presupposes a definiteness of measures
which would enable the United Na-
tions, the main universal security body,

Shultz and
Shevardnadze
sign the
agreement on
exchanges in
science,
information
and culture at
Geneva in
1985.

to ensure its maintenance at a level of
reliability.

The division of the world’s countries
into those possessing nuclear weapons
and those not possessing them has also
split the very concept of security. But
for human life security is indivisible. In
this sense it is not only a political, mili-
tary, juridical but also a moral category.
And contentions that there has been no
war for half a century do not withstand
any test on the touchstone of ethics.
How come there is no war? There are
dozens of regional wars flaring in the
world.

It is immoral to treat this as some-
thing second rate. The matter, how-
ever, is not only in the impermissible
nuclear exclusiveness. The elimination .
of nuclear weapons would also be a
major step towards a _ genuine
democratization of relations between
states, their equality and equal respon-
sibility.

Universal

security

The unconditional observance of the
United Nations Charter and the night of
peoples freely to choose the roads and
forms of their development, revolu-
tionary or evolutionary, is an impera-
tive condition of universal security.
This applies also to the right to social
status quo. This, too, is exclusively an
internal matter. Any attempts, direct or
indirect, to influence the development
of ‘‘not one of our own’’ countries, to
interfere in this development should be
ruled out. Just as impermissible are at-
tempts to destabilize existing govern-
ments from outside.

At the same time the world com-
munity cannot stay away from inter-
state conflicts. Here it could be possible
to begin by fulfilling the proposal made
by the United Nations Secretary Gen-
eral to set up under the United Nations
Organization a multilateral centre for
lessening the danger of war. Evidently,
it would be feasible to consider the ex-
pediency of setting up a direct com-
munication line between the United
Nations headquarters and the capitals

S2 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, JUNE 3, 1987