FEATURE

By S. SHAVLOV

It is claimed in Washington that the United States does
not need to assume a ‘‘no-first-use’’ commitment. Pre-
sumably, the U.S. administration has never thought of
using nuclear weapons, even when the United States had
a nuclear monopoly.

Those who claim this probably hope that there is no
evidence to the contrary. But evidence — irrefutable
evidence — turns up in official documents on the inter-
national relations of the United States in 1953-1954, re-
leased by the U.S. Department of State. The collection
includes declassified records of meetings with the par-
ticipation of top political and military leaders of the
United States during the U.S. aggression in Korea.

What do claims about Washington’s ‘‘clean consci-
ence’ with regard to nuclear weapons look like in the
light of facts contained in those documents?

Claim number one: The United States has never plan-
ned the first use of nuclear weapons.

Facts: Documents show that during 1952-1953 alone
the question of the possible use of atomic weapons
against the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was
discussed 22 times at meetings of the U.S. National
Security Council and at other high-level conferences.

U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, March
31, 1953: “One way or another, the
taboo on the use of atomic weapons
must be broken.”

President Eisenhower said on March 30, 1953: ‘‘If we
go over to more positive action against the enemy in
Korea, it will be necessary to expand the war beyond the
boundaries of Korea and to use the atomic bomb.”’

General Hull, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on
May 13, 1953: ‘‘There are no good strategic targets in
Korea itself but the military would like very much to use
atomic weapons in any option involving operations out-
side Korea. Their use would be most profitable from the
purely military point of view.”

Paul Nitze, Director for Policy Planning at the U.S.
Department of State, on March 27, 1953: ‘‘Politically,
there is no insurmountable barrier to the use of atomic
weapons.”

Claim number two: U.S. policy is based on the aware- ~

ness of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons
and is characterized by a responsible ebprapch to this
matter.

Facts: In reality the U.S. leadership were most of all
pre-occupied with overcoming people’s fear of nuclear
weapons and with leading them to the idea that it was
admissible to use those weapons.

President Eisenhower, on May 6, 1953: ‘‘We should
regard the atomic bomb as merely another type of weap-
onry in our arsenal.”

Secretary of State Dulles, on March 31, 1953: ‘‘One
way or the other, the taboo on the use of atomic weapons
must be broken.”

Claim number three: The United States does not plan
a disarming first nuclear strike.

Facts: The keynote of all documents is that the United
States should use nuclear weapons first, in a surprise
attack, and employ them on a large scale.

President Eisenhower on January 8, 1954: ‘‘If we suc-
ceed in a simultaneous nuclear attack on all the forward
air force bases of the Communists, the enemy will be
bled white from the outset of the hostilities. It is our plan
for Europe as well.”

Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on January 8, 1954: *‘The military are constantly
working to cut back the 22-hour period needed to pre-
pare a nuclear attack so that a nuclear bombing of the 22
enemy air fields in the Far East-could be carried out as
swiftly as possible.”

Claim number four: The United States does not think
in terms of nuclear escalation, limited nuclear war or
attacks on civilian targets.

Facts: Basic premises on which the U.S. military doc-
trine rests today were formulated as far back as the early
1950s.

6 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, SEPTEMBER 7, 1984

Policy planner Paul Nitze, March 27,
1953: “Politically there is no
insurmountable barrier to the use of
atomic weapons.”

-with the West Europeans in the atomic weapons field

being hatched in connection with the deployment of U.S. —

socialism, in their militarist fever and in their obsession i

U.S. claims versus U.S. facts

President Eisenhower (January 8, 1954): ‘“The worry Do
of the military that they need time to prepare an atomic
strike is understandable. They could begin by using
conventional weapons until the atomic systems are fan
ready for attack.’ its

Defense Secretary Wilson (January 8, 1954): ‘‘There is
a divide between the strategic use of atomic weapons, for &
which Washington’s authorization is of course neces- C:
sary, and tactical.”’ tie

Bowie, Director, Policy Planning at the Department of E
State (December 3, 1953): ‘‘Since the recommendations &
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mean by ‘enemy’ all the
communists without exception, in practical terms all the if
Soviet and Chinese armed forces and military targets in &
the Far East will have to be annihilated by atomic weap-_|
ons. Moreover, the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff &
means atomic bombings of virtually all the Chinese ’
cities.”

Claim number five: The United States, in pursuing its Ue
nuclear policy, thinks about the security of its allies,
consults them and respects their opinion. hes

Facts: Statements by the President and his aides leave b:
no doubt that Washington guided itself exclusively by its N
own goals during that period, too, and viewed its allies as P
an obstacle to its plans to use nuclear weapons. tA

After being advised that Churchill was not enthu- |
siastic about the use of atomic weapons, President
Eisenhower wondered if Sir Winston had gone soft in his S

head. W

President Eisenhower, January 8, 1954:
“If we succeed in a simultaneous
nuclear attack on all the forward air
force bases of the Communists, the
enemy will be bled white...”

Secretary of State Dulles (December 10, 1953): —
‘Churchill's belief that the use of atomic weapons by the
United States would disgust the whole world only shows ~
that the U.S. views of atomic weapons are years ahead of
the thinking of the rest of the free world.” ;

Secretary of State Dulles (January 8, 1954): “To neut-_
ralize the possible negative reaction of the allies toa U.S,
nuclear strike, it is necessary to exchange information

and to allow some of them to acquire a few atomic &
bombs.

Claim number six: The United States has always had

a “‘highly moral’’ attitude to nuclear weapons.

Facts: The kind of morality the United States fol-
lowed is graphically illustrated by President Eisen-
hower’s statement at a meeting on May 13, 1953. That
statement needs no comment: “Counting i in dollars, it is”
cheaper to use atomic weapons in Korea than to con-
tinue to fight with conventional ones. This is particularly” i
true in view of the cost of bringing conventional ammuni-
tion from the United States to the frontline.”’

In January 1954 President Eisenhower ordered that i
future no records should be kept on the ‘‘more sensi-
tive’’ questions discussed at the closed meetings.

But just as history has brought to light this horribl
evidence, it will one day reveal the truth about w
Washington did and planned in the course of the U.S.
aggression against Cuba, Vietnam and Iran and the plans

nuclear missiles in Western Europe and preparations for F
“*Star Wars’’. a

The present U.S. administration has gone even further
than their spiritual fathers in their gut hatred for

with nuclear weapons. Paul Nitze, who personally par- —
ticipated in conferences at that time, now conceals that :
he had championed the use of nuclear weapons but he is —
the same Nitze. Neither he nor other participats in those”
‘‘military councils’’ ever showed the slightest sign of
moral indecision when they cold bloodedly planned the ~
holocaust for millions. ;
They failed to burn the world in a nuclear fire because ~
even at that time they were not certain that they would ©
escape retribution. This should be borne in mind also by
those who are laying down U.S. policy today. o
— Izvestia St