_ By JOE SLOVO

Moved by what he terms “Fidel-

. ista impatience,” Regis Debray -dis-

’ misses Lenin’s “theoretical formu-
lae” relating to insurrection aS
having “nothing to do with the
present situation.”

It is no longer necessary to wait
for conditions for revolution to be

fulfilled. =

For militants of the “Fidelista
generation” the conditions for arm-
ed struggle “are given in a general
manner.” In most of Latin America
at any rate, the injection at a. vul-
nerable point of national territory
of an armed band of heroic and
dedicated men will spread “like an
oilpatch propagating itself in. con-
centric ripples through the peasant
masses, to the smaller towns
finally to the capital.” Priority No.
1, therefore, is the creation of in-
surrectionary “foco.”

And what of the political leader-
ship guided by the science of strug-
gle? This, in“Debray’s scheme of
things, is only really vital after the
capture of power when the construc-
tion of Socialism is on the agenda.
It will evolve from the people’s army
and not the other way about.

Debray is highly critical of exist-
ing Communist parties in Latin
America, whose leaders he regards
as conservatives and time-servers.

His wholesale rejection of the S0-
called Left establishment is
not so much on his criticism of
what he believes to be their past
failures, but-on the theory that in
Latin American conditions, in the
phase the seizure of pow-
er, the military must be predominant
over the political. He thus reverses
the traditional approach.

He asserts further that the strug-
gle in a colonial or semi-colonial
territory cannot be conducted under
the banner of Marxism-Leninism OF

; the leadership of the working class.

' With Fanon he believes that the
working class is relatively pampered
and corrupted by the standards of
city life and the peaSants—for his-
torical reasons—can Only be follow-
ers of “propaganda by facts.”

The insurrectionary foco is there-
fore initially staffed by students and
revolutionary intéllectuals who, be-
cause of the social situation of many
Latin American countries, have been
“assigned the vanguard roje.”

The foco’s military exploits will

galvanize resistance from the mass
of the population. It pecomes the
nucleus of a popular movernent and
the political vanguard “in nucé.”
’ His militaristic logic Jeads him to
an advocacy of the principle that, if
possible, military and political lead-
ership should be combined in one
person.

The commander-in-chief (and it is

no doubt true that collectivism is .

often harmful to the tactical n
of military action) is also the politi-
cal commander. A new quality is
thus introduced for leadership; that
of biological fitness. Very little room

here for a middle-aged Lenin!
It is certainly arguable (and Cuba
_is proof of this) that given certain

pre-conditions; armed activity can”

play an important and even decisive
role in hastening the eyolvement 0
insurrectionary Conditions. Thé his-

~ Regis Debray and
revolution in Latin America

This is the first of a series of articles on the theme Ideas of Rebellion
and Revolution in which the writings of men like Herbert Marcuse, Francis
Fanon, Regis Debray and Ernesto Che Guevara are examined.

torical process is obviously conect-
ed with what people — expressing
themselves in organized activity—
do, or abstain from doing.

For example, the South African -

National Liberation Movement
makes no claim that there exists at
the moment in that country the sort
of nation-wide crisis which would
warrant an October-style assault on
the central power. Yet, for reasons
I believe to be correct, it has under-
taken armed activity of the guerrilla

Lenin, more than most, railed
against “mechanically equalized and
identical rules of struggle” for dif-
fering conditions and nations. His
famous “formula” (and he would have
been the last to insist on this word)
was concerned with the problems of
the moment of a general all-round
insurrection, and not with the way
in which a revolutionary organiza-

alized formulations that the injection

- of an armed group into a country

in which there is severe repression
—a group, let me emphasize, with
no special ties with the people and
one which must initially keep away
from them—will of itself, and sub-

ject only to its professional skill,

lead eventually to the growth of a
popular armed movement capable
of capturing power, for a number
of reasons.

Debray’s commitment to focismo
is unshaken by the post-Cuban his-
tory of the routing and destruction
of “half a hundred revolutionary
organizations” who, he claims, were
prisoners of the Cuban model.

“Revolutionary failure is a spring-
board,” he ‘says. “As a source of
theory it is richer than victory, it

‘accumulates experience and knowl-

edge.” One of the prime lessons of
revolutionary failure is surely that

tice. He invokes the Cuban experi
ence to demonstrate that in the
special conditions of Latin America
“honest and sincere” revolutiona
struggles will lead to the conscious
adoption of Marxism.
Whatever special circums
combined to lead to the eens
a unified Communist party out of the
constituents of the victorious arm
led by Castro and the P.S.P, (ola
Communist party), history certainly
abounds with proof that it is a rar
and almost accidental phenomenon
that revolutionary struggles—arme
or not—lead to the sort of victo
which is desired without the guiq
ance, at all important stages, of Q
revolutionary political vanguard. *
Modern scientific Socialist theo
although it obviously has its Toone
in the struggle, does not arise ai
rectly and spontaneously out of it,
The point was made long ago by
Lenin that the spontaneous develo
ment of the working-class moveme
leads to its becoming subordinate.
to bourgeois ideology. Sa
If this is true of workers in q
conflict with the class enemy, ho
a eaneen application has it to <
struggle whose main con
tional in character? Penk le. na.
‘Revolutionary struggle, even ;
colonial or semi-colonial countri <
requires the guidance of a theoretj.°
ally advanced collective leadershi~
When specific conditions ca}] fe:
armed activity of a guerrilla or
it is all the more necessary to }*
guided by an experienced politic’
vanguard. eal
The impressive points made :
Debray concerning the taction acy”
culties of leading such a stry aS
from the cities, or the neeq forme
political leadership, or part of it, «©
join the guerrillas in no way suppe.e
this main conclusion. rt
Of course, the fact that an o
nization calls itself “Comm:
does not automatically fit jt for
role, nor can it claim exclusive 0 is
race = a revolution except 3, ~
the re of its leadershi y
tions. =e a
At the same time neither
nor any other stranger to a Sten y
has the right to brush aside Te
established, indigenous revolutig>
ary organizations, and to Carry nn
the burden of continent-wige dees
sions concerning the commencem oc
of any specific form of action <™
to guide its development. ang
To do this effective]
than analytical brilliahee gee “ae
an intimate nexus between a leah’
r

r
unises

a people and a situation,

Even in a continent. in whic’
generally agreed that armed ait is

cos AR, ed CPS i

"TRIBUNE" SEPTEMBER 13, 1968—Pase 18 onary ANS

se Ma i Ne i te he a het ma me ea apne. eee tee Se te ee ek |

tion can, by its political and organi- a tactic that leads to it is suspect. gle is the rule and the peacefy] y-&
zational work, help create conditions His theory of focismo and his the exception, it is highly questi ®3
for the conquest of power. denigration of ideological and poli- able to claim that only he is maky®
It is, indeed, conceded by many tical leadership are inter - related the revolution who physically Cat
Latin American Marxists that a concepts. They are based, in the first fronts the enemy with gun in Q
failure to appreciate this and a me- place, on the historically false and The leadership of a complex strup “9
‘chanical adherence to the so-called over-generalized idea that the dor- Surely involves very much more oe
eternal rules of revolutionary strug- mant mass will respond in the right this. nat 2

gle has in some situations in the way to the heroic actions of a cour- _ A mood of impatience is often
past stood in the way of effective _ ageous elite. indispensable spur to revolution.™
leadership. In the second place he believes endeavor. It is not always the pom
But all this is a far cry from the that we need not worry over-much _— effective midwife to revolution CS
dangerous illusion encouraged by about theory and ideology; they will theory. _ Ray
Debray’s expansive and over-gener- | emerge out of revolutionary prac- (The Morning Sta,
’

rs -

m P tremacs 5 i RET EL ITER es SS

SRR
t
denied.

+.

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