ear - As far as the U.S. aggres- and their flunkeys are con- it ded ae = i r ii u3 ¢ : Z FERS Ht eis 5s eg 5 hard to seek a political advantageous for them. recognize the NLF and 38 ney As far as the South Vietnam- ese people are concerned, it has been an upward climb. They be- with guerilla actions by scattered forces supplied with rudimentary weapons and now E ed uprisings against a numeric- ally superior enemy and now they stage generalized upris- ings, overwhelming the enemy everywhere. As for the National Liberation Front, at the begin- ning it gathered only a restrict- ed number of people and today it has become a powerful force, rallying under its banner dif- ferent social classes and strata and revolutionary organizations in South Vietnam, is -doing the duty of a real people’s adminis- tration and enjoys the confi- dence and protection of the popular masses end a high pres- tige in the world. “Preliminary statistics show that during this period, reckon- ing up to the beginning of Oct. 1968 only, close to two million enemy troops were killed, wounded or captured, and a large number of others disband- ed. American and satellite casu- alties alone ran in the region of 500,000 men. Enemy material losses including more than 13,000 planes and _ helicopters shot down or destroyed on the ground, about 26,000 military vehicles among them nearly 12,000 tanks and armoured cars destroyed, more than 1,100 war vessels, combat launches and militafy freighters sunk burnt or damaged. Political actions by the civil- the National South Vietnam. Front jans have been staged concur- rently with military operations of the armed forces and have greatly contributed to the lat- ter’s victories. In those eight years, an estimated aggregate 140 million turnout has been recorded in political demon- strations in varied forms and on various scales, _ At first, the slogans were meant to denounce enemy crimes, demand payment of compensations, boycott reac- tionary policies and measures, secure democratic liberties and vital economic rights. Today they are aimed at the overthrow of the puppet admi- nistration, the withdrawall of U.S. troops, the people’s right to sovereignty, independence and freedom and the re-estab- lishment of peace. Since last “Tet,” this movement has been gaining fresh momentum and has turned into an armed insur- rectional drive in the whole of South Vietnam. It has reduced to failure a strategic plan of the aggressors: to conduct ag- gression under a neo-colonialist form. Agitation work among enemy troops has also yielded great “successes. According to still in- complete figures, by Sept. 1968, more than 467,000 puppet sol- diers had deserted or had been disbanded. Developments on the battlefield today clearly show that the puppet army is not viable without the backing of U.S. troops. The victories recorded in all fields by the South Vietnam armed forces and people in the period under review have made possible the emergence of a vast liberated zone ‘stretching from the 17th parallel to the Ca Mau point over four-fifths of South Vietnam’s territory with two- thirds of the population. In these liberated areas, a new po- litical power, revolutionary power, really representing the legitimate interests and aspira- tions of the people, has been established or is in the making in many localities. In fact, the puppet administration now con- PACIFIC TRIBUNE—JANUARY 31, 1969—Page 6 , Liberation at y £> wt, trols, and at that, only some sectors, in the cities and along a number of arteries. The NLF leads, organizes and mobilizes the South Vietnamese people in the resistance to U.S. aggression. It finds growing favor in the eyes of various Strata of the people, including those in the cities and areas stil! under enemy control. The coming into existence of the Vietnam’ Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces which approves the Political Program of the Front and its five points has spelled out the Front’s influence among the ur- ban population and marked a new expression of the bloc of national union in the struggle against U.S. aggression, for na- tional salvation. In the international arena, the credit of the Front also con- stantly grows. Up to now, the Front has established 21 repre- sentations and two information bureaus abroad and has sent 168 delegations to international, regional and national confer- ences and 237 delegations on friendly visits to many coun- tries. Its affiliated organizations are members of 11 international organizations. Although the U.S. aggressors still refuse to recognize the Front, they have been com- pelled to accept talks with the Front’s representatives in Paris, to seek a political solution to the South Vietnam problem. Thus, willy nilly, they have had, in fact, to recognize the deci- sive role of the NLF in the set- tlement of the South Vietnam problem. In this period of eight years of struggle waged by the South Vietnamese people against the U.S. aggressors, for national salvation, under the leadership of the NLF, the year 1968 in- contestably occupies a particu- larly important “place. The South Vietnamese people have won, since the launching of the generalized attacks and uprisings on the night of Jan. 30, 1968 great, multilateral and strategically significant victo- ries. Their resistance to U.S. ag- gression has thus entered into a new period, the period of out- burst of impetuous and sus- tained attacks and uprisings, forerunners of final victory. For the enemy, this is a period of irresistible gliding toward his ultimate doom. Parallel to the prodigious growth of the Liberation Army in all fields, the guerilla has also made enormous progress. In the first six months of the gene- ralized attacked and uprisings the militia, guerillas and armed population took a toll of nearly 60,000 enemy casualties, shot down, destroyed or damaged 250 planes and _ helicopters, wrecked 1,300 military vericles, razed more than 700 posts and seized about 3,000 weapons of different types. Backed by the impetuous widespread attacks by the PLAF, the armed uprisings of the peo- ple in turn provided support for the latter’s operations by mak- ing away with cruel thugs, breaking the enemy’s grip, cut- ting communication lines and besieging enemy posts. Like the armed uprisings, the unarmed political struggle of the popular masses has exper- ienced a new development. Ac- cording to still incomplete sta- tistics, since last “Tet,” the ag- gregate total participation in political struggle in South Viet- _nam has reached the 20-million mark. One of the striking features of the situation is the ever more active share of the people in the movement of agitatia among the puppet soldiers. — Immediately after the laund ing of the Tet generalized # tacks and uprisings, tens ¢ thousands of officers and mé of the puppet army, respondiy to the NLF appeal and persual ed by the popular masses, ld the enemy ranks. In the sect Northwest of Saigon alone, th action by the masses and ¥j relatives of puppet armymé provoked, in eight months, ! disintegrating process whid affected 7,000 enemy soldiers Compared with the previod years, the total number of mt tinies and revolts staged ff officers and men of the puppt army has increased substat tially. The morale of U.S. troof has also been sinking critically In all U.S. divisions, numerod GI's, seized with fear, sought tt avoid combat with the PLAM deserted to take refuge in mt jor cities, refused to take pat in military operations, and dé! manded repatriation. Cases 4 GI’s surrendering to the PLA were also recorded. The victories of the Sout Vietnam people and their armel’ forces, the enlargement of the liberated zone and the growitf' prestige of the NLF at home ail abroad, have made it possibl! to establish revolutionary powé at various levels. This nef! event has given rise in the ibe rated rural areas to a new a mosphere of overflowing zé#! and enthusiasm. The new power continued distribute land to those pea! ants who lack it and helps them in particular, to organize them selves into mutual-aid teat, with a view to boosting produe tion. Great attention has paid to the development of ed” cation, health and cultural work 4