DEBATE ON VIETNAM SHOWS

Trotskyite line
consistently
inconsistent

Recently a debate was held at the
University of Toronto between Nelson
Clarke, Communist Party, and Joe
Flexer, Red Circle (a Trotskyite group),
on the significance of the Jan. 27 Viet-
nam accords. What came up during the
course of the debate should be of inter-
est to our readers.

First, it appears that the Vietnam-
ese revolution is being fought on two
fronts. One front is in Vietnam, where
the Vietnamese people and their leader-
ship have struggled valiantly for over
25 years. The other front is in the U.
of T. cafeterias, where Red Circle is
waging the Vietnamese revolution. If
we go by Flexer’s remarks, Red Circle
knows how to fight the Vietnemese
revolution better than the Vietnamese.

Second, if we were to pick a “win-
ner,” it would be:no contest. Clarke
would win a unanimous decision. And
the reasons are quite simple. In his
presentation and answers, the Com-
munist spokesman begen with concrete
historical facts, and from them drew
certain estimations and conclusions.
Mr. Flexer did just the opposite. He
first produced a schematic (and highly
suspect) series of “theoretical” postul-
ates, beginning with the old stand-by,
“permanent revolution,” and then tried
to fit in the facts. If, and when, the
facts contradicted the theory, they
were consequently dismissed as either
unimportant, artificially contrived, or
better still, non-existent (i.e., there is
no such thing as a national liberation
struggle). However, some of Flexer’s
points may merit looking at.

Flexer’s schematicism is quite inter-
esting. According to him, revolution is
simple. There are no stages, no allies,
no national liberation struggles, no al-
liances. If something doesn’t fit into the
scheme of things (the NLF just hap-
pens to be an alliance, including sec-
tions of the bourgeoisie, and peasantry,
fighting a war of national liberation),
it doesn’t exist. Therefore, a non-exist-
ent NLF is waging an illusory national
liberation struggle. And, of course, if
something doesn’t exist, it can’t win
victories. At least Flexer admits that
there is something real—U.S. imperial-
ism.

Revolution, says Mr. Flexer, is a
simple conflict between two classes.
On the one side, the international
working class. On the cther, world im-
perialism. They continuously confront
each: other. The working class will at

last come out victorious, and a world
dictatorship of the proletariat estab-
lished.

One would wish it were that simple.
But conflicts like Vietnam get in the
way, because they can’t be explained
so easily. One is always hesitant to
offer up ‘authorities,’ but because Mr.
Flexer began his opening remarks by
alluding to himself as a Bolshevik, the
following contribution is difficult to
avoid: :

“To imagine that social revolution is
conceivable (emphasis author’s) with-
out revolts by small nations in the co-
lonies and in Europe, without revolu-
tionary outbursts by a section of the
petty bourgeois with all its prejudices,
without a movement of the politically
non-conscious proletarian and semi-
proletarian masses against oppression
by the land-owners, the church, and the
monarchy, against national oppression,
etc. — to imagine all this is to repu-
diate social revolution. So one army
lines up in one place and says, “We
are for socialism,” and another, some-
where else, and says, “We are for im-
perialism,” and that will be a social
revolution! Only those who hold such
a ridiculously pedantic view could vili-
fy the Irish rebellion by calling it a
‘putsch’.

“Whoever expects a ‘pure’ social re-
volution will never live to see it. Such
a person pays lip-service to revolution
without understanding what revolution
iS;

Mr. Flexer denies the validity of
democratic national liberation strug-
gles, on both practical and theoretical
grounds. One can cite Cuba’s example,
or that of Algeria, as concrete exam-
ples to the contrary. But because he is
so fond of theory (since if not first
“proved” philosophically, it can’t be
so), we turn again to the same source:

“The socialist revolution is not a
single act, it is not one battle on one
front, but a whole epoch of acute class
conflicts, a long series of battles on all
fronts, i.e., on all questions of econo-
mics and politics, battle that can only
end (emphasis mine) in the expropria-
tion of the bourgeoisie. It would be a
radical mistake to think that the strug-
gle for democracy was capable of diy-
erting the proletariat from the socialist
revolution, or hiding or overshadowing
itjetc.

“Tt would be no less a mistake to re-
move one of the points of the demo-
cratic program, for example the self-
determination of nations, on the
grounds of it being ‘impracticable’ or

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—FRIDAY, MARCH 16, 1973—PAGE 10

‘illusory’ under imperialism . . .”’?

An interesting question was asked of
Mr. Flexer: “Assuming that the Viet-
namese were aware of the French Com-
munist Party, or had read (Prof. Gab-
riel) Kolko’s book (as had Flexer), what
would you have them do differently
than they have done?’ Although he
was not quite as specific here as in
other theoretical areas, one assumes
he could have repeated his earlier read-
ing from the works of Trong Chin,
member of the political bureau of the
Vietnamese Workers’ Party, cautioning
the Vietnamese not to nurture illu-
sions:

“The possibility .of peaceful transi-
tion is very valuable, but can only
happen very rarely. For this reason,
while providing leadership to the re-
volution, the Communists should stand
ready to face both the possibility of a
non-peaceful, and that of a peaceful
transition. They should essentially pre-
pare for a non-peaceful transition. In
no case should they nurture illusions
about a peaceful transition... .”

One is really at a loss to discover
what Flexer is so worried about. It
certainly cannot be said that the Viet-
namese have not prepared for a non-
peaceful transition. One just has to
look at the past 25 years.

e

Here we can move to perhaps the
most important substantive question of
the debate, the implementation of the
treaty. Mr. Flexer was not decisive
here, but certainly some of his Trostky-
ite companions were. “It’s a sellout’,
cried one. It might be interesting to
figure out, “theoretically,” of course,
how the treaty can be both a sellout,
and, as Flexer reluctantly admitted, a
retreat for U.S. imperialism.

One might also ask what the alterna-
tives are. It’s always easy to demand
that someone else fight on until he has
defeated imperialism, but bad interna-
tionalist practice. It’s also like saying
“We must fight on to the last drop of
Vietnamese blood.” :

If, as Mr. Flexer admitted, the Jan.
27 accords signify a retreat for U.S.
imperialism, a weakening of their posi-
tion in Southeast Asia, why not help
to make the fullest effect of it? Al-
though it might just be, “‘‘a piece of
paper,” as Flexer characterizes it, its
implementation is quite material. It
does restrict both the manoeuvres of
the U.S. and its puppet Thieu regime—
if carried out to the letter, it will even-
tually eliminate both—in Vietnam.

To campaign against implementation
of the Jan. 27 accords, this writer
suggests, would be counter-revolution-
ary. If we in North America can force
“our” governments to keep their end
of the bargain, I think that we can
trust the Vietnamese people to look
after their end. Confidence in one’s
fighting comrades is also a feature of
internationalism. And one would really
find it difficult to say that the Viet-

namese people, based on their 25 years:

~ only to Mandel and Co.), you ay

ke
of struggle, do not deserve”
fidence and respect.

A comic aside was also played?
in the framework of the debate
this one among three Trostkyite®
— League for Socialist Achat P|
Circle, and Old Mole. One mish .
it “Rush to the Franchise,” and Frill
along the lines of a Gilbert and SU"
opera, or perhaps as a child's Bo
like Snakes and Ladders. But
some background information:

When Trostkyite guru Ernest ™
came here from Belgium last Ye
inspect the insignificant TTS
Fourth International’s Canadiat
tion, the League for Socialist 4
he found it wanting. It was “unW
of its Fourth International.
(something like the pot call
kettle black). Perhaps for Man@
Co. it wasn’t “left” enough, OF
too “opportunist,” or “revisiont

Anyway, word reached the ©
number of eager people that if@
Trostkyite grouping were fom
might be looked upon favorane
Brussels, and thus claim the it
chise.” Or, alternatively, if Be (ee
infusion of newer, “purer” ble a
take orders from Mandel), ¢
would change its “position qu !
number of its present leaders a)
(i.e., Ross Dowson, Dick Fiddle ‘put
Steele, Colleen Levis, to na oe
few) the eyes of Brussels WOU" gq)
look benevolently down on the © aj”

And so, the rush was on. Pad Qh
keen new groups (Red Circle aaers
Mole) as self-proclaimed prete®

the “Franchise”. Then among. oft

came macro-fractions and mi i
tions. Some groups tried (and 4 gil
trying) to enter others; some
off. ing DE
One of the criteria for obtain
“Franchise”, it appears, 35 a 4]
Communist and “leftist” oné it
So it was fun to see each grouP sa!
to outdo each other during ae if

Going back to the Snakes a
ders analogy, if (in the n@ ay
“Rush to the Franchise”) you i ;
enough that the Jan. 27 accor fe
victory (in any way) for the 3
ese people, you slide down 4 T ]
lower square. Your particular é
ite group loses points. Howey 08
say that the accords were I sig
on Vietnam by the U.S., or the ©

ey

Jo"
re"

Jeadership, etc., you can cli

i
ladder to a higher square. wa
group reaches the final squar' eg

ed the prized “Franchise”.

It’s important to realize 1 it
these days one can never '©" 19 $i
the various Trotskyite groups, a
ing is really “policy”, oF 1 1 Ce
they think Mandel wants to hea® sot”

1. V. I. Lenin, Collecte 058 py
Volume 22, pp. 356-7, Prot
lishers, Moscow.

2. ibid, p. 144.

this Di