F.

OE ERS

aaa rs

See SS

‘ar

Out of the monster's mouth

By VICTOR PERLO

Director Herman Kahn of the
Hudson institute is well-known
to TV audiences. He is infamous
as the advocate of the 44-rung
ladder of escalation leading up
to “spasm or insensate” thermo-
nuclear war. He is a frequent
commuter to Saigon, devising
new atrocities against the Viet-
namese people. And now he and
his associates, as “experts” on
the subject, have written a book
smelling of Nazi torturers and
executioners and American ra-
cist cops and assasins.

Kahn also gets paid for devis-
ing new modes of anti-Commu-
nist warfare in Europe. In the
November Fortune he tells the
executive subscribers why they
lost their battle for Czechoslo-
vakia.

Was there a real threat of
counterrevolution in Czechoslo-
pakia? Was the action of the
Warsaw Pact power necessary
to save socialism there? Did the
intervention strengthen world
socialism? These questions are
hotly argued. Kahn says yes to
all these questions—and to more
far-reaching plans that were
squashed.

His views are important be-
cause they reflect and guide the
policies of U.S. imperialism. It
is not Kahn, of course, who de-
cides the policies—but he ex-
presses, rationalizes, helps im-
plement them.

According to Kahn, “most
Soviet experts in the West” be-
lieved in the decay of commu-
nism, in the “embourgeoise-
ment” of the people of the
Soviet Union through “growing
material prosperity.” They be-
lieved in the “convergence” of
the two social systems, in a dis-
solution of the unity of the so-
cialist camp. They “expected a
general drift of Soviet society
toward the West European or
U.S. models.” They were confi-
dent that “the power, prestige,
and influence of the U.S.S.R.
were in decline,” and could not
prevent the destruction of so-
cialism.

Czechoslovakia was to be the
key country in the process.

A favorite devise of U.S.
policy planners is to prepare a
“scenario” for a campaign they
wish to launch. In this article
Kahn presents the U.S. scena-
rio for the events that were sup-
posed to unfold. In Czechoslo-
vakia, there would be:

“Early recognition of Bonn,
followed by West German cre-
dits, trade and influence . .
general atrophy of the (Com-
munist) party’s influence .. .
Possible development of ...a
social democracy with capital-
ist overtones .. .”

To an American executive,
that is a description of present-
day Britain—it means a capital-
ist state with social-walfare
trimmings.

The regression of Czechoslo-
vakia is followed in the scenario
by:

e@ The fall of Gomulka in
Poland and his replacement by
a “hypernationalist . . . anti-
Soviet” regime.

e Denunciation of the War-
saw Pact by “one or more East
European countries.”

e@ The capture of East Ger-
many by West Germany, per-
haps through a “dangerous”
War,

@ This would “force a mas-
sive Soviet retreat from Eastern
Europe’... .”

@ There would be a “loss of
morale in Moscow, perhaps a
near-total erosion of imperial
nerve.”

These events, together, “would
raise very serious threats to the
existence of the current Soviet
system and state.”

But perhaps the above is mere-
ly Kahn’s clever post-mortem?
No. He says:

“These events . . . represent
a fair summary of what most
Soviet experts in the West an-
ticipated (and what they be-
lieved the Russians themselves
anticipated) if there was no in-
tervention . . . This general an-
alysis of what was at stake in
Czechoslovakia was widely ac-
cepted. In fact, parts of the an-
alysis were so widely publi-
cized that they might well have
begun to work as a self-fulfil-
ling prophecy .. . it seemed
likely that Alexander Dubcek
could not stem the tide in
Czechoslovakia even if he tried
—and it was not so clear that
he would try very hard.”

Kahn and his cohorts are not
interested in academic analyses.
Their job is to act to produce
their scenarios—not rely on
“self-fulfillment.”

While initial reliance was on
ideological and financial subver-
sion, force would be the ulti-
mate weapon. As already indi-
cated, Kahn anticipated that
West German militarists would
deliver the coup de grace to a
softened-up German Democra-
tic Republic. As for the Soviet
Union:

“The politburo was undoubt-
edly obliged to consider one
other threat to Soviet security
that might materialize if the
Soviet Union simply stood by
and let events in Czechoslo-
vakia take their course. The
threat was that these events
might leave the Soviet Union
militarily exposed: that the weak-
ening of the Warsaw Pact, com-
bined with the strengthening of
West Germany (because of
Czech recognition and trade),
might one day culminate in a
U.S.-backed West German at-
tack on the U.S.S.R.”

Kahn’s opinion is that this
military threat was the domin-
ant factor in the final decision
of the Soviet Union to act.

The men who drew up the

scenario were convinced that
the Soviet leadership was weak
and demoralized, unable or
afraid to take counteraction to
save socialism. Kahn specifical-
ly included himself among the
Western experts who made this
wrong estimate. He refers re-
peatedly to “our fantastic un-
derrating of the Russians’ nerve
and resolve.” He says it is .
“a striking and disturbing fact,
that most American experts .. .
during the spring and summer
concluded that intervention was
most unlikely.”

He notes that the Soviet lead-
ership increased its aid to North
Vietnam to “rather high levels,”
“authorized a big increase in
missiles, rearmed the Arabs,
adopted a tougher line towards
West Germany.

“Why in the face of all these
actions,” he asks, “did so many
American students of the Soviet
Union — myself included — con-
tinue to underrate the ability of
the leadership to act resolutely

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—JANUARY 24, 1969—Page 6

in defense of its interests?”

His answer is _ superficial—
that he and his colleagues were
taken in by their own propa-
ganda about the “colorless”
Soviet leadership, thrown off
guard by the leaders’ lack of
bluster, their matter-of-fact way
of doing important things.

The real reason, I believe, is
more profound. The imperialists
invariably and systematically
underestimate the strength of
the Soviet Union, of the social-
ist camp, of the whole align-
ment of forces opposing them.
If they proceeded from a cor-
rect estimate, they would have
to conclude that their day is
done, and give up the ghost.

In view of the real balance of
forces in the world, the aggres-
sive policy of imperialism has to
start from an unrealistic ap-
praisal. It has to bank on ad-
venturist devices, sneak attacks,
fifth columns, on advancing the
cause of capitalism under the
name of socialism, on waging
war in the name of peace.

Since, as he acknowledges,
the Soviet Union was probably
aware of niuch of the scenario,
Kahn asserts: “from the Soviet
leaders’ point of view the case

Li

The Manual coupling of space-
ships Soyuz-4 and Soyuz-5 was
carried out successfully January
16th. This happened when the
ship were flying over the terri-
tory of the Soviet Union, when
Soyuz-4 was making the 34th

revolution and Soyuz-5, the
18th revolution round the earth.

Before coupling, the crews of
both spaceship checked on the
shipboard systems the state of
which was reported to earth,
the automatic closing in of the
ships began, as a result of which
the distance between ships re-
duced to 100 metres.

After that Vladimir Shatalov,
the pilot of spaceship Soyuz-4,
went over to manual control
and, manoeuvring spaceship
Soyuz-4 docked with spaceship
Sayuz-5. After the docking there
took place a mechanical en-
gagement of the ships, their
riding linkup and the intercon-
nection of electric circuits. In
the close-in, docking and coup-
ling stages all the systems of
the ships functioned normally.
Thus, the world’s first experi-
mental space station with four
crew compartments providing
conditions for carrying out a
broad complex of experiments
and research jobs, as well as for
work and comfortable rest, was
assembled and started function-

for intervention was on balance
an overpowering one. . . armed
intervention was necessary by
August.”

Having self-criticized his er-
roneous earlier appraisal, Kahn
now makes a fresh error. He
says that following the Czecho-
slovak crisis, “.. . the Politburo
has already made a decision for
isolationism.” Soviet influence
in the world communist move-
ment and in the “third world”
will decline sharply. The Soviet
Union will turn Slavophile, and
“reject” Europe and its culture.

Starting from such a premise,
the American imperialists, of
course, would feel free to go on
rampage against progressive
forces everywhere else in the
world—against Cuba, against
Asian and African peoples.

This is wishful thinking by
the inveterate Soviet-haters. The
events in Czechoslovakia in no
way change the Soviet policy of
continually broadening and ex-
tending the U.S.S.R.’s relations
and cooperation with countries
in all parts of the world, the
policy of peaceful coexistence
with states of different social
svstems, The renewed evidence
of firmness in principle, com-

Herman Kahn

bined with restraint and hum
nitarianism in tactics shown |
the U.S.S.R. in Czechoslovak
will increase the interest

states of varying social syster
in further developing friend
relations with the U.S.S.R.,

cooperating with the Sovi
Union in disarmament a
peace-making schemes.

Many progressives say that
there had been a real danger |
counterrevolution in Czechos}
vakia, intervention would ha
been necessary. But, they sa
there was no such danger, <
they haven't seen evidence of|

Well, now they have it fro
the monster’s mouth.

-up In space

ing in a round-the-earth orbit.
Telephone communication has
been established inside the sta-
tion, between its compartments.

For the further fulfilment of
the flight program, the orbital
space station was orientated by
Boris Volynov, the pilot of
Soyuz-5. The processes of clos-
ing in and docking were telecast
to the earth by means of outer
television cameras.

Vladimir Shatalov reported
that all the systems of the sta-
tion showed normal operation.
The parameters of the micro-
climate in the compartments
are within the preset limits. The
cosmonauts feel fine.

The spaceship was visible dis-
tinctly on the screen. It grew
larger and larger, as if it was
heading towards the viewers.
Finally, the ships touched each
other. Wide-angle object-glasses
were switched on before the
contacting of the ships, and
part of Soyuz-4 became visible.

“All is fine”, said Vladimir
Shatalov at the time of contact-
ing. A cheerful and_ satisfied
voice was heard from the earth:
“All is coming normally, all is
fine”. Applause was heard too.

Then came the voice of Sha-
talov, commander of Soyuz-4.
“T have got right into the socket
which I aimed at. Alignment of

|
Cosmonauts (left to right)—Alexei Eliseev, Yevgeny Khrunov, Viadimir Shatalov and Boris Volynot |

the ships is taking place”, A:
other voice came from space
“The cosmonauts are. shakin
hands”,

“Welcome, Baikal”.

“Welcome, Amur”.

The viewers heard the cop
versations between the com
manders of the spaceships an
you and have at least foun
jubillant voices:

“I have long been looking {¢
you. Everything came out as
was on the simulator”. |

“I see even the sign of th,
ship”.

The ground centre receives
the report of the cosmonauts: ,

“The ships have almost align
ed and are not moving in reli
tion to each other. The closingt
in continues”. !

“All is well. We congratulati
you on the success,” the earl
replied. ‘

The ground centre gave th
first assignment to the spal
station which had been set ul
in the eyes of the viewers
“work according to schedule.” t

The crew of the station fulf
filled the program of the furthel
experimental work. A. reliablt
radio communication was maith
tained with the cosmonauts. tf

Both ships landed safely itt
the Soviet Union. t

i