2 RRR i : FEATURES — Reagan’s charges of Soviet ‘cheating unsubstantiated, say control experts | By FRED WEIR American ultra-conservatives have been claiming for years that the USSR “‘cannot be trusted” to live up to treaty obligations, and that it is therefore useless to negotiate in many parts of the government that because of the need for new weapons. - weiere are going to need testing and perhaps €V™ testing above the 150 kiloton limit for a lone time to come”. even be eligible to be considered as a possi- [tis Forward taxed System ble violation of the ABM Treaty until it is |itw | ih. completed and put into operation. 1RBM The Reagan administration has made no |itinv — suis attempt to conceal itsowncontemptforthe [cic with them. The Reagan administration has now dropped all pretence of commitment to arms control, and has joined this dubious and insupportable bandwagon. With much media fanfare, the administration has just released a report which purports to “docu- ment” several specific instances of Soviet “cheating” on arms control agreements. The charges are not surprising in them- selves. It is inevitable that disagreements and squabbles over interpretation will arise between parties to complex strategic agree- ments. It was for just this reason that the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was set up by the U.S. and the USSR to ~ monitor compliance with the SALT treaties. The SCC meets twice a year in Geneva, and provides a forum in which differences and complaints relating to arms control treaties can be dealt with by experts from both sides. The record shows that every dispute that has ever been taken to the SCC has been satisfactorily resolved. In 1980 a Pentagon statement said that “Soviet com- pliance performance under the 14 arms con- trol agreements signed since 1959 has been good... We raised a number of issues with the Soviets in SALT — as they did with us — but in every case the activity in ques- tion either ceased or subsequent informa- tion clarified the situation and allayed our concern.” What is truly astounding is that the Rea- gan administration has made no move whatsoever to take its current accusation to the SCC, although it has had ample oppor- ‘tunity to do so. Instead, Washington has chosen to launch a massive propaganda campaign, placing a string of unsubstan- tiated and irresponsible allegations before a public which-is hardly equipped to judge them. The only conceivable point of this exercise is to discredit and repudiate the arms control process itself. The hypocrisy is breathtaking. Reagan has already denounced the SALT II Treaty as “fatally flawed”, and the U.S. is quite openly developing a number of new wea- pons that will destroy the last semblance of binding arms control. The charges in the present report, therefore, have the ring of midnight calling the kettle black. Moreoever, the allegations are dubious at best. Examined closely, they don’t appear to describe clear violations at all. This odd lack of clarity may offer some clue as to why Reagan is reluctant to take these complaints to the SCC, and prefers to trumpet them to the media. ® The charge that the Soviet Union is building an “anti-ballistic missile radar sys- tem” relates to a large radar installation seen to be under construction in south- central! Siberia. If indeed this radar is meant to coordinate a ballistic missile defence net- work, as Reagan claims; there are some problems. : First, it is in the wrong location to fulfill such a function. Second, there should be several such rad-. ars, not just one, since it is inconceivable that a single installation could cover the entire USSR from nuclear attack. Finally, no other anti-ballistic missile hardware — such as ABM missile sites — are seen being constructed in association with this radar. It is probable, as the Soviets themselves say, that this radar installation is part of their space program, intended to track orbital objects. In any case, it will not 10 e PACIFIC TRIBUNE, FEBRUARY 1, 1984 wars” speech, Reagan announced the launching of a project to build a vast anti- missile laser system in space. According to Gerard Smith, one of the American nego- tiators at the SALT I talks, this Reagan plan is “equivalent to termination of the ABM Treaty”. @ Reagan charges that the Soviets are “developing a second intercontinental bal- listic missile in violation of SALT II”. Under the terms of SALT II, both countries are entitled to one new ICBM each. The US. is testing the MX missile. The USSR has announced that it is developing the SSX25. Reagan, however, claims that the Soviet Union is also testing another ICBM, TheseP IS: Soviet spokesmen have said that the “PLS” is actually an updated version of one of their existing missiles, the SS-13. If true, FBS in Europe es 2 MRV contine Number of SLBM — Submarine-L strategic nuclear MRV 20000 — ALCM Air Grol niches le M Treaty Last March in his “star SSBN — Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine A B . ? "Trident—2” { BM SL = a 15000 + a ® @ @ “MX"ICBM @ a IRBM “Pershing—2” oMk—-12A"4 GLCM MIRV @ M ALcN@ 10000 4 2 AY My, "Trident—1" { SEBM USA MIRV ICBM 4 wy + 9 SLBM ig a MIRV 5000 SLBM : 1970 1980 peo 1945 1950 : 1960 Soviet activity is completely legitimate, and could not conceivably be a violation of SALT II. In any case, everyone agrees that the so-called “PLS” has only been tested five or six times. Under the terms of SALT II, the definition of ‘ta second new missile” depends upon technical criteria applied to the last 12 of 25 separate tests of the missile. So, the “PLS” will have to be tested some 20 more time before it becomes even a poten- tial violator of SALT II. The U.S. for its part, is quite openly planning a second new ICBM. The Reagan administration is committed to building large numbers of mobile, single-warhead “Midgetman” missiles to supplement the coming MX deployment. ® Another charge is that the Soviets are “encrypting” vital data concerning their missile tests. SALT II permits the encoding of some information but Article 15 prohib- its the encrypting of telemetric data where this “impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty”. The ques- tion of whether or not the Soviets are encod- ing critical telemetric data is so ambiguous that it cannot conceivably be settled in the court of public opinion. If Reagan honestly feels that he has a case, he should put his money where his mouth is, and take the matter to the SCC. © The Reagan administration claims that the USSR has committed “numerous viola- tions” of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban - Treaty, which limits underground nuclear tests to a yield of 150 kilotons. Although this treaty, like SALT II, has yet to be rati- fied by the U.S., both sides have agreed to abide by its provisions. As to the specific charge that the Soviet Union has violated the 150 kiloton limit, Reagan has been unable to find support in the American scientific community. In a recent issue of the authoritative Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (No. 3, 1983) two top - American geologists state bluntly: “We have not found a single instance in which the size of a Soviet test has exceeded the threshold.” ao Moreover, the Reagan administration abandoned the 20-year negotiations toward a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1982. Reagan’s top arms control advisor at the time, Eugene Rostow, explained that the talks were terminated because of a “feeling e Finally, there is the already discredit? charge that the USSR and its allies are usi™! chemical weapons — “yellow rain” — Indochina and Afghanistan. The presett report offers no new evidence for this claifl and relies very heavily on documentatiol presented by the U.S. State Department? two previous reports, in 1981 and 1982. #2 ' problem is that these accusations hav already been torn apart by the most ind® pendent scientists who have examin them. E By far the best and most thorough exam ination of this allegation can be found in# new book by Grant Evans, The Yellow Rainmakers,(Shocken Books, New Yo at all to the charge that the USSR is us! chemical weapons, and that the whole “Y& low rain” story is very probably a cl disinformation campaign designed to fa tate the passage through Congress of # Reagan administration’s own chemical weapons build-up program. __ The very fact that all of these accusatio® are being presented by the Reagan adminh tration in public before any serious attemp has been made to deal with them throug? proper, existing channels within the ati control process, illustrates a central poll Reagan and his people are utterly pre pied with arms buildup. They are devotes of the cult of military power. They have ™ interest whatsoever in pursuing arms col trol, and would prefer to see it dead. _ The escalation of global tensions, and tht total breakdown of arms controls talks # the recent period has brought our world t0 the brink of disaster. Let everyone note th# the buck stops at Ronald Reagan’s door. Fred Weir is a member of the Canaaia Peace Congress and the author of sevel@ pamphlets on disarmament issues. Military authorized ‘to push the button’ Various U.S. presidents from Harry Truman through Lyndon Johnson —and possibly beyond — have “pre-delegated” the authority to use nuclear weapons to military commanders, an article in the Washington-based journal Common Cause has revealed this month. The article, entitled “Whose finger’s on the button?”, cites claims by White House and Pentagon spokesmen denying mil- itary personnel now have advance author- ity to use nuclear weapons, but it also quotes several defence experts who say that some form of pre-delegation may still exist. The notion that U.S. presidents have pre-delegated nuclear authority has added yet another ominious dimension to U.S. nuclear policy since the final measure of control — that political leaders would have to make the awful decision to trigger nuclear destruction — apparently did not exist. The article points to several instances where military leaders had been given advance authority to use nuclear weapons under crisis conditions. Among them: ® In 1957 and 1958, General Earle Par- tridge, former Norad commander, stated that Norad had been given President Dwight Eisenhower’s ‘‘approval to use, without reference to anybody, any wea pons at our disposal if there is a hostile aircraft in the (detection and warning) system.” 4 ’ @ In 1976, retired Navy Vice-Admiral Gerald Miller testified at a congressio hearing that the Norad commander at the time had been pre-delegated the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons — “only under severe restrictions and severe conditions of attack”” — without first hav- ing to check with the president. 7 Despite denials that pre-delegation s exists and. despite the fact that pre- delegation violates Congress’ sole author ity to declare war, the president does have the authority to pre-delegate nuclear deci- sions, the magazine found. Moreover, it says, that right “is virtually without limitation.” The article quotes former SALT Il negotiatior Paul Warnke’s warnings that pre-delegation could lead to a conflict being escalated out of control as the resul of rash decisions being made by mili It also notes that at least some membe of Congress will be raising the issue o pre-delegation at defence subcommitt hearings slated to take place in January. —