Czech Social Democracy |
fights for socialism

By ZDENEK FIERLINGER e

Chairman of the Czechoslovak Social Domocratic Party

F we want to understand the post-war history ol -
must remember its position after the tragedy ot
masses of the people, brought about a strong
Phis. desire grew even
thened by. the successes of Nazism and Fascism,

forces against Fascism.
and democratic trends in our
country as well.

In those days, every sincere
gemocrat and socialist came to
understand that it would be neces-
sary to carry on @ desperate strug-
gle against the reactionaries in
order to preserve the most primi-
tive civic and national rights, and
that it would become necessary to
continue this fight even under-
ground.

During the whole period of war,
too, the conviction grew stronger
that after the Allied victory the
socialist forces would not remain
divided any more, but that, in the

wake of great socialist reforms,
the unity of the working people of ;
town and countryside would be-
come a reality. Especially when it
‘became clear to what great extent
the Soviet Union had contributed
to the Allied victory, and to what
extent the socialist set-up of the
USSR and the patriotism of her
people in their fight against Nazi
Germany were playing their part,
the conviction that it would be
necessary to carry out fundamen-
tal changes in the old social order
and to build real socialism natur-
ally grew stronger, and it was
impossible to conceive this build-
ing of socialism otherwise than
upon the foundation of a unified
socialist movement.

Nevertheless all these plans for
the realization of the political
unity of the working people im-

- mediately after the end of the
war had to be corrected to a cer-
tain extent as a result of the
development in international poli-
tics which at that time still con-
tinued on the basis of the agree-
ment between the Soviet Union
and the U.S.—between Stalin and
Roosevelt.

At that time we were still firm-
ly convinced that it would be pos-
sible to continue Allied coopera-
tion even in peace time, and that
it would be possible to count

countries of urope would be
permitted to find their own solu-
tion for the great contemporary
social and economic problems in
accordance with their possibilities
and special conditions, —

: =

(FBEBRFORE we: de Gpechpo-

- vakia, in agreement with the
president and with all the im-
portant political personalities who
took an active part in the fight for
‘liberation at home and abroad, did
not enter upon a course of radical
- political changes, but returned to
the system of the four traditional
political parties in the Czech
lands, and in Slovakia to the sys-
tem of two political camps, the
Communist so-called
“Democratic” one. In Czechoslo-
-vakia we therefore had after the

armistice six political partics, ©

the conservative Catholic elem-

ents.

So as to give every political par-
ty an adequate possibility of or-
ganizing itself anew and of taking
its part in the new political work
in the liberated country, each par-
ly was accorded an equal share
in the new administration and the
economy of the country, in the
staffing of the various official
posts, in the local, district and
provincial National Committees
and also in the first National As-
sembly. ‘

Besides this, all political parties
united in the so-called National
Front upon the basis of a common
political and economic program
which they undertook to put into
effect immediately. This program
contained a whole number of so-
cial reforms which were also gra-
dually put into practice.

JN this way it seemed that the

cards had been dealt out fairly
among the various political par-
ties, especially if we consider that
after the new great catastrophe to
humanity, the Second World War,
the opinion prevailed in Czecho-
slovakia that it had become neces-
sary to start firmly and decisively
upon the path of socialist con-
struction. The political develop-
ment of the first eighteen months
was peaceful on the whole, and
extremely fruitful, too. Czechoslo-
vakia could truly be called an is-
land of order and peace in Europe.

But already the first general
elections of May 1946 showed that
the old rancor and competition
between the political parties was
growing; that the opposition, hid-
den right from the beginning in
the government and in parlia-
ment, was vigorously reappearing
in the open, and that it was not
hiding its intention of halting and
turning back the successful de-
velopment towards new forms of
economic democracy. The first
elections held in 1946 gave the
Communist and Social Democratic
parties a small majority in parlia-
ment, Both parties worked toge-
ther very well, and thus the dem-
ocratic development of the Czech-
oslovak Republic seemed to be
fully ensured.

As time proceeded, however,
world reaction began to mobilize
its forces and opened up its ag-
gressive policy towards the Soviet
Union and towards all countries
and states that consciously and
convincedly respected the growing
influence of the Soviet Union and
wanted to cooperate with her.
This, of course, had its influence
also upon the Czechoslovak oppo-
sition forces who were recruited
in the main from the circles of
the old reactionaries and of big
business, and who were unwilling
to accept the socialist reforms
which we were able to put into

‘The tension grew al

Czechoslovak Social Democracy, we
Munich which, among the broad
desire to unite all socialist and progressive
stronger when the reactionaries, streng-
attempted »

to suppress all progressive
and reached a peak in 1947, at the
time of the declaration of the so-
called Truman Doctrine, and later
of the Marshall Plan. In the gov-
ernment and in parliament inci-
dents and conflicts were caused
intentionally, and a very crude
propaganda was carried on, aim-
ed mainly, against the cooperation
between the Social Democrats and
the Communists.

The leadership of Social Dem-
ocracy at that time was aware
of its grave responsibility and
knew well that without an agree-
ment and cooperation with the
Communist Party, which in the
elections of 1946 had gained about
40 percent of all votes in the Czech
provinces, there would be no

peace in the state, and that the ©

further successful development of
the republic would not be ensured.
On the contrary: the leadership of
the Social Democratic Party was
convinced that by a conflict with
the Communists a full-scale civil
war would be caused, and that all
attempts at maintaining the dem-
ocratic development would fail in
the end. |

At the Brno Party Congress,
with the help of untruthful pro-
paganda and with the active sup-
port of some leading functionaries
of the party it was made possible
to change the leadership of social
democracy, but they failed to car-
ty a resolution which would have

changed the policy which the old

Social Democratic leadership had
consistently defended. Neverthe-
less even these changes in the
leadership of the Social Democrat-
ic Party increased the inner poli-
tical tension still further, because
the attempts at creating a bour-
geois anti-Communist and there-
for anti-Socialist camp with the
help of Social Democracy were
too evident.

. e

S the general election of 1948

came nearer, the tension in
the leftist camp grew, not only
among the Communists but also
among all sincere Social Dem-
ocrats, and the cheek of the re-
actionaries also grew accordingly.
By the resignation of the minis-

tens of the three opposition par--

ties, the National Socialist, the
Czech People’s and the Slovak
Democratic parties, a reconstruc-
tion of the government was to be
forced even before the elections in
order to weaken the progressive
forces before the elections were
held and to prove to public opin-
ion that the Left was weak and
helpless. The Right expected great
successes from this in the coming
elections. In connection with the
developments in international
politics these attempts heralded
nothing good.
€

JT was natural that the masses of

the workers, who for a long
time had shown dissatisfaction
and uneasiness about the develop-
ments at home and abroad, did

*

the time not remain quiet. It is also

KLEMENT GOTTWALD
President of Czechoslovakia

understandable that this did not
influence the Communists alone,
but also the policy of the left
wing of Social Democracy, which
despite a certain reversal at the
Brno Congress had remained very
strong and influential, and to
which belonged the best and most
authoritative functionaries of the
party. The February events also
showed that the intentions of the
opposition failed as soon as the
masses of the workers were mob-
ilized. There was no violence and
no interference by force. On the
contrary, it can rather be said
that the reactionaries, trying to
turn the clock back, were indeed
amazed at the terrific power of
the progressive forces, \which
showed itself at the Prague Con-
gress of the Works Councils in
such a convincing manner.

In the leadership of Social Dem-
ocracy there was a sharp discus-
sion as to whether the party
should join the resigning ministers
of the three opposition parties, or
whether it should proclaim its
solidarity with the government
led by Communist Premier Gott-
wald. The right wing of Social
Democracy. did not succeed in
convincing the party. On the con-
trary, at the point when the
stronger left wing demanded sol-
idarity with the Gottwald govern-
ment even if this was to mean a
split, the right wing gave way
and informed the prime minister
that the party would remain in
the government.

Thereby the necessary parlia-
mentary majority for the recon-
struction of the government was
assured and the president gave
his agreement to the reconstruc-
tion proposals. The crisis was
overcome, but it had the logical
result that the opposition was re-
moved from the government, that
a new crisis now arose in the op-
position parties, in the National
Socialist, People’s and Slovak
Democratic parties. The long-sup-
pressed hatred of the broad
masses of the working people for
the methods of the reactionaries
naturally showed itself on this oc-
casion,

The so-called Action Commit-

tees came into being everywhere,
which carried out a purge of the
administration and of national
economy of opposition
ents. A new reborn National Front
was formed, consisting of the rep-
resentatives of the political par-
ties which fully recognized the
new government.

elem-

The original leadership of So-
cial Democracy also got rid of its
right-wing elements and reached
an agreement with the leadership
of the Communist Party about its
cwn independent course at the
coming elections. Nevertheless the
aims at reaching a real organiza-
tional unity were very strong in-
deed among the working classes,
and manifested themselves vigor
ously at many places,

It was difficult to count upon
the necessary peace if the social
ist parties carried on separately
and if, especially in the days be
fore the elections, the necessary
further political competition were
to continue, In reality all reasdns
for a further differentiation i?
the socialist camp had ceased t?
exist, because as a result of thé
full nationalization of productio®
and as a result of the implement
ation of new and far-reaching 5°
cialist reforms all reasons whicb
may have existed before for thé
separation of the Communist 2!
Social Democratic parties came t?
an end.

There cannot be any real dif
ference of program between 5°
cialist parties where productio?
has been fully nationalized. OP
the contrary, the great tasks COP”
fronting us by the full national
ization of production can only be
fulfilled by common efforts. THES?
are the reasons which led Us Me
accept the principle of a
list of candidates, a principle
which was also willingly accepted
by the other political parties, #
these are also the reasons which
called for a decision as to whether
the old differentiation in the 5°
cialist opamp should continue as
exist. k “

We decided to unite both ey
ties, and under the circums’"
it is quite understandable ©"
this unification ‘is coming
upon the organizational and idee
logical principles as accepted by
the Communist Party, whic? too
‘our country is numerically vw:
stronger and whose cadres
functionaries are far better »
up and organized. ; 4

I am convinced that this
operation in the new united
will be good and fruitful a4
we will build together @ ™
popular democratic move”
which will succeed in puilding
our country a real at bai
mutual trust and cooperatio®:
which will therefore not
sincerely. socialist, but Wit
represent a better and
fect form of democracy