oreo aTT0 Os ATT OTT elie ee mo In preparation for a major inter- national conference being held in Lis- bon, Portugal, March 25-27, the follow- ing analysis of the struggle in southern Africa was provided during an interview by the Tribune with Yusuf Saloojee, Chief Representative to Canada of the African National Congress (South Afri- ca). * * * : For quite some time we have been dis- cussing the question of Southern Africa mainly from the standpoint of the strug- gle for national liberation. And, particu- larly since the independence of Zim- babwe, we have been talking of concen- trating both in southern Africa and inter- nationally on the question of national liberation struggles in South Africa and Namibia. However, the struggle has escalated to such an extent that U.S. imperialism under the Reagan administration has be- come quite concerned about South Afri- ca’s stability and the future of the entire southern African region and has now de- clared it considers southern Africa a part of its global economic and military Strategy. This results directly from the crisis the present South African regime faces, in- dicated in a secret CIA report which was revealed by Trans-Africa organization in Washington in late 1982. The report says that the situation in South Africa is far more critical than the South African government has reported; that it has co- vered up a number of acts of sabotage carried out by the African National Con- gress and that the ANC has mass popular support. Sore This fact, plus the escalating armed struggle being carried out by the military wing of the Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, has forced the U.S. to come up with a new policy which it calls ‘constructive en- gagement’’. New U.S. Policy Here is how U.S. vice president George Bush described this policy to the government of Mozambique. He said the U.S. considers southern Africa extreme- ly important to U.S. economic and mili- tary interests and that it will not permit a revolutionary change in South Africa. Bush announced that ‘Washington favors ‘‘peaceful change” in South Af- rica and thus is concerned about stability in the region. He warned that the U.S. would never permit the success of armed revolutionary struggle inside.South Afri- ca. And he made clear the U.S. considers the struggle being waged by SWAPO in - Namibia and the ANC in South-Africa as the source of the region’s instability. Bush said while his government ‘‘de- plores”’ the system of apartheid in South Africa, the U.S. recognizes the present regime is the government in authority today and as such can not stand idle while it is attacked internally. He said the U.S. supports the idea that SWAPO and ANC are able to carry out their armed struggle only because of aid received from the front line states and that South Africa has a right to carry out military operations against these states. Bush urged acceptance of the U.S. “constructive engagement” policy, that is, to bring about change in South Africa by persuasion and cooperation with the regime and through negotiations be- tween the front line states and South Af- rica. He proposed the U.S. would play the role of honest broker in such a pro- cess. - The U.S. argued that such a policy would decrease the danger of military confrontation between powerful South Africa and its neighbors. This, it says, would guarantee stability in the region, thereby increasing the possibility of International Monetary Fund loans to — the front line states... This is the U.S. message to all front PACIFIC TRIBUNE—APRIL 1, 1983—Page 8" line African states. It is accompanied by extreme political pressure and aims to achieve one single objective — to in- crease the life of the racist South Afri- can regime. It is no accident that in January, 1983, the Afro-American Institute sponsored a large conference which took place in Zimbabwe with a powerful U.S. delega- tion present made up of government and business people. And it is interesting to note the U.S. group spent several days in South Africa prior to the conference. While in South Africa, the U:S. delegation engaged in ‘‘constructive en- gagement’”’ dialogue with the aim of finding an alternative to the ANC be- ~ cause the ANC rejects a policy of co- operation with the racist regime. What the U.S., of course, does not say, is that the threat to peace in the region is not caused by the liberation struggle but by the South African mili- . tary regime’s repression inside its bor- ders and its economic and military threats against its neighbors. We have seen the U.S. create a power- ful Israel to act as its policeman in the Middle East. Similarly, in the name of protecting its strategic interests it has de- clared South Africa its policeman in southern Africa. Strategic Blunder Historically, imperialism has always made strategic errors because its nature is deceitful and evil. In the case of south- ern Africa it is inevitable imperialism will make another major strategic blunder. The policeman it has chosen, while he may look immaculately dressed and be well armed, is totally rotten inside. Inside South Africa the struggle has escalated to unprecedented levels. 1982 was declared the Year of Unity in Action by the ANC and was the year of the ANC’s 70th anniversary. At the beginning of 1982 the ANC pledged to intensify the armed struggle and increase the political mass resistance of the people. It is clear this objective has largely been met>The students who rose up in Soweto in 1976 today continue to be engaged in a sustained battle against the regime and the quality of their struggle is politically much higher. In the forefront of the struggle are the Black workers. This is the case despite efforts from both inside the country and abroad to divide the Black trade union movement. From abroad the Inter- national Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the-AFL-CIO have poured large sums of money into an effort to convince the Black unions to stick to economic issues and exclude ‘‘politics”’ ‘from their demands. An AFL-CIO delegation in. 1982 to South Africa had this specific task as ef- forts carried out by the liberation move- ment to unite the Black trade union movement were beginning to show signs of success. The AFL-CIO group in- cluded such people as Irving Brown a well-known CIA agent and Nana Mahomo, a South African working for the African-American Labor Commit- tee, known also to have CIA connections. aes Their efforts failed because the major ity of the Black trade unions refused to meet with the delegation and those who did made it clear they would not accept interference in the internal affairs of their unions. Struggle Increases Our women, in the past two years have increased their role in the struggle. They have been organizing around ‘‘bread and "| butter’ issues in the Black townships as well as being an integral part in the major thrust of the anti-government opposition. Throughout the country women have formed into committees that deal with rent increases, food price increases and also assist the victims of apartheid and their families. For many years we witnessed a lack of support for the struggle from the re- ligious community, especially the Christ- ian churches. Today increasing numbers _ of Christian churches have become allies of this mass democratic front. The re- gime out of fear has introduced legisla- tion making it practically impossible for public meetings to be held, and now churches are becoming our political platform. 1982 saw an increase.in both the quan- tity and quality of the ANC’s armed con- ~ frontation with the regime. Despite intimidation of our political cadres and detention of some military cadres, the armed struggle has escalated. It is this internal situation that has made the regime, U.S. multi-nationals ~ and the U.S. government seriously con- cerned. It is the threat of internal security that pushes South Africa into a policy of military and economic destabilization of _its neighboring states. In 1980 the South African Defence Force raided ANC homes in Mozam- bique. The killing of ANC cadre did not stop the armed struggle. On Dec. 9, 1982, under the pretext that ANC military headquarters are in Lesotho, South Afri- can forces carried out an Israeli-type raid against ANC refugees and Lesotho citizens: South Africa’s Minister of Defence then announced that its raids on ‘‘ANC military headquarters’’ has crippled the ANC military capacity. That this claim is a lie is evidenced by the fact that im- mediately after the raid the ANC carried _ liberation movements. out four military actions agains Africa’s major nuclear plant at Ki ANC Stronger These actions and others since that South African military act’ the front line states will not dest ANC. The fact is that the ANC bases in the front line states. Its? in Cape Town, Pretoria, Johanm Durban and throughout South J South Africa’s role in ‘‘const engagement”’ is to conduct a © with a number of front line states: with the government of Mozambiq™ demanded all ANC personnel te" forcefully removed to the northem@® of the country. : It met with the government of BB and proposed Angola withdraw port of SWAPO in neighboring in exchange for a cease fire. response was negative. South Africa has been concell its attention on Zimbabwe There are two training camps fi babweans inside South Africa contain those working in South 4 mines and others who have ™ South Africa illegally. J Many are trained and sent bat®,, Zimbabwe to carry out acts of 0 which can then be claimed as bel petrated by the forces of Nkom' babwe African People’s Union ( thus igniting an internal conflict be™ ZAPU and the government. ys South Africa’s role in the % invented policy of ‘‘const! engagement” is to pressure, it dialogue, the front line stat economic ‘and political submissi9 when such pressure fails, it res? military force. To date it appears neither the tion movements nor the front liné > have acceeded to the U.S.-Sout pressures. 3 We have seen that despite a com’ campaign by the United States and Africa during November, Decem? January, the front line states res by calling a meeting, togethe Lesotho and Nigeria, held in Ta™ which declared its continued 2™®© creased support for the ANC SWAPO. | “a This was followed by a meeting © Southern African Development COP tions (SADEC) in Lesotho wher front line states agreed to inc! economic cooperation with the ob) of decreasing their economic dence on South Africa. What of the Future Bush’s diplomatic offensive has resulted in a hardening of attitudes ”” front line states and Africa as 4 toward U.S. policy. It means th can see an escalation of military-cO™, in southern Africa in the future backed by the U.S. It is no accident, for exampl South African Foreign ‘Ministe! Botha announced following Bush that the U.S. was prepared to “a South Africa with the Cruise mis§ Everything must be done to ral level of world consciousness to PX the turning of southern Africa into? zone. In this regard, a conference ™. darity with the front line states 2 t national liberation movements will’ place in Lisbon, March 25-27. | - The conference has the endors4 all front line states, by th secretary-general, the UN Coun¢ Namibia, the UN Special Com. Against Apartheid and the World CO™ of Churches amongst others. _ U: Its objective is to bring to light ” policies in the region and exposé » African atrocities and its destabili af policy and to mobilize world supp! the front line states and the n4!