|
| __ The following is reprinted from a Soviet
J ™agazine, Asia and Africa Today.

t us recall how events developed. By
© spring of 1964 the patriotic forces of
a Vietnam had scored major success-
“S. The anti-popular puppet regime was
ble to withstand the pressure of the
Brot, militarily or politically. In this
enn. Washington, which was giving
peo every possible assistance, crystal-
ia its plans for an air war against the
‘~*Mocratic Republic -of Vietnam (DRV)
a an invasion of South Vietnam by land
| {0rces,

“ Aware that it would inevitably have to
ee all the socialist countries, Washington
aited for an opportune moment. In the

zine 1971, there is decisive evidence of the
ct that in planning aggression against the
ed amese people, the imperialists count-
heavily on Peking’s divisive activities
: ee world revolutionary moyement. In a
| “Able to the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon on:
es Tch 20, 1964, President Lyndon B. John-
sen Said that the USA was expecting a
| xcisive clash between the Chinese and
| | Nee Communist parties in the immediate
| , ‘ure and that it would be more practical
te steps against the DRV after, not
Ore, that clash.

‘ eking was not found wanting. In the
3 tamer of the same year, the Chinese lead-
w Peremptorily rejected the CPSU Cen-
tal Committee’s proposal for an interna-
| ha conference to-examine their dif-
; hee’: Almost simultaneously, U.S. war-
PS provoked the so-called Tonkin inci-

dec time, Peking kept up a flow of bellicose
its larations and vociferous assurances of

emphatic support for the Vietnamese
jl: these were nothing but words. In
ytuary 1965, Mao Tse-tung informed
ist , through the American journal-

Edgar Snow, that the Chinese would

ricans. :

At that time, U.S. aircraft carriers were
ang ue towards the shores of Vietnam,
American marines were landing in
Va Vietnamese ports. Whatever the
Tdstick, Mao Tse-tung’s statement could
“3 ed be interpreted as direct encourage-
it as of aggression. That was exactly how
Said: seen by the New York Times, which
hon, cu March 2, 1965, after the Mao pro-
Usa coment appeared in the press, that the
- ereti Now felt free to strike, at its own dis-
land or” from the air, from the sea or on

at any objective in North Vietnam:

WORD MaGazINE

Tet Pentagon documents made public in

tent off the shores of theDRV. Although, at.

= war only if they were attacked by —

In April 1965, the Soviet Government
suggested to Peking that the USSR, the
DRV and the PRC hold a summit without
delay to discuss the question of coordinated
action by the three states to build up quick-
ly an effective system of anti-aircraft, de-

fenses in North Vietnam. Entirely disre-_

garding the position of the DRV, the Peking
leaders rejected this proposal.

The Maoists took every opportunity to
flaunt their obstruction to the continuing
efforts of the Soviet Union and other social-
ist countries to form a united anti-imperial-
ist front in support of the Vietnamese peo-
ple.In April 1967,the Peking newspaper
Jenmin jihpao cynically wrote: “Needless
to say, we will under no circumstances
agree to united action. Such is our stand
today, and such it will be in future.’’ In-
deed, theSoviet Government’s innumerable
calls for united action, calls that were
dictated by a sense of responsibllity for the
destiny of the Vietnamese people and by
proletarian internationalism, were turned
down out of hand by the Peking leaders
throughout the imperialist aggression in
Vietnam.

Encountering heroic resistance from
the Vietnamese patriots, the U.S. military
began escalating the: war. The fighting
drew nearer to the PRC’s frontiers. How-
ever, at every new phase of the escalation,
Peking gave the aggressors to understand,
in one way or another, that they need not
fear China’s reaction, that it would not

interfere in the conflict and would not take

united action with the Soviet Union.

This policy played into the hands of
the interventionists, viciously subverting
the Vietnamese people’s struggle for free-
dom and independence. It was denounced
by the countries of the socialist commun-
ity, the Communist and Workers’ parties
and the whole of progressive world opinion.

In the long run, the Maoists went so far
as to begin preventing the Vietnamese
people, who were fighting a heavily armed
aggressor, from receiving assistance from

‘their true friends, notably the Soviet Union.

In order to cover these actions Peking
propaganda sought to make use of the slo-
gan: ‘‘reliance on one’s own resources.”

One cannot,-of course, deny the impor-
tance of one’s own resources and their
correct utilization by a pedple fighting for
liberation. However, to presume that the

people of a small country should refuse

assistance from their friends in a war
against the most powerful imperialist
state only abets their enemy.

Events showed that the Workers’ Party
of Vietnam and the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam were able to evolve
and implement the only correct revolution-
ary strategy, combining the total national
effort with massive international support.
When the war ended, the leaders of theDRV
and the Republic of South Vietnam stated

on innumerable occasions that the victory -

in the struggle against imperialist aggres-
sion was won mainly through the heroic
efforts of the entire Vietnamese people
but that, at the same time, it was insepar-
able from the all-sided assistance rendered
by the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries, by all progressive forces
throughout the world.

Failing to isolate the Vietnamese pa-
triots from their true friends, Peking
endeavored to hinder the transportation
of Soviet military and other supplies that
moved to Vietnam across China.

The Soviet Government time and again
demanded that the Chinese remove their
artificial barriers to the transit of supplies.
‘However, Peking persisted in its policy of
obstruction even when the situation in
Vietnam had seriously deteriorated. For
instance, in 1972 when Haiphong was block-
ed by mines, the question arose of using
South China ports for unloading Soviet
ships. Every minute counted, but the Chin-
ese authorities remained silent for a long
time, and when they finally agreed they
organized countless provocations against
Soviet seamen.

The Peking leaders speak of their assi-

stance to the Vietnamese people. Indeed,
some material assistance was rendered by
China. But this can in no way be compared
with the assistance given by the Soviet
Union. Then, in the face of the unparalleled
worldwide campaign of solidarity with
Vietnam, when support for the heroic
struggle of the Vietnamese people became
the criterion of a true revolutionary spirit,
of the conscience and honor of every per-
son, the Chinese leaders had no alternative
but to help the DRV in order to “‘save
face’ in the eyes of world public opinion,
particularly in the Third World, to whose
leadership Peking has been laying claim
for a long time. :

Regarding the political support given :
Vietnam by the Maoists, it boiled down to .

hollow declarations. Peking sent no rep-
resentatives to the collective meetings of
leaders of socialist countries and Commun-
ist Workers’ parties, which unanimously
supported the just struggle of the peoples
of Indochina.

The Peking leaders showed their hypo-
crisy by their attitude to the political set-
tlement in Vietnam. Talks between repre-

sentatives of the DRV and the USA, which -

got under way in a Paris suburb in May
1968, were welcomed by progressive world
opinion as a major achievement of the
Vietnamese people, who compelled the
aggressor to seek a peaceful settlement of
the conflict. The countries of the socialist
community, the Communist and Workers’
parties, declared their wholehearted sup-
port for the policy pursued by the leaders
of the DRV and the National Liberation

Front of South Vietnam.

But the news that the talks had com-
menced was received by Peking leaders
with undisguised disapproval. The Chinese
press maintained a’ total silence. On the
day the DRV delegation arrived in Paris,
the Maoists recalled their correspondents
from France. Observers estimated that in
1968,reports on Vietnam carried by the
Chinese press dropped to one-tenth the
usual number. The Maoist press reported
nothing, not even so important a political
initiative of the South Vietnamese patriots
as the 10-point proposal that later underlay
the Paris Agreement. Slogans supporting
the. Vietnamese people disappeared from
the streets of Peking and other Chinese

cities. In the documents of the 9th Con-_
gress of the CPC (April 1969), the problem .

of Vietnam received only two and a half
equivocally worded lines. In the Chinese
press and in official statements, it was

_ openly declared that the Vietnamese could

count on support from Peking only if they
continued ‘“‘doggedly to fight a prolonged
war.”

What lay behind the Maoist campaign
of pressure and blackmail against the
DRV, a development unprecedented in
relations between socialist countries?

As envisioned by the Chinese leaders,
Vietnam — and then the whole of Indo-

china — had to illustrate Peking’s pseudo-

revolutionary theories, particularly the
“protracted -people’s war’’ doctrine. They
tried to attribute the military victories of
the Vietnamese patriots over the aggres-
sors to the infallibility and universality of
the ‘‘thought of Mao Tse-tung.’’ They used
the vast revolutionary experience of the
Vietnamese Communists in their brazen
efforts to impose this ‘‘thought”’ on the pro-
gressive forces of the Asian, African and
Latin American countries. ;
Moreover, Peking would have liked to
turn Indochind into an arena of conflict
between the world’s two major nuclear
powers while reserving to itself the role of
a spectator ‘‘sitting on a mountain and
watching two tigers come to grips.”

That explains why the DRV leadership’s

decision, which led to the conflict’s transi-
tion to the stage of political settlement,
evoked a frankly hostile reaction from the
Maoists. Peking had no interest in the spe-
cifics of the struggle waged by the Viet-
namese patriots. It was indifferent to the
destiny of the Vietnamese revolution and
the vital interests of the Vietnamese peo-

ple. Vietnam was but one of innumberable

examples which show that, for the sake of

‘their great-power ambitions, the Maoists

are prepared to sacrifice both the libera-
tion movement and entire nations.

The attitude of the Chinese leaders to
the Vietnamese people’s long heroic strug-

- gle for freedom and independence mirrors

their chauvinism and hegemonistic ambi-
tions on the world scene.

PACIFIC TRIBUNE—JUNE 20, 1975—Page 5