World

Recent weeks have seen an upsurge of
political activity throughout the USSR,
some of it very hopeful, some extremely
disturbing. Across ‘the political spectrum
there is an awareness that the configura-
tions’ of power and social order are chang-
ing decisively and that this presents both
challenge and opportunity to all.

This is a period of transition, from one
institutional framework to another. Depend-
ing on how one selects and reads the evi-
dence, it is easy to make a convincing case
that what is going on here is the total disin-
tegration and collapse of the Soviet system.
Conversely, with different selections and
emphasis, one can just as easily argue that it
is renewal and rebirth.

_ In fact both processes are unfolding dia-
lectically in the midst of crisis and upheaval.
Amid the shattering structures of the old
status quo, and all of the associated turmoil,
we can see the outlines of a new level of
stability and social consensus gradually
beginning to form. The materials of the
Soviet past and present are being shaped
— sometimes violently — into an entity
which will remain in many fundamental
and continuous ways the same society, yet
also be radically changed.
| Both sides of the equation have been very
' much in evidence in the tumultuous events
| of the past few weeks: disintegration and
reconstruction — with the attendant risk of
chaos looming prominently at each sharp
and slippery turn.

FROM
MOSCOW

| Quite large opposition demonstrations in
major Soviet cities have shown, optimisti-
_ cally, that the population is increasingly
fearless and prepared to participate in mass,
peaceful political actions. At the same time
there is a potentially destabilizing edge to
some of this, a threat of snowballing extrem- °
ism which derives, in the first place, from
inexperience, from the Soviet heritage of
nonexistent independent social mobiliza-
tion and undeveloped political culture.

The Feb. 25’s opposition rally in Moscow
was vastly smaller than advertised — its
appeal almost certainly deflated by the
sweeping political changes introduced by
the recent CPSU Central Committee
plenum — but it was far more bitter,
| intense and confrontational than anything
_ that has gone before. There is a certain
logical dynamic at work here, as ambitious
| opposition figures manoeuvre desperately
_ to outflank Gorbachev, but there is danger
as well.

One danger lies in the de facto alliance of
the ultra-left and the ultra-right, a spectacle
familiar to political people everywhere.
(Actually, the terms “‘left” and “right” in
their Soviet context require volumes of
explanation. One might speak briefly, and
not altogether flippantly, of a Napoleonic-
Thatcherite left and a Stalinist-Dostoyev-
skian right). It was astonishing, and more
than a little disturbing, at the Feb. 4’s huge
rally in Moscow, to see the neo-fascist thugs
of Pamyat sharing the street — apparently
comfortably — with the militantly Wes-
ternophile Democratic Union, and all of
them billing themselves as ‘democratic
social forces.”

From this volatile mix trends are emerg-
ing that could threaten the fragile Soviet
_ democratization. One threat can be vividly

observed in radical “‘leftist”” poseur Boris
' Yeltsin’s rapid metamorphosis into an old-
_ fashioned nationalist demagogue.
| Another can be seen in the demands of
} more refined intellectual oppositionists,

|
|
|

Politics changing face of the USSR

such as Gavril Popov, who seem to be uni-
ting under the demand that the Soviet
government be dissolved in favour of
round-table talks with the opposition: an
almost mindless attempt to conjure a GDR
or Czechoslovak situation into existence.
(The critical difference here is that the Soviet
Congress of People’s Deputies already is a
democratically-elected parliament with full
powers to recall the government through a
vote of non-confidence if it sees fit. The
escalating efforts by frustrated intellectual
“radicals” to find a route to power around,
or over the dead body of the Congress of
People’s Deputies, is where the real danger
lies — and not in the much-touted possibil-
ity of a “conservative coup” by the army,
the KGB, Yegor Ligachev, or whoever.)
Most problematic of all is the failure of
the CPSU to live up to its own sweeping and
visionary decisions and become a fighting,

Mass rally in
Moscow Feb.
25: tumultuous
even
destabilizing
events, but
potentially a
new
consensus.

democratic political party. It has vast
reserves of respect and authority within the
society, it has far and away the most respon-
sible, principled and coherent program, it
certainly has the talent and the resources,
but has so far lacked the will, courage and
conviction to organize politically in its own
right. In its paralysis, the CPSU has ceded
the streets to the opposition, who manage to
create the impression that everyone is
marching against the party. This despite the
fact that most of the people who participate
in demonstrations are clearly doing so in a
spirit of support for perestroika, and many
say they find the alternative leaders on dis-
play distinctly inferior to Gorbachev.

Elections in most Soviet republics, and all
regions and municipalities have brought,
and can be expected over coming weeks to
bring new, often radical or nationalist forces
to power. Lithuania is a case in point, where
candidates backed by the nationalist
movement Sajudis captured over 50 per
cent of the seats in the first round of voting
on Feb. 24, and may be headed for a two-
thirds majority.

Does this mean that Lithuania is on its
way to secession? Perhaps. But then again,
the quality of politics has a way of changing
with power. The headlong rush to inde-
pendence has been the common platform of

an extremely diverse movement united only
in their opposition to Moscow. They have
been able to gloss over their differences with
rhetoric and ignore certain realities just so
long as power was the over-riding goal.

I had an exasperating discussion with a
Sajudis activist recently, who brushed away
questions about economic viability or
geopolitical consequences saying: ‘Inde-
pendence for Lithuania is the only thing
that interests us. We would be happy to
starve for that.” Fine words when you’re a

_Street-fighter but — as Gorbachev knows
better than anyone — no help at all when
those in power have to explain to the people
why it’s not all working out as promised.

Though it is early to say anything with
confidence, and there may well be serious
traumas ahead, there are many reasons to
believe that democracy is going to work in
the USSR. It will bring into the corridors of

power all sorts of vigorous new forces, with
their own ideas and broad social support.
They will find that they cannot wish (or
legislate) historically-evolved social and
economic realities out of existence, and
most of them will eventually learn to work
within those realities, to change them crea-
tively, constructively and democratically.

One small but long overdue step in the
direction of a genuine, law-governed social-
ist state was taken last week by the Moscow
procurator’s office: it laid criminal charges
against the virulently anti-Semitic Russian
nationalist Pamyat society.

For almost three years Soviet authorities
have tolerated this tiny neo-fascist organiza-
tion, which has since mushroomed into sev-
eral interlocking factions. Some say that no
legal action was taken against it because
Pamyat had highly-placed sympathizers,
but it is more likely that officials have
simply been afraid to appear repressive in
the age of glasnost.

Pamyat’s anti-Semitic leaflets and public
provocations are, unlike most of the demo-
cratic activity unfolding in this country, in
clear violation of Soviet law. Now the
organization has finally been charged,
under Section One, Article 74 of the Crimi-
nal Code of the Russian Federation, with
“inciting national and racial hatred and

conflict.”

The incident that prompted this devel-
opment was the publication of Pamyat’s
program to “de-Zionize” the USSR in a
small technical newspaper, Energetik. (The
newspaper is not being prosecuted because
it firmly condemned the program even
though it published it. Like a good deal of
the Soviet press today, it seems that Ener-
getik’s editors thought that “keeping an
open mind” meant being an open sink.)

The Pamyat program declared, among
other things, that “Jews and their relatives
must not be allowed to defend dissertations,
to gain higher education or academic titles.
They must not be allowed to join the Soviet
Communist Party ( ... ) be elected to
Soviets or appointed: to leading party,
government or other posts.”

Although Pamyat is small, even minus-
cule, it has succeeded in terrifying the Soviet

Jewish community out of all proportion.
With sharp and sensitive historical memo-
ries, and now finding it very difficult to get
to the United States, Jews are lining up to
emigrate to Israel in unprecedented num-
bers. Once again we see a weird symbiosis:
for all its “‘anti-Zionist” rhetoric, Pamyat is
making common cause with the Zionists. It
is hard to tell who is doing more to fuel the
wild rumours of pogroms that have been
sweeping the Jewish community. Is it
Pamyat, with its crude, mimeographed anti-
Semitic tracts, or Israel, with its large
underground network and daily radio
broadcasts?

In January, Gorbachev finally came
around to the painful realization that dem-
ocratization is not a smooth road and that
the whole process could be swamped if vio-
lent chauvinists and hatemongers were not
forcibly contained. At the January Central
Committee plenum he argued eloquently
for a much tougher law that would enable
such organizations to be banned outright.
At the time, he surely had certain elements
of the Azerbaijani Popular Front upper-
most in his mind. But let’s hope that the law
will be passed and quickly applied with full
force against Pamyat, potentially the most
dangerous of them all.

Pacific Tribune, March 12, 1990 e 9