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FEATURES

Imi utlook for arms control took a

ie Worse last week as the Rea-

Waited wusttation produced its long-
bachey? Tesponse to Soviet leader Gor-
“stron ae The tenor of the U.S. reply
Tinese) SU88ests that ultra-right hard-

7 me now completely hijacked the
Aa a foreign policy-making

Pre Crucial issue of Star Wars,
es acty 4S not only refused to budge, he
Goth, ally moved backward.
J cuts jn pees proposal called for deep
; Change f €nsive nuclear weapons in ex-
} list a reaffirmation of the Anti-Bal-
7 ter eee (ABM) Treaty for an
TAR Period of 15 to 20 years. The
Vp, °8tY forbids construction and
F Bic. tal testing of ballistic missile de-
| in « tar Wars — weaponry on Earth
J nj a One clause, however, per-
4 Breen, er Side to withdraw from the
) White ptt On six months notice. The
| hich oe has made disturbing noises
1 the Zest its intention to do just that
 j, wear future.

Mitiatie* response to the Gorbachev
| that g, Reagan last week proposed
Fay Star -S. will refrain from deploying
‘ly Wars weapons for a period of 5
by Years, if research and operational
Pou ihe Including tests in space —

line. allowed to go ahead during that

8 comprehensive disarmament '

:
|
|
|

Deep Strategic cuts: rejected.

Since the chief of Star Wars research,
Gen. James Abrahamson, has already
admitted that no such weapons will be
ready for actual deployment for at least a
decade, the hook is that the Soviets con-
sent to allow Star Wars testing.

Star Wars ban: rejected.

What the U:S. is ‘‘offering’’, then, is
that the USSR agree to abolish the ABM

Treaty. Period.

e The U.S. continues to claim, rhetor-
ically, that it supports the objective of
deep reductions in long-range offensive
missiles. However, the Reagan admin-
istration’s determination to build Star
Wars directly contradicts this goal. If the
U.S. goes ahead with its Star Wars
‘‘shield’’, the Soviets will be forced to
expand and develop their missile forces
in order to maintain an effective deter-
rent.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is clearly sticking
with its own decision to abrogate the
SALT II limits on offensive weapons
systems before the end of 1986.

e On medium range nuclear weapons
in Europe, the Gorbachev proposal calls
for complete removal of all U.S. and
Soviet missiles, and freezing the growth
of the ‘‘independent’’ nuclear strike
forces of France and Britain.

The Soviet insistence that France and
Britain be included in this process is not
academic: both nations belong to NATO,
both point their weapons exclusively at
the USSR, and the arsenafs of both are

arim outlook :
for arms control |

Backgrounder
Fred Weir

expanding and modernizing at an alarm-
ing rate.

The U.S. has nixed every attempt to
involve France and Britain in nuclear
arms control in the past, and appears to
be pursuing this tactic with a vengeance
in the current talks.

e The Reagan administration seems to
have ruled out the possibility of a
comprehensive test ban agreement al-
together. This despite a year-long Soviet
unilateral testing moratorium, and a
flood of support for the idea from around
the world.

The White House has claimed that a
total test ban is valid only as ‘‘a long term
goal’’. However, that’s what it was
twenty-three years ago when Kennedy
and Khrushchev signed the Partial Test
Ban Treaty. At that time, the U.S. and
USSR agreed to continue negotiating
until a full halt to atomic explosions was
achieved. The Reagan administration is

Comprehensive test ban: rejected.

far more retrogressive on this issue than
was President Carter, who had worked
out an acceptable draft of a comprehen-
sive test ban agreement with the Soviets
when the talks last recessed in 1980.

All of this adds up to an across-the-
board rejection of the Soviet arms con-
trol agenda, a set of proposals which
many observers consider the best oppor-
tunity to cut a major nuclear arms deal in
decades.

The total lack of compromise in the

“Reagan position suggests that the hard

right-wing faction in Washington has
finally eclipsed the ‘“‘moderate’’ estab-
lishment — those who are willing to ra-
tionally manage the U.S.-Soviet
relationship.

The key figure in this shift is assistant
secretary of defence Richard Perle, a
man who has been called ‘‘the Prince of
Darkness”’ and “‘the person in charge of
World War Three.”

Perle’s style has been to turn U.S.
arms build-up priorities into specious
‘arms. control proposals’ for pro-
paganda purposes. He was responsible
for the 1982 ‘‘Zero Option”’ farce, a gam-
bit that even former secretary of state
Alexander Haig described as *‘absurd”’
and ‘‘non-negotiable.’’ He also authored
the Reagan administration’s START
proposal, which would have gutted the
Soviet nuclear arsenal while allowing the
U.S. to actually add weapons to its own.

The torpedo just fired into the arms
control process by Washington has
Perle’s fingerprints all over it. If he is
now, as seems the case, in charge of arms
policy, his visceral hostility to any sort of
military limitations or foreign policy
accommodation with the USSR virtually
ensures that there are very dark days
ahead.

NN tat

trie arging that the U.S. is creating a “militarized
lage ee” in the western Pacific, Mikhail Gorbachev

i Week proposed important measures aimed at re-

of ing tension and reducing arms in this crucial arena

big power confrontation.

Gorbachev, in Vladivostok to celebrate Soviet

is a Day, spoke out against the military alliance that

So veloping between the United States, Japan and
uth Korea. The Pacific, he said, is being turned into
he of nuclear war preparations and the danger of

Nilagration breaking out is steadily increasing.

ay counter this trend, the Soviet leader suggested
an international conference be convened to find
ij “Ys of demilitarizing the region, and building friend-
~~ Telations among neighboring states. The most ap-
be Pilate venue for such a gathering, he said, would

Oshima, site of the first atomic bombing.
Oo] Why should not that city, the first victim of nu-
ie evil, become the Helsinki of sorts for Asia and
© Pacific Ocean?”’ asked Gorbachev.

fe In addition to calling for a general security con-
"eNce for the region, the Soviet leader made a num-

&

‘Nuclear-free Pacific’: Gorbachev offer

ber of specific proposals, most of which could be
quickly acted upon to reduce tensions:

e Pledges of no first use of nuclear weapons, and
establishment of nuclear weapons free zones, par-
ticularly on the Korean peninsula.

“Although two out of three nuclear powers in the
region — the People’s Republic of China and the
USSR — pledged not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons, the United States has deployed nuclear
weapon delivery vehicles in one of the zones of crisis
— in the Korean peninsula and nuclear weapons
delivery vehicles on Japanese territory,’’ said Gor-

bachev.
e Bilateral discussions between the USSR and the

United States aimed at diminishing naval activities in
the region, in particular the operations of nuclear-
armed and nuclear-powered ships. ‘‘In general,”’
noted Gorbachev, ‘‘I would say that if the United
States gave up its military presence in, say, the
Philippines, we would not leave this step un-
answered”. *

e Negotiations between the USSR and China to
lower the level of armed force along the mutual border

of the two nations. Gorbachev noted that trading rela-
tions with China had shown steady improvement, and
expressed respect for Chinese efforts to modernize
their economy and, “‘build in the future a socialist
society worthy of a great people’.

Gorbachev spoke hopefully of improved links be-
tween the Soviet Union and China in future, including
co-operation in space exploration and development.
This could possibly include Soviet training and flight
experience for Chinese cosmonauts.

e Ina surprising move, Gorbachev said he is think-
ing of making Vladivostok — a Soviet naval town —
into an open city, a free port for all foreigners. It
would be, he said, a ‘‘widely opened window on the
East. The words of our great Pushkin — ‘The ships of
every flag and nation will hail our shores’ — will then
apply also to Vladivostok’.

Such proposals are breathtaking in their scope, and
if seriously addressed by the other side hold out the
promise of reversing the disturbing trend toward
greater militarization and nuclearization of the west-
ern Pacific.

PACIFIC TRIBUNE, AUGUST 6, 1986 e 5

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