‘BRITISH COLUMBIA Media, gerrymandering won for Socreds Socreds just hold 1983 vote; NDP strongest in Vancouver By MAURICE RUSH Jhe return of the Socred government Inder Premier Bill Vander Zalm with an Werwhelming majority of seats was the Syult Of a massive media and big business ampaign intended to sell the reactionary emier as a populist who promised a hange from the right wing policies of the Omer Bill Bennett government, and the ryMandering of electoral boudaries. A Close analysis of the election results hows that the election of the Vander Zalm soverMmMent was by no means the massive weep the media ind the Socreds lym. Despite all he hoOpla surround- Vander Zalm nd his “style” and “charisma,” the barely held My tO the popular loge they had in the 93 election. Final Kyults Show that the ed Popular vote tyually dropped lightly to 49.7 per tut from 49.8 The NDP popu- & yote dropped 2.7 ys Cont — from 49 per cent in 1983 as per cent, b ; Mhile the Liberals Nereased their vote SKELLY tym 2-7 in 1983 to 5.8 per cent. The New : ts held on to many of the working lass 2Teas but dropped their percentage \te 12 Some interior and Vancouver Island boints- They showed great strength in the Vancouver ridings, returning all their seats ih P18 majorities and threatening the Candidates in close races in other A VANDER ZALM The Media gave a big play to the Liberals 4 dis election, hoping that they would \phOM Off some of the votes which might lave One to the NDP. This was a factor Npich helped the Socreds. The Significant thing about this election is t despite the weak and faltering leader- p 1M the early stages of the NDP cam- ug, 4Nd the massive build up for Vander 4m by the big business media, anti-Socred lotets TOlled up a very large vote, demon- aun that they were not taken in by nia” and remaining solidly pod to Social Credit policies. » the New Democrats won 20 yts, "Wo less than they had at dissolution. -—__ Analysis could affect the outcome in a number of ridings where the contest was close. What Vander Zalm’s campaign mainly succeeded in doing was to retain the 1983 Socred popular vote by winning back to the Socred fold voters who had been alienated by the Bennett government. Polls taken early this spring indicated that the Socreds were running eight to 10 per cent behind the New Democrats and Bill Bennett was run- ning even further behind. Defeat stared them in the face. The manoeuvres carried out by the right wing forces which led to Bennett’s resignation, the holding of a Socred leadership convention, and the cho- ice of Vander Zalm as the man best able to lead the Socreds back to power, essentially succeeded. Unfortunately, a major reason for the success of Vander Zalm and the Socreds was the strategy adopted by the new Demo- crats in the two years prior to the election. Much criticism has been made of Bob Skelly during the election campaign but the real criticism should lie with the NDP lead- ership which followed the same strategy which led to the defeat of Dave Barrett in 1983. The roots of the New Democrats’ failure to win the government in 1986 go back to the post-1983 election when the top leadership failed to learn the lesson of that election and carried forward the same stra- tegy under Skelly. The theory behind the NDP strategy was to play down issues, avoid any controversial policies, adopt a middle of the road stance and attempt to convince business that it had nothing to fear from an NDP government while keeping labor at arms length — all this in the hope that this strategy would win over middle voters. Since the NDP leader- ship adopted this strategy the New Demo- crats’ popular vote in the last three elections has declined steadily: in 1979 it was 45.9 per cent; in 1983 it dropped to 44.9 per cent and in 1986 to 42.2 per cent. The failure to come forward with strong alternative policies allowed Vander Zalm to outflank the NDP when the election was called, and appear to be on the left of the NDP ona number of issues. He promised to reduce the sales tax on some items; pro- posed cheaper beer for the working man; called for an investigation into whether the province was adequately taxing the forest companies; posed as a friend of labor, and claimed he was left-of-centre on social Of the road stance.9 Much criticism has been made of Bob Skelly during the election MP@ign but real criticism should lie with the NDP leadership which #OFE the election followed the same strategy which led to the defeat ve Barrett — to avoid any controversial policies and to adopt a E the difference of only 7.5 per cent in "te between the Socreds and the 2. Socreds won 49 seats to the This is largely explained by the = £0vernment’s scandalous gerry- ture Which added 12 new seats to the of 4 ost of the new seats were the “Oubling up ridings in strong On, the Socreds took 11. d Shee also a scandal, with W of ids of voters left off. Section rpaer ¢Plctions Act allowed people to toed ty, Cf On election day if they pro- ifthousan gles of identification and tens vil not j,, © °f People did so, Their ballots = ounted until Nov. 4 and they security issues. While this was pure demog- ogy on his part, Vander Zalm attempted to use these issues to appeal to centre and left centre voters, while hiding his real right wing policies. The election only started to turn around in favor of the New Democrats in the last two weeks of the campaign when they real- ized they had to come forward with policy initiatives to challenge Vander Zalm. Unfortunately, even at that point they did not go far enough in adopting more far- reaching policies and a more militant stance. It was a matter of too little, too late. Some recognition of this fact came on elec- tion night from the president of the NDP, Joy Langan, who said, “If we had to do it B.C. Communist Party leader and Vancouver East candidate Maurice Rush addresses supporters at headquarters on election night. over agin, we would have gone on issues.” As early as June, 1985, the B.C. Com- munist Party, in a widely circulated appeal for unity to defeat the Socreds, said: “A winning strategy requires two things: a broad fightback program around which a majority of the people can be rallied — and unity of all anti-Socred forces around an agreed upon electoral policy. ..Unfortu- nately, however, the NDP leadership has not come forward with a strong alternative tion 80 votes are tallied, was Vancouver East 286, Nanaimo 285, and New West- minster 63. However, the Communist Party can be proud of the excellent campaign it con- ducted. Its program for real change founda ready response among voters who in many instances congratulated the party on the stand it took on the major issues. The par- ty’s unity position also won it many friends in the course of the election campaign. &The major need in the coming months will be unity of labor, New Democrats, Communists, movements among women, Native groups and others to fight for the policies that will get B.C. out of the Crisis — we need a massive extra-parliamentary movement for change. 3 program to the restraint policy of the Socreds. If the NDP hopes to form the next government it must adopt a program which will offer a clear people’s alternative to the Socred big business policies.” Unfortunately, the Communist Party’s appeal for unity of labor, the NDP, Com- munists and progressive civic forces around a fighting alternative program was rejected by the top NDP leadership who were bent on pursuing their losing strategy. In the course of the election campaign, the Communist Party carried forward its policy of anti-Socred unity and appealed to voters all over B.C. to reject the Socreds and gave critical support to the election of an NDP government. At the same time it brought before the people a program for real change. Communist Party public meet- ings were held in many ridings, and candi- dates were heard in radio interviews and given local media coverage. Over 60,000 pieces of literature were distributed, includ- ing 9,000 copies of the pamphlet by Ben Swankey, “The Two Faces of Vander Zalm” which was produced in the first week of the campaign and did a major job of exposing his right wing record. There were also scores of radio spots and some local newspaper ads. In the three ridings where the Commu- nist Party ran candidates a major job was done to popularize the party proposals to deal with the crisis facing B.C. With the threat of a Socred victory hanging over the voters, the Communist vote was not a true reflection ‘of the support it had among working people for its policies. However, in the two-seat ridings of Vancouver East and Nanaimo the vote increased because scores of New Democrats gave one of their two votes to the Communist candidates. In the single-seat New Westminster riding, where anew NDP candidate was in a tough fight to prevent the seat from going Socred, some left wing workers who support the Com- munist Party’s policies did not vote for the party’s candidate. The final vote, before Sec- The question now arises: where do we go from here? The fact we must face is that the same right wing, pro-big business crowd which ran B.C. before and imposed its right wing policies, are back in power with a bigger majority than before. The issues fac- ing the people of B.C. before Oct. 22 are still there. They did not go away because of the election, the results of which make the tasks we face all the more difficult. The major need in the coming months will be unity of labor, New Democrats, Communists, progressive civic forces and movements among women, tenants, educa- tors, youth, native peoples, anti-poverty groups, and others, to fight for the kinds of policies B.C. needs to get out of the crisis. B.C. needs a massive extra-parliamentary movement of the people to press for needed change. They need to demand of NDP MLAs that they mount an effective opposi- tion to the right wing policies of Vander Zalm and the Socreds. The large anti-Socred vote rolled up in Vancouver on Oct. 22 demonstrates that Vancouver need not go the way B.C. went. When the civic election rolls around Nov. 15 the people of Vancouver can defeat the Socred machine which runs under the banner of the Non-Partisan Association. The election of a progressive majority and Harry Rankimas mayor on Nov. 15 would give the people an important victory over right wing forces and help turn the tide in B.C. against right wing, big business poli- cies. What is needed above all in the remain- ing days until the civic vote is unity of all progressive forces. The lesson of Oct. 22 is the need for unity and support of strong progressive policies, both of which have been put forward by the Committee of Pro- gressive Electors. Maurice Rush is provincial leader of the Communist Party in B.C. and was the party’s candidate in Vancouver East in the Oct. 22 election. PACIFIC TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 29, 1986 e 3